Eastern Illinois University

The Keep
Historia
1997

Historia Vol. 6
Eastern Illinois University Department of History

Follow this and additional works at: https://thekeep.eiu.edu/historia
Part of the History Commons

Publications

HISTORIA
A Journal of the Eastern Illinois University History Department

The Epsilon Mu Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta
Vol. 6

1997

4

5

The (Not So) Poor Knights of the T em ple

tlie gn:;1t religious leader, Bernard of Clrur\'au.--. On-~ or Bernard's

Scott .r. JJeem.
Sco11 Beem graduated with a Master in Arts in l11slory
ji-0111 Eastern111/nafs in Spring 1997. Ti11s a11a!ysis ofthe
7'cmp!ars in I/le Holy L.1nd and in Europe was wrrcren for
Professor Boifoy Young's me1/icvo! history semin<rr in
Spring J996.
he Knights Tcmplar presem historians with on interesting
if mu..-ly· subjccl. The litcrnturc dc,·oted to this militar•reli&>ious order, though usually quite we!l.rcscnrch~d.
rcmnins steeped in folklore. These legends include nil monncr of
bizarre prnctices, nnd links Lo such divers &'Toups as the infamous
Cult of Assassins, the Mcrovingi~n d)'113Sly, and the Frccmosons.'
Ho"e,·cr if we foous our al!cntion on the his:orical Tcmp!ars, we
find a unique milicnry order which nchiC\·cd remarkable successes
during its existence. These accomplisluuents included not onlv
militnry vie.torics, buL the creation of an international supply
network linking Latin Europe ~with the lauds of Outrcmcr. It
all?'~·ed tl1e Templars to take advru11agc of ccrlai n political,
rchgious and especially economic rcnlitics created by the success
or the First Cru..~ade. The fonnation ru1d evolution of this
nclwork, its function, ~nd its makeup nrc the focus of 1his stud~·.
The Poor Knights of tlte Temple of Solomon rose quickly
power. Jn 1119, Hugh de Paycns nnd eight other kni£:hts began
protc.::ting pilgrims on the treacherous roads of the Holy Land.'
King Bald\\in of Jerusalem welcomed these pious warrior-monks
and granted them la\'ish quaners on the site of the Tcmpk of
Solomon.' Despite this splendor, the new Order lived by the Rule
of St. Augustine, binding them lo the Church instead of scculal'
authorities. The Templars toiled rmd fought in relati,·c obscurit\'
during 1heir first years before rco:i\"ing enthusiaslic support fro~

T
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grcmest pntrons was Hugh, Counr of Champagne, a Templ nr who
4
had granted the monk the land for his monnstcry.
In 11 28, afier some corrcspondenc() witl1 Bernard and other
church dii,'llitarics, a council met in Troyes to give the Tcmplars
o11icial sta\us.' Bernard himself helped draw up the original
Tcmplar Ruic, based on that of the Cislercian Order.~ This Ruic
combined '"those who pray", the !irst medieval estate with "those
who fight", the second, lo produce a religious order dedicated to
prccccting the faithful nnd righting the infidel. Ideally it would
confer on its followers honuony between sword and nliar. The
Templors would be<:ome .. Knights of Christ."
Establishing the Mcm1s
The Council of Troyes coincided with an cxl·~nsi,·c charitable
campnisn in Western Europe. The Tcmplnrs were well-placed to
ta.\;c :xl,·anlnge of the oulflow of donations to the Church which
occurred in the twcl Clh century. Witl1in twenty years the
Tcmplors had estnblishcd estates tliroughout Europe, o.nd were
funneling supplies, fw1ds, and men to the Holy Land.
The success of this eompai!,'ll is more casilr understood when
one recognizes 1hc ch:mi;ing mentality of cmsading Europe.
Economically, Europe wos in a stage of transition from gift to
prolit economy.' Attitudes, especially among the nobility, lcnded
to fnvor n system of reciprocal exchange similar to tl1ose
documcn1cd by anlhropologists among traditional sociclics.•
Kings, dukes, nnd counts showed tlieir appreciation for a cause or
person ruid dernonstrotcd 1heir onn generosi•y by bestowing
donotions end presems. William Marshall, in the years when he
lived by his sword (l 160-11 80), showered gifts frocly upon
fellow knights nfler successful tournaments, even though he was

S1rphc:n I fO\Vl'lrJ\~ 71,, Kulgl1ts Te1:1plJri)lc"' Yor~ 1982). 49.
1

Rcadcrs

inlcr~slt:d

in lhis tl:Spc.:t o[ the subject sho1J!d COr'IS'J h nnv of ttie

11c:r.:011J111y \vcrks ci1ed hcrc\!lf\cr.

•

:p4:lel' Po.11ocr, 1'/H1 K1tigl1ts Te.n:p.'ar aud "'";' ~~vth (Ro~hc::;tcr, \'crmont,
1989).3
•ci..i., 34.

1

P~nni::1. Tl:e .t.:n;g!rts T.:111piar ~r.d their ,\!)tit, S.
'Ibid .. 6.
'Lester K. Lillie, Religl<>:t1 Pol-·erty ana r/11t P~lit Ecano111y ht i\·fqdi~t.·al
E:11rope (ltlt:!;l.:.3, Nc\v l'ork, 1978). ch. l .
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or1en in debt 10 O!hers.9 Thus, lhc oris1ocra1ic c1hos d~111 011ded
frcqucnl donation of c~laies and money withoul regard of
economic relum.
The Tcmplors reputation nnd lhc cause lhcy defended
designntcd thern as a prime targcL for such giCt-gi\'ing. They were
initial!'• pcrcei,·cd as '"poor knights" engaged in a \'Cl)' noble and
holy endeavor, which helped co build their patrimony. Bernard
embraced the Tcmplars because 1mlike other knigllls, thcv were
not barbarous pilloscrs living in excess, who would !mer seek
absolution from the Church. High rnnking nobles and churchmen
responded i=-0siti1·cly to lhc Templar image as well, e1·en if there
wns some apprehension about '·fighting oonb." Wmiors saw
the Order as a new and better path lo sn!Yntion. rncy could toke
up the sword for Christ imd continue as knights, instead of
singing ond 111-iring in Lhc monostcry.
'11ie \'cry !irst grams preceded the Council of Tro:'cs.
Theobald, Cowil of Blois (also nephew ~nd successor to the
Templor Hugh, former Count of Champagn~) gr:i:itcd lhc Order
"a house, grange, and mer,dow, together with one lcncmcm of one
carueate, al Barbonnc..., as well as conceding to his own \'ossals
the right to make gifls from their 01111 fonds."' 0 Hugh de Paycns,
Grnnd :Master, gave up hls own holdings to Ilic Order, and
campaigned for more granls.
He rca:ived lands almost
immediately from \\iilliam Clito, Count o[ Flanders, ns well as
holdings in Anjou and Poitou. 11 Hugh campaigned in England as
well, receiving sc\'eral grnnts, including the originnl London
Temple." All of these initial gifts came in 1127-28 as Bcrnnrd
and Hugh were seeking official recognition.
Early donors co the Order included some of lh~ greatest lord~
in Christendom. Henry I and Stephen, Kings of England, r.1ade
substamial giils to the order, as did Eleanor of Aquitaine."
Lesser European nobles embraced the Templars, and the Order
soon established prcccptories throushout the West. l'crhnps the
'Gc:crges Duty. Jl'UHara A./ars.110/l· 1110 Fl~r~r ufChiRJlry f.'le~\· 'tor~,
1985), I t0-1.
lt-f\.1':~kolm Barb~, 11u: ,V..·•v K11igh1hood: ;I His/Ory ~l' J/,e Ora\:r o_{ Jh~
1'.:Jup!c (Ca1nbrid~c~ 19911), 13.

''li>id.• 13.
1
:1 lo\\'3r1h, The .':nithL• Te1nph:,., 64.
"S.rb=r. The ,V.rw KntgJ;1!iaod, ~4-6.

most fomous grant was that of Alfonso I of Aragon, "ho left
them one-third of his kingdom." Though the gesture impossible
to in1plcme11t, it strongly illustrates this initial cntlmsiasm :1mong
the nobility.
Poorer la,·nten expressed generosity towards the Templ~rs
also. Donations from the former included smns as low as one
d;:nier, as well a.s sm:ill estates, horses, annor, and weaponry."
Go·cal church dignitaries also made generous gifts.
The
Archbishop of Reims, and Bishops or Soissons and Angers <1ll
made early contributions comprising coin and certain prolitnble
burial rislns. 1 ~ In the 1130s, Pope Innocent ll donated a mark of
~old (a subslantial sum) annually, while his Chancellor gaYe two
~unccs of gold. Archbishops, bishops, and abbots were
encouraged to given rnark orsil\•er. J't
Perhaps neatly as importam as granls of land and monC)' were
the many pri,·ilegcs and exemptions extended to the Templars.
In England, King Ste(lhcn exempted lhc OrdeT from all lllxes.
This l>Olicy w;is further strengthened by a charter granted by
Richard the lion-Heart in 1189, later renewed by John Lackland,
by Herny Jlf, imd by Edward 1.1s These privileges included
freedom of warren, waste, and regard, as well as the right to
impose lines and punishments within their holdings.' 9 In Wales
these rights led to entire' illages coming wider the control of the
Tcmplnrs. a process "11ich surely had p<'.rnllels throughout the
West. ' 0
The Church \\'OS noL to be ouLdone by the secular magnates in
the granting of privileges. lnJ!ocent H not only confirmed the
Ruic of the warrior-monks, he codified their extensive privileges
"ith the papal bulls, Omne a'a111m optimum. Milites r empli, aud
,'..fi!itla lkf." These granted collection righcs to Tcmplars,
pcnnission to 1~kc tithes, obligations, and burial righlS in pl:ices
~Purl11\!1', T/,e K':igl!J.<: 1'.:111p/,1r u.nd their Al)'t/J,

1
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Bar~r, 111~ i\'e-w ,r:11Fglrt/inr;:l, 24-5.

'%:d.. 23.
'"lt"1.. S6.
1

*1 (O\\'arlh, The j«:nighl.i 1"n11pldr,

2.31-8.

"~oid , 23R.
1
''~illi:11n Rd.'.s, A Histol')• nf 1/u; OrJe.r of!•il. Jc>'"'' ofJtJr1t.aalent Ir:
•l1rd <»11/u, il'elsh Sorder(C.lrdi«. l 9·17).48·51.
:iaarbcr, Tho! Jt.:e1Af J:uil('1tl:<>nd, ~s.

n1tn'e.r
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" ·h<re they had ornlorics, the power lo arroinl their 0\111
chaplains, and exemption from the controls of locnl bishops.u
Generous grnnls of land and coin, lax c.~emptions, and
ecclcsias1ic.1l pri\'ileges were the foundation of a vast economic
nel\\'O:k which would supply the Templars i11 the Holy Land.
Pro\'iding for a permanent lighting presence in the Enst was nn
im::1ense nncl costly enterprise. But this largesse carried a
ncgali,·c cost as well. It lead lo some tarnishing of the Tcmplar
image, the result of jealous ~ccusations and rescno11cn1, gn-ci1
unfortunate credence by cases of abuse within the order. These
problems long remained secondary·, offset by the srcat wsk
widcnnkcn b)' the Templars. By the middle of the twc lfi.h
century, the situation of lhe crusader states was becoming more
and more critical.
Needs in the East
The Templar presence in lh~ Ouircmcr grew aficr 1130.
They quickly became a prominent fo.."tUJ"e on the lnndscopc of the
crusader kingdoms. assuming larger ;md more complc." roles. By
the close of the twelfth century the Templus were no longer
mostly concerned with prolecting pil;,'Tims; they were now
building custlcs, mounting campaigns against the Muslims, and
advising the King and his barons as well. One csumate of
Tcmplar numbers counts "600 knights and 2,000 scrtcants on
ncti\'c service in the cast"·· nn enormous standing force al thal
lime." The expenses of such an army were diverse and
fom1idablc
Knights were by definition mounted warriors, and calvnry
maintcnnnc.: was a prime concern. This alone must have been a
difficult task in the semi-arid crusader kingdoms. In Burgundy,
a friendlier region for breeding lhe kind ofhea"y destricrs n.:Wed
by heavily annorcd Western warriors, lite cost of equipping and
mamtaining a knight wns about 30 manses (750 acres) in 1180,
and nbout 150 manses in 1260." InOa1ion proved nearly us great

foe ns the infidel. The Order mighl have begun with second·
bvnd equipment nnd donated clolliing, but as it gained
prominence, its need for "stale of the art" equipment increased.
Tcn1pbrs were not c."travasant (indeed their Rule forbade costly
ornament), but their list of equipment was "splendid and
compklc, their lhfog quarters [kept I dean".0' The Rule of the
Ter.iplars proYidcd strict guidelines, includ ing U\) to four horses,

;i

iron hose, a hclmcl or c/1apecm de fer, a sword, a shield,
a lance, a Turkish mace, n surcoat, am1ing jacket, mnil
shoes, and lhr~ knh·cs: a dagger, a bread knife, nm\ n
pocketknife. They may have two caparisons, two shi11s,
two pnirs of brc~chcs and lwo pairs of hose; and a small
b: ll.::6
Other slalutcs within the Ruic detailed eve.rything from
horseshoes and saddles to 1cn1s.
Equipping each knight was only one expense; the Tcmplars
also buih nHlll\" ~tone castles. Some, like 'Atlit and Safod were
c;uile C.'>"tcnsiv~ The Tcmplars maintained and garrisoned thirty·
rwo cnstlcs in Outrcmcr!' Rulers in the West appreciated the
e:-:ocnsc of castles, and recognized the necessity of these great
st~1cl11rcs in mnintaining control over a hostile population. The
Tcmplnrs took cnrc lo publicize their achievements."
The Tcmolrirs were no longer jusl protecting pilgrims, nnd
their expense. accounts rc nectcd the variety and complexity or
the ir expanded mission in the East. EYcn though they lived in
rcktiYe humililv as their Rule demanded, their remoteness from
the Wcsl incrc.Jscd the cost of upkeep. The annual cost for
nrnintaining a knight in Acre was ninety !ivres toumois in 1267.2?
Th~ expense of 600 knights was 54,000 livres 1011rnoi.r, abouL
lm~nly·IWO p~rccnt or the annual income of the Royal Dynasty of

~T1nrr, Th~ .(11igl11.s T'111plar 0•1d lhe.lr !.·fyr11. 14.

''No. 1:;8. Tli< Rul• of1h• 7•n•pluu, l;Rnslo1"1 b~ J.M. Uptcn-Ward (Bury
" Ibid., SS-9; Howorth. The KnightsTemplar, SO.
na.irbcr, 1'1111. t\'Ch/ K11igJuhood.2.
H1bid., 230· 1. One 11'111.nsc n1ca:c;ored the.am<) Unl or land 0 single household

li.:nncd for the local lotd.

S:. Edttlur~d$, 1 ~2), 53.
?"llarb~r, 1/u.·/'t/11w K•tlgl:JJuxxi. 18.
!') Iden Nichelson. T ll•Jt{'lllnr. Hospft,1l!ers. and 1(:u/onic J;1!ig,~t:r: lrnng~.f
of the Mi/i1<1ry Order.r. 112~· / 291 {1.ondo1t 1993), l 06.
;-:;Uarbi:r, T/11: /\'t1w K11;g/1rhood, 232
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France-250,000." And l11is did not include castle maintenance.
Defonding the faith was indeed an ex-pensive cndea\'or, yet the
Ternplars never wanted for proper equipment. They were cvcrrcady to battle the enemies o f Christianity, and prospered in doing
so.

The Network in the West
The expansion o f the Templar's activities requi1·ed a complex
net\\'ork of funding and supply, more advanced than any kno\\n
in the West since the days of Rome. These needs were initiolly
met by spontaneous donations and grants, but. in[rnstructure
quickly dcwlopcd lo administer Templar holdings and look after
their interests.
The extcnsi"c, diversified, and sometimes isolated estates of
the Order in \'.'eslcm Europe required skillful management.
Initially, this system was inspired by the model developed in
Cisterciun monasteries, wil.h a "mother" house keeping oversight
on its "daughter" foundations. This method, however, proved too
inefficient fbr Templar nccds.31 They instead mirrored the efforts
of llteir riq1ls; the Hospitalers, focusing on gco-political
rcalities.>Z At the base of this system \\'ere individual estates
awarded to prcceptorics, local commw1ities living tmdcr the
authority of a ccmmander. Lines of authority bccnmc c()\(ilied,
as each preceptory laid claim to particular parcels of land. The
minister or bt1illi of a preceptory saw to its needs, aml answered
to the Mast.er of the region (such as England or Frnnce).
The specific functions of individual bailli varied from region
to region. Enghmd was a prime source of agricultural wealth for
the Tcmplars. They profited from f,'Tain, fish, and especially
wooI. 33 The Templar's development of the wool trnde mi1rnrcd
that of their Cistcrcian cousins, as they were able to capitalize en
the profits generated when English wool was made into Flemish
cloth. Land acquisitions by the Order in England following the

<lri!!ina\ grnnts illustratcs a policy of c~ploiting this industry."
Th~v purchased properties along continental land routes
\': hc.ne\'cr possible, as bai/lies sought to "consolidate ~nd
. through land lransacucns
.
r. l managcmcn
' L""
r~1 tionaltSc
an d care1u
The house in Proving for example, took advantage o f the
Champagne fairs, the regional center of economic dyn~mism at
that time. The hail!i quickly established a powerful presence
-.•:ithin the tO\\"lt.% Tcmplars e\'cntually ran some cf these
profitable fa irs.
Specific functions of a prcccptcry may have depended on
geography, but certain activities were practiced in every house.
The Western houses rccrnited for the Templar headquarters m
Acre. Sometimes this process became fairly complex. The Order
oft.en attempted to acquire the lands of a particular recruit, and
sometimes that knight wished lo leave his lnnds lo his family.
The Tcmplars were usually willing to negotiate. In on·~ instance
1.hc vou112cr son of a noble m;s promised to the Order, with the
und~rsta;ding that if his older brol11ers all died within six years,
he would return to his family Ciel's and provide the Tcmplars with
a pa'1l1ent or l ,000 sois instead?'
The Temolar houses also commonly collected additional
rc,·cnuc through privileges and rights. Templars ·could fine law·
breakers, and impose taxes which followed the tenets of local
ma~natcs. In one example, the Templars received permission
frn~1 the Cro"11 to raise taxes in Wales. This area, wmscd to a
hc.wy fiscal hand, resisted, embroiling all panies in a morass o f
manctl\'ering and litigation." The Order could also eam income
from their ecclesiastical exemptions. Templnrs might perfom1
burial rights, and through th~ir O\\TI pricsl5, administer the
sacrnmcnls al ce;tain times or the year. They used these rights to
form confraternities.:'' These groups sought salvation (and
c1tjoycd cc11ain tax-breaks) through providing small annual
donations.
Jllbid., 239.
;.~B~u bt..'T, i'1oc llew Kn;gJ;t/Joud, 2 50.

'"ltiid., 232-].

)t,lbi<l,. 262-3.

"Ibid., t9-20.
" Ibid., 20.
nHt>\\'ur1h, Tiu: ;~,1ig/,1s T~111p!ar, "239.

"Ibid., 261.
;\;H.<:cS, A .'-ffstory q.ftlie Order, 4S.
'1>PJ.!11ltt, J7u.: KNigh1s Ternphrr trod :ludr A.f,,vJh, 11-2.
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The Templar network c.'11ibitcd a propensity for ,·crtical
expansion, excmpliii<:<l by 1heir activiti~s in the wool-cloth \rude,
local fairs, and overland irade routes. It should not he surprising
that they soon de\·e!oped na,·al capabilities as well. ·111e Order
poss:sscd houses in the major Allantic ports of Do,·cr, Names, La
Rochelle, nnd Bordcnux. Their presence in the Meditcrrancnn
centered on Marseille, with other key holdings in l1:i1}".>
Esrnblishing a fleet was not only vital for supply and
communications with Am:, but allowed burgeoning Tcmplar
trading enterprises as well.
As \\'ilh their other nctivities, the Templars enjoyed certain
privileges in mnritime commerce. In La Rochelle for example,
Eleanor of Aquitaine allowed them Lo Lrnnsport "freely and
sc.curely, without all customs and all exactions, ci1hcr by lund or
by ,,·ntcr.""
In Marseille, Lhe Tempbrs enjoyed similar
privileges: the freedom to transport pil&'Tims and mcrchanls with
few if any restrictions." In I.he early days, the Order conlractcd
out mnri1ime affairs to mdi,•iduals (chiefly ltahnns). but by 1207
they O\\ncd their O\\TI ships0 The benefits oftrnnsporting for the
Templnrs--guarantced payment, busin~ss, fiscal advantagcs--must
have been tcmpling LO pri,·ate entrepreneurs. Later, \\1t~n thev
owned their O\\TI ships, 01~ Order cenainly hod no problem~
fmding worthy cnpwins. The Tcmplar flcec became so successful
that records mention an official of llie Order in Mnrscille called
"Master of f'11ssages ""
Pcrhnps the most famous (or infamous} piece of Templnr
infras1ruc1ure ll'DS 01e banking network. The development of
effective finru1cinl institutions was the final link in the chain
\\·hich supplied Acre, and shows that the Templars were quick to
embrace the realities of the profil economy. Tcmp!ar banking
e\'oh•ed rapidly, dJi,•en by a need to deal with lhc initial gilts of
coin and property ll1e Order received. TI1e fact that the TcmplarS
were recognized os lhc bankers of the French kings by 1147 (a

mere nineteen year$ afier the Cotmcil of Troyes} illuslralcs this
proi;; "<:.
..._ ~.• .:.~

Tl~ Templ:rrs n~dcd banking, and with the gro\\1h of the
rrofit economy, so did many c!Mrs. It should noi be surprising
thal th-:> Bro1hers became so adept at fmancc. \\iho belier to trust
1hM the knights of Christ?
The Orders Rule sp~eifically
prohibited Brothers from pladng "a fund of money r:n~whcrc
except in the trcnSut)"," to which only 11te Treasurer or Master hnd
access:•• They swore fcnlly to no one, and were objc-cti\'e enough
to broker to hoth the Capetians and Angevins simultaneously.
The kings, nobility, Ol\d merchants o[ Europe [cit secure enough
ill the Order 1.0 deposit jewelry, g<>ld, and silver within 1he
•
41
preccptoncs.
.
.
. .
The Orders function ns " depository was JtiSl Lhe bcg1nnmg.
Ti:eir m::ul\' localions throughout Christendom allowed for the
transfer or" funds in a primitive c~it or checking system." The
Tcmpl:tr network began financing loans for both kings and the
Church. The cnisadc of Louis \Ill is an early example. The king
had spent n=ly all of his money by the time he rc:iched Antioch
in March of I 148. 111c Templars oITered hom assistance and
borrowed from locnl merchants on lhe security of their
possessions.'> Lalcr, Louis ordered his regents in France lO settle
pymcnt \\~th the Temple in Paris. The Capctians continued their
financiJI link with them umil King Philip IV brutally suppressed
theOrdcr in 1307.
The papncy olso found Templar banking useful. Houses of
the Order were depositories for imponant docwncnL5, treasures or
relics, and funds. A fier the schism of 1167, the popes tumcd LO
the Tcmp!Jrs 10 help linnncc activities.so The expertise of the
Order led to Tcmpl~r Cllbfcularii adininistcring to papJl banking
from 1163 011wnrds, illcluding the tabulation of revenues and
Gnancing of lolns.s• The importance of this relationship is best

':P~nn ::r, 11ir: K11ise_l1IJ r~1'1plM e1.11d tlrt:ir .•11)ti1~ 11 .

;~Uorbct,

Tiu: ·""·~w Kniglrtlrood: 250· l.

''lhid.. 26.
AJlbid .• :'!37.
O(hicJ,. 237,
M(bid .. 238,

"'No. 335, T/r~ flu!.: of Ilic: Ten1plors, 9-1
"'Ho\\':lnh, Th~ 1:111glr1s T.:111pf:J,., 240· l.
"ibid.,~ I .
4
'Barbcr, Tlr'"· .l\rqw K11tg/J1J:wd. 67.
!1bid.,277·8.
" lO:c!,, 21a.
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illustrated by 1hc foct that Tcmplar c11/Jic!l!arit were left alone
during the Orders persecution nnd expulsion."
The Tcmplor financial in~titutions continued to grow
(hrougholll the Order's existence. By Lhc middle or the thinc·: nlh
century, they numbered the growing merchant class among their
dicntclc. These merchants \\Crc more concerned with the
Tcmplars as finnncicrs, than wi1h their no\\· obsolete claim as
"poor knights of Ch rist.'" Banking had bcco:l\e a ncccssnry
adjuv:mt to the e.xercise of power i11 Europe, and the Tcmplars lcd
the way. Many still cherished the volues associated with the old
system of gift exchange, however, and sco:ncd profit as ignoble.
The Order's success in finance was vital to their support of the
continuing Cru~nde in the East, yet it :ilso sowed t.hc seeds of
their eventual destruction by wc:ikcning their old, knightly
virtues.

The finnncinl network asswncd such an important role in
Europe, it is not surp:ising thal Tcmplars becam; 1nrsted ad;~sors
to the greatest lords. The aforementioned rcb1ionships "ith the
papacy offer an ecclesiastical example. King Loui s VII o[ France
not only looked lo the Tcniplars for financial oid during his
Crusade, they were his military ndvisors in the Holy Land as well.
They also advised Richard the Lion Heart during the Third
Crusade, and acted as his honor guard.s.i He e,•cn tra\•ebl
disguised as n Tcmplar on his way back Lo England (but was
recognized i11 Austria)." ln Lo~.don, the King's Council orten
met at the Temple. lt wa;; here the Templar Master ancmpted to
reconcile Henry I! and Thomas Bccket. 56 William :-1nrshnll. Earl
of Pembroke was close friend to the Master of Engl:ind, Aimcry
de Sainte-Maure, and as:.-umed the Templar mnn1lc before his
dcath.s' The Templnrs profited by such relationships, \\i1ich
helped to further strengthen all aspects of their network. Bt:t the
Brothers came to discover that the fo,·or of kings Md popes was

nw1.:d«i1m Ba:rl.lct, 711e Trial of1hc ·1~1nplun (Cam':Jrid£C, 1978). ?2.
)iNi<t:hCl$On, T~lilf'lars, /fo.~pUoller.f and7'eu.'ou.:e K11ig/ifJ, 1:S.
)JHO\..·arth, r;,., K1Jighl:J Te.wpf(Jr, l 7t.1-7.
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"Ibid .• 241.
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a fickle and dangerous business, when Philip IV offr:lllce mmcd
on them and Clement V subsequently abandoned U1em.
Despite its cfficicnc)', the Templnr network in its heyday hnd
both problems and critics. Dignitaries were somctinics accused
or being greed:' or com1pt, o[ c.xploiting their privileges. Local
clcrg_v olicn complained thnt. Tcmplars intruded on their territory,
offering discount burials and other holy services.'" Some
Weishmcn compl~ined that Templars let too many burgesses into
their frntcmal order, thus exempting them from local laxcs. 5~ The
realities of banking also presented problems. Jenn Sire de
Join.,.ille, chronicler of St. Louis threatened a Templar treasurer
"~th an nxc to ri;cci\'e cosh foc a !c:on promised to his lo:d.6> II
seems the lvfos1er had died in combat., nnd the Marshal and
Commander citing a statute requiring lhe Mi1stcrs consent on such
transactions, were rcluclnnl to act. The tcmplmion presented by
large sums o[ ready coin must have \YCighed heavily even on the
m~l pious brothers. TI1c notion o[ knights dirtying their hands
with monC\· nrouscd hostility, and Europeans found many aspects
of banking un·Christian or nmornL They were not ready ior all
the implications or a profit economy-" Tcmplars were ollcn
represented as too greed)', too rich, and LOO proud; in reality they
had adapted Loo quickly to changing economic conditions.
Ho"· successful was the Templar network, this great medieval
corporation? The Brothers in Acre never lacked equipment and
rccniits, despite some devastating losses over U1e yc~rs. They
built "at least 870 castles, prcccptories, ond subsidiary houses"
and Look care of pens ioners chroughout Europe. 6' They were
\\·cnhhy enough to buy the island of Cyprus from King Rfolrnrd
(although were unable to hold on co it) ..s A final, if ironic
~ample of the effcctivcrn:ss of the network occurred after the
Tcmplar's demise. Tiie French crown ordered the Hospirnllcrs,
who inherited most Templar properties and wealth to pay n sum
~;Pulln1.-r1 77J~ tj:iglrls 7(..,npl.va11d !luWAlyzlt, 12.
';Rccs.A ififr~.;o/1!1e Ortltr. SO.
'°"Jean Sire de Jo:llvillt, Tlr1 History o.fSt. Lo1t!s, tr~nsfal~ by Jo.to Evans

(loodon, l 93Rl, 113-4.
1
" Liulc:, Religiou:sPover1y, 35-46.
6?lJ.:'.l1bc:r. Tire Trial of t11 r 1<r11plnrs: 1·2.
"'H0\\"311h. 7,',.: K11fgl1u Tf'JJl/•lar. i 73.
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of 310,000 bvrcs 10,,rr.ois from 1313 10 1318." O'·cr 1hc course
ofnooul 200 years, lhc Tcmplar ncl\\Ofk con~,olidatcd i1s holdings
to exploit supply and demand "hilc taking advantage of d istinct
pri\'ileges. It prO\·idcd shipping and c,·cn built its own Ot-ct and
it dc,•elopcd and h~rnesscd an ad\':10ccd array of banking
institutions, and provided ad\'icc nnd guidance 10 the first two
cslntcs.

T he M en nr the Network

In ccnccption :md structure the Templnrs responded well to
the 11;:w realities of Crusading Europe. tlugh de Paye~ .h.ad
prcdicled at the onset that, gwen Church appro~al, the nooility
wo·J!d cnthu~iastically s upport the Tcmplnrs. He proved to be
rioht mid the Order profited Crom the still potent girt economy,
b:t Hugh also unders tood the inherent dang~r~ . Several slatutes
within the original Tcmplar Ruic prolub11cd the pcrsoMl
cxchan~c o r gins, for cx:imple.6' Hugh's vision nnd pmdcnt
Jc<tdcrship set the precedent for effective administration of
Tcmplar p~cccptorics in the West.
.
·11ie rapidlv. ~
• rowinob network wns closcl~· tted to the by
!vtighthoo~." TI1e Tcmplars undoubted!~ offer~d avenues ~I
111>w~d soci:1I mobilily to small l:indo\\1ung knights. As tls
prcsli!:~ quickly mounted, the Order accorded talented lesser
knit'.hts nc\\' p:11hs to power and inOuencc. In Europe there was
ort~;, Jin lc distinction between the knights proper, who took
rnonnsue ,·ows, and fraternities of 'married brothers', who helped
adminis1cr cstntes.68 These men could continue in a similar
JifosLdc, while enjoying the benefits of the Order. Sergeants or
b:-oti;crs in scf\ ice could occupy multiple positions in the
nclwork. In England, where the Order was chiefly collO!med
\\ith agriwliurc, they were smiths, tanners, shepherds, g::mlncrs,
:md cowherds." Such members arc comparJblc to the conw:rsi·working Inv brothers of 1hc Cistercion monaslaries. In the
Mcdilc;ran~an, 1hc mariner Roger of Flor, designated a sergeant
by the Order, captnincd a Templar ship for years.'0 The rest of
Lhc fictt \\'aS probably commanded by similar men. The
mb1c:ilai1i who assisted the papacy tu1doubtedly trained in
monasteries. As time passed, the Order lhus crune to engage in
diverse and complex activities; to allrnct members from a varicly
of social backi,'l"ounds.
At its upper echelons, the Order displayed an impressive
knack for acquiring land and engaging in cffecti,•c commerce. IL
is unfortunalc that there arc not more demi led records of the men
#

Who were the men who created and facilitated this \'ast
nct\\ork? They certaiPJy were 11ot the same sort of 1!lneratc,
crude and undoui>tedly fonalienl men who went off to light in the
Enst.
Y cl th;y cor.1rihu!cd to this perception themselves,
describing 1hcmselves as "simple nnd ignorant" right up lo the
time of their suppression."' Tcmplars in lhe Wcsl were often
older, cslablishcd in their region, and skilled at pnrticul ar
fwictioas.
Their talcnls might include literacy, financial
knowledge. agrjcultural e.xpertise, or seamruiship. An inlri!,'Uing
dichotomy deYeloped bctwocn the fierce warriCt·monks \\hO
lra\'cllcd 10 Acre an-0 the brethr~n supplying them iu Europe.
Hugh de Payens, first ~foster of the Tcm pie, p::csents nn
interesting portrnil of the effce1ivc administrator. Alihough the
first years or the Order were spent iu relative pO\·eny nnd
obscurity, the /\faster hnd n plnn. His tics to Counl Htigh o(
Champagne as a fom1cr vassal, and Bernard o f Clain·aux helped
to (,'Uantnlcc his ambitions for the Temple. Hugh's inilinl
campaigns in the West around the lime of the cotmcil of Troves
illustrate a good understanding of 1he realities of cstablishini;. an
Ord:r such as the Tcmplars. He appears to have been well ,·crscd
in secular and ecclesiastical politics; he was acmely aw~re of
m ~ny of the criticisms of the knightly c lass, and seemed to
undcrslnnd some of the prC\'Jiling economic trends. ft is perhaps
a Stretch lo state Oiat Hugh and his colleagues completely
understood the transition Crom girt lo profit economy, but they
were qui le aware of certain changes.
~38:rbcr, The TritJi ~f:he T~1'1plars, 2) 1..2.
UJ>lrtncr~ T1re !01ightsTnnplar af/J thti r ... fyc/,, 15-.
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who enac[cd lhcse policies. We know uboul the Grand Masters,
who were sometimes illiterate and usually concerned with
mililary opcrnlions in Acre. We know somc(hing of pnrticular
]l.foslcrs, such as Aimcl)' of Engbnd, ns well.

T

he loss of Acre in 129 1, the last Christian port of Outrcm:::r,
signified a new and noxious moment in Tcmplnr h!stOI)"
Their rniso11 ci'erre was compromised al a time when the
crusading ideal itself had become corrup1cd.
During the
Thirteenth Century, kings and popes had used crusades 10 achic,·c
political and e\·en persona.I ends. Perhaps the foremost of these
was the Albigensi~n Crusade, in which the barons of ::-lorthcrn
France plundered the bnrons of the South, ostensibly to combat
hm:sy. In tl1is climate, the Templars, now a wealthy, wcll-rumcd,
independent institution, with a presence throughout Euro1>c,
aroused suspicion and jealousy.
Were they really dangerous
to Europe's rulers? Scholars debate this point and ccm·; to
d ifferclll conclusions. Many org11c lhal the Templars were
relatively weak militari ly by this time, but d id commanded vasl
economic pom,T. Perhaps they could have cnn·cd oul the ir O\\TI
stale somewhere, given the time and moli \·ation. 13ut Jacques de
Molav,
. the Inst Grnnd Maslcr, was still co:1cemed with mo1mlin!!
..
a return c:<pcdition to the Moly L:md when the Order was
suddenly suppressed.' '
In 1307, Philip IV of France chnrgcd the Tcmplars with a
sinister nrray of crimes, including heresy, worship of idols ond
demons, and sodomy. Wilh the rcluctanl assent of 1hc papacy 1he
King arrested every Templ01 he could find. To1ture was used lo
extort confessions, and the Grand 1'.foster, proclaiming his
innocence was bumed al the !he stnkc. The initiJI reaction to 1his
throughout Europe was shock and disbelief. Various kmgs,
princes, and dukes were happy lo devour t.IJe remains of Tcmplnr
holdings, however, once guilty verdicts were followed by Pope
Clcn1em V's agreement to ban 1hc Order and diwibutc its assets.
Perhaps the most intrii.'lllns question concems the true aims
and goals of lhe Order. Did some Knights of the Temple indeed
lose faith in !he Crusade, and become ~i1ic<1J about their
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mission'' Considerable c\·idence shows lhal t.hcir activit.i.c.<,
iuitially, were centered with supplying nnd .rinnncmg an ongom.g
-ru>~dnH! cff::>:t Outrcmer. Bui by the tlurtccnth cc11lu1y, their
: ,. r)d " ;s changing. Jenious enemies whiSpcred these nm ·,
0
wc;ilth-.· knights were the milil:l!)' orm of a myslcrious esoteric
n-dcr
~a lied the /'11urre de Sien, with sinister .,.
plans in\'olving
,,_. ~
I t11c
,
Hoh· La:!d nnd the rightful kings of Fra11cc. ' Al thous 1 sucn
dai~is remain suspect and unpro,·cn, the rumors weakened
support for tlic Orccr at a time when tl1e Cru~adcs all sc:::med to
fail Philip )V's need for money coupled with Tempfor wealth
made them a tempting target.
The Order of the Temple was conceived \\ith an imprcssh·e
unccrstandmg of politics, economics. and religion. As it c\'olvcd,
it ;rrcw into a ,·ast mcdie,•al corporntion c:;ipable of profiling
white sustaining an expensive wnr effort in a distant land. The
admin istrators of th·~ TcmplM economic nclwork were able to
!J.: ncfit from the lingering nspccts of the older gift economy,
whik Jdapting ~nd contributing to the growing profit economy.
By the beginning of the Fourteenth Century, \\ith the Holy Lnnds
lost. the great and mighty Order o f the Temple was suddenly
cxp~scd in a glaring, unfriendly, nnd dangerous light. They hnd
lost Outrcmcr, but continued to generate large profi ts. A
powerfi.il inslitution of "warrior-monks" \\ hose l,>TCalest
accomplishm:!nl '"ns ftna.nci:il gain , \\'ilS too slurtling n paradox
to survh·e in medieval Europe.
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Pastors And Pestilence:
lVIartin Luther's Views on the Church,
Christians and the Black Death
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.oapr:r. 1Jir1uen jOr J>rofessor Jo): Kt111111U'!t'ling's sc111inar
0'1 the Jlenaissance and the Rcf1Jr11iation. anal)'Zcs
l.i1thcr 's n·ritings on the b ubonic plague.

I

n ihe lote twentieth ccmury, it is difiicult or impossible to
comprehend folly the.intense horror and consuming fair that
m usl hJ\'C accompanied outbreaks of the bubonic plague in
Europe. Nothing in todny's world compares with the threat this
contagion posed in the Middle Ages and the earlv modern cm.
With no pmiculru- warning or explanation, the bla~k de~tb swept
in successi\'e wa,·es across the continent from the mid-fourteenth
centmy until well into tl1e 1700s. Most historians agree th~
plague cnmc to Europe from East Asi3 aboard trading ships. But
no mancr ils origin, ihe plague left behind <>hastlv deslniction.
Entire cities were pnralyzed by epidemic~ Some villa ges
disappeared altogether. In the end, between one-third and o~e
half of Europe's population died from this rclcnllcss killer
The \'cry worst of the plague's molly outbreaks occurred in
the 1340s, but the disease continued to resurface in the sixteenth
century, while Marrin Luther and the Rcfomrnlion sought to
change many of the Christian church's fundamental tc:ichings.
Ccnainly few . C\'Cnts in this period would so likely p~o\'Ok~
rchg1ous qucstrons as a bout with the plague. The plni,'l1c touched
Luther's life most closely when it su11ck Wittenberg in August
1527. He mcnlioncd the disc"sc regularly in his sermons and
other \\Titings, partic.ularly in discussions of Genr?sis.
The unum~lic experience of nn cruplion of plague took a
deep emotiona l mll on the lives of believers, shaping-and no
doubt shaking-their mornl and religious outlooks, as well us their

supcrs 1i1ions. Appcnmnce of the plague confronted Europeans
with sudden, incxplicnlllc d·~ath. The mere suggestion of a plague
infection, not surprisingly, could send a village into near hysteria.
This study \\ill argue, through Lutl1er's own words, that he
b:lie,·cd one's response to the pl~guc was :m imponant
d·:monstmtio11 of Chri stian compassion. An ouibrcak of plague
mnrkcd a time of heightened responsibilities for commwuty and
church lc.1dcrs. Luther knew the black death called on Christians
to show tl1;ir lo\'Cand faith as few otlicr c,·cnts could.
There is a wealth of academic literature on the bubonic
pllguc in the Middl: Ages, exploring in-dcplh the disease ;;ml its
histmv. Medical demits are of little importance to this paper, but
we should firs! brieny place the plo!ruc's signilic:mcc in historical
1:crspccti,·c. To most Europeans, tlie plague represented more
t!rnn uu occ~sio:1nl nnlural disnsicr. The disease wns a part of
Europe's late m~dic\'nl and corly Rcnnissance cullurc, ns re ficclcd
in the period's art, litcrntw·e, worship and folk customs. An
ubiquitous threat when the plngue struck, it touched every part of
one's life.'
Mortnlity rates Cor plague outbreaks ranged fro:n 30 lo 90
percent or c\•en higher.= At least as frightening ns tl1c disease's
sheer deadliness wns i1s wiprcdictability. The plague could
swe<:p inlo a city or village overnight ruid kill its first round of
victims in Jess than 3 da'" It might remain for months or v;;nish
as quickly ns it 3ppcnrcd. The plague could spread by the bric[cst
louch, and yet some people who cared Cor victims were constantly
exposed but never infected. Furthermore, infection with the
pb!,'tlC "as not alwnvs a death sentence. Some strains of
infection could be bcat~n.
But most who were un fortunntc enough to cntch the black
death died from it. Theories abounded. as lo what brought the
plagu: :ind how to defend oneself agninsl its deadly work. Some
were pseudo-s~i~ntilic. others pure superstition by modern-day
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standards. But the \lest way to escnpc the plngue wns to ficc from
it lly leaving the afflicted area quickly.
Luther knew this, nnd his fullest commcnturics on the disease
arc found in the essay "Vv11ethcr One hfay flee From a Deadly
Plague," \\Tinen in 1527.3 The fourtoci1-page pamphlet was
reprinted in nineteen subscquco1 editions rmd enjoyed "idc
readership, cspccinlly when plague lhrcatencd.
Luther's
composition of the booklet se1vcd a dual purpose: 10 comfort
followers who li\'ed with the pestilence nnd 10 di scuss Christians'
moral obligatiotlS if their communities should become infested.
The black dcnth struck Wiucnbcrg en August 2, 1527.
Concerned for the safety of faculty and students, Elector John
ordered pco fessors and others lo lcnvc for Jena. Luther was net
persuaded by the Elector's request. or the appcnls of his friends.
He decided to stny to minister to the sick and those" ho could not
lca\'c. Luther also helped the city council and lectured lo a small
group of smdcnts who, for unkn0\\1t reasons. remained. 13v
August 19, eighteen people had died, including several who wer~
close lo Luther's family. The wiCc of the mayor died nearly in
L\lthcr's arms. Mnny o( Luthci"s friends lost loved ones, and
others moved far away to escape the pl~gue. Luther's son John,
then a toddler, likely suITcrcd from tl1e plague in September and
rcco,·ered. Luther's daughter Eli7.:ibeth. born in December, died
in less than eight months, prob nbly weakened by her mother's
~-xposurc to the bbck death while pregnanL •
Luther's bcha\'ior during these months of plague, along with
his thoughtful treatise on fleeing the disease, offer compelling
evidence of his dedication to God and his undcrstandine of a
Christian's responsillilities to his brethren. Some schola(s note
that in this period, which marked the tenth anni,·ersarv of the
posting of the Nine1y-Fiw Theses, Luther composed the nowfamous hymn "A Mighty Fo1iress is Our God." The song may
ha\'e been based on Luther's o"n experience in Wittenberg.'
"\Vhclhcr one ma>• flee" was a response lo quesuons raised
by Johann Mess, a Reformation leader in Sibsia, where the plague
'Lur;'1er's fl '01·k.c, vol. 113, I J 5-38.
'Jbid; l,Jtther'.t rf."ork.r \'(11. 48~ 173; l..-11/Jrcr 's JVo-rks \°CL 49, 203.
'Luther's fi'm-1:.r, \.~. 35~ 281. Soc also no1c no1nber ~6 in l11ther's ff'orks
"Cl.~~.
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d so appcar~d in August 1527. Hess had. asked Luther whether
Christians could !lee from the plague with a clear conscience.
Luther " as further prompted lo write after hearing how u
j)()niinican in Leipzig had mocked the way residents or
Willenbcrg ran from the peril. The pamphlet blended Christian
charit)' ~nrl co1nmon sen.c;e.

Abo,·c all. Luther appealed lo pastors not to abandon their
flocks. Al I good Christians should resist giving into panic, but
pastors carry " higher obligation. The pastor, Luther wrote, is nol
merch' n hired teacher but a committed shepherd whose l1clp is
csscniial ''hen the plague infects a region:
Those 11 ho arc engaged in a spiritual ministry such as
preachers and pastors mu.5t likewise remain steadfast
before the peril of death. We ha\•e a plain co1llilmnd
from Chri~t. "A good shepherd lays down his life for the
sheep but lhc hireling sees the wolf coming and flees."
[Jchn I 0: 11 f. For when pooplc are dying, they mos! need
a spiritua I ministry which Strengthens and comforts their
conscicnc~s bv word and sacrament and in faith
overcomes dcaih.6
Still, Luther recognized that if c00<1gll religious leaders stayed LO
take ca.re of sick Christians, additional preachers need not e"-pose
lhcmsclvcs to danger. "I do not consider such conduct sinCol
because spiritual services arc provided for and because they
would ha\'C been ready and willing to stay if il had been
ncccs-S-:11)'. ' ~
1

A sunil:u- moral code bound civic officials. Secular
authorities must sta)' to sec that law and order arc presen·cd in
prevention of ''fires, murders, riots and every inmgi11able
disaster.... On the other hand, if in great weakness they flee but
provide capabk sul>stimtes ... all that would be proper." Servnnls
should not lc~\'e ll1eir masters, and p~rcnts may not abandon their
children. No o::e shO'~ld le:t\'C "ithout first checking on tlie wcllbcmg of llh'lSC "ho cannot move.

!!.a;rll~r's ll'CN·k.1'. vot 43. J 21 .
'Ibid.
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pr~scn·ation

recognized that the luunnn instinct for sclfO\'erridcs most oth;:r concerns in cris~s such as the

plague.

ICsomeone is weak and fearful, let him lk c in God's
name as long as he does not neglect his dul)' lO\\'ard his
neighbor but has made ad·:quatc pro\'iSion for others to
provide mm;ing care. To Occ from death and sa,·e one ·s
life is a natural tendency, implanted by God.•
But. he wrote, an outbreak of the bbck death is no different from
any other thrc~t. According to Scripture, God sent four scourges:
famine, sword, wild beasts, and pestilence. The Bible tcnches
tl1at in each of the first three cases. de\'oted believers mav save
tl1emselves only after they ha,·e sec~ to the c:ire of ou~ers. Just as
Abraham, J:ieob and Dadd did tlicmsel\·es. Luth;:r exoccted that
some Christians would doubt whether the plague. could be
eompt1rcd to scourges described in the Bible. Biblical figures,
after all, neYer faced the black death. "Death is death, no m atter
how it occurs," Luther insisted. Rcgm llcss o f whether the threat
is persecution or plague, Christians are bow1d by God's law first
to meet obligations to their Ccllow men. Onlv aflcrwa :ds may
they think o f their 0\\11 escape. Those who pru;ic a nd ignore thi.s
holy directiYc "ill be j udged harshly in the eyes o f God "Christ,
there fore, will condemn tl1c111 as murderers on the Last Day when
he will say, "! l\'3S sick ond you did not \'isit me (Matt. 25:43 J."9
Luther thought that God sent the plai,'l1c, either ns a
punishment, a demonstration of his power or ns nn exercise to test
mnn's faith and love. Or perhaps tl1e illness could ha\•c
reprc.<ented all three simultaneously. God sent th:: plague :is "a
fatherly game," Luther said, "for the purpose of melting nnd
purg ing." Although God nppcars to be angry, he is not. The
anger is "simulated. " Naturol disasters are sent ''tl1ar you mnv be
led to a knowledge oi your sin.. .. Indeed, 11c mu;t fall ~ost
horribly, in order that we may recognize our wretchedness ru1d

The dcdl entered the picture because his evil sought to create
pJnic ;111d scllishncss among people in conununities 3ffiicted with
the pbguc. Lulher told pious Christi;ms lo defy the Prince of
D;irkn~ss in times of plague by showing more compassion, more
courage, nol lcss. ' 1 Interestingly, Luther years later s uggested
fcor os a main c;iusc of the plng11:. In October 1539. more than
a dcc.idc 3!\cr the Wittenberg outbreak, Lutl1cr helped bury
5c,·crnl friends who died of plague in Nuremb~rg. Jn a lecture he
told lis:cncrs that the panic-s tricken should flee ' 'ilhout Sh3me
rrom the threm of plague because "fear itscl( is the chief cause of
this calamity," although he did not elaborntcn
Luther shared the opinion of his comemporarics who believed
that the block death "spread among the people by e\·il spirits "·ho
poison the air or exhale a pestilential breath wh:ch puts a dcadl>'
poison into the !ksJi.•11 I lowe\•cr, he seemed to believe that God
would impln " m::isure of di\'inc immunity to those Chrisiians
who nursed plogue \'ictims. "It is pro\'cd by experience that tbose
\\he nurse the sick with lo\'C, del'otion, and sinceri ty arc
generally protected. T hough they are poisoned, they are not
hanncd." Luther added a warning that "a person who attends a
p~licnt bccnusc of greed, or with the expectation of an inhcrit:mce.
or some personal ad\·antagc in such scn•ices, should not be
surpri;ed if C\'Cntually he is infected, disfigured, or C\'Cll dies.""
Luther ;1dviscd against going too for the other direction,
disregarding minor precautions thnt might prc,·cnt one from
becoming ill. i1pparcnll)', some Europeans tried to demonstrate
superior foith by rejecting medicines and making no e!Tort to
m·oid pince.~ and persons infected with plague. They were "much
too r.i~h and reckless," Luther said. "This is net trusting God but
tempting hi111. God has created medicines and prO\ idcd us \\ith
intdl igcncc to guard and take good care of the body so that we
can live in good her.Ith." In the same way, anyone who ca relessly
acquired the 1>lague and infected others was considered a
murderer, as was the person who, ha\'iog apparently rcco,•cred
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from plague, passed the disease lo otl1ers before he "as
completely free of the gc.-ms-"
Luther sa,·ed his harshest condcmnalion for people with the
black death who kept their infection secret eitl1er in the belief thm
they would rid themselves of the sickness by contaminati ns
others or were simply "incredibly vicious." He suggested that
such "deliberate murderers" promptly be sent 10 the hangman.
Luther suggested that communities seek ways to isolmc
victims of plague, just as God in the Old Testament ordered
lepers to be banished from the cily. Isolation is beller for
c\"Cf\-Onc.
The ill m 3v
still be cartd for, and the infection \\ill not
.
'
s;irc.ld. "Our plague here in Wiucnbcrg hc.• been cnuscd by
nothing but filth. ·n1e air, thank God, is still clean aml pure, but
some few have been ccntarninntcd be;;ause of the laziness or
reekJcssness of som•'!. 11 ts
Luther thought mo,·ing cerncteries outside the city mii;ht
stem the spread of th; black demh. Many popular beliefs about
the dead held that poison vapors nnd mists rise out of !,'Tn\'CS.
Luther suggested graveyards be moved for the conunon hcnhh of
cities and because burial grounds should be s2crcd, hallowed
places, not small plois in alleys or outside market?laccs. "A
cemetery rightfully ought to be a Cine quiet pkce. removed from
all localities, to which one cnn go and reverently meditate upon
dcnth, the Last Judgement, the resurrection, and sny one's
prayers. 11 1"
Luther ndded a lew words on how to prepare for death to the
end of his essay "Whether One May Flee From a Deadly Plngue."
lie reminded readers that Lhe best way to prepare for the end of
life was through regular worship and taking the sacrarnenL But
when the plague stn:ck a family, Christians should call for a
pastor before the victi:n became delirious or unconscious. If a
pastor arrived too late, he could not counsel the sick person or
administer conmmnion becau se the patient would noc understa nd.
Chaplnins \\"Ottld not "tcJch them the gospel at the lnsl minute and
administer the sacrament lo them us they were nccustorncd to it
under the papacy when nobody :isked whether they believed or
"Ibid, 13 1-2.
"1hiJ. 132-1.
"!bid. 136-7.

und:rstcod the jlOSpcl but just stuITed the sacram<:nt dO\m their
b db ag. .,.
thro::ts as ·r·
1. mto a rca
.
Philip ZicQlcr :i scholar o( the black death m the l;,tc
.
~
'
mcdici·~l period, argues that the plague helped create doubt and
skepticism about Cmholic authorities. Christians were strnck by
scv~w! phrnomena. First, they saw the Church treated the plague
os a punishment sent from God. Yet 1•illagc priests died at le;;st
as oficn as commoners when the disease surfaced. This
grop'iically dcmonstrJtcd that the clergy's supp~sedly. close
relationship with God did not prO\·idc escape from his pcsulencc.
<:ccond, evidence suggests that some priests would not s=·c in
;;'~£'rc-s1rickcn areas \\ithout exceptionally hish salaries. Sue~
bcha•:ior rnised ob,·ious questions about the Church s
co:m11'. tmcnt 10 its nock and the priests' mnteri:ilism. Add to this
~ few notorious stories of priests abandoning lheir infcc.1ed
communities and one secs why the Church's credibility w~s so
d;irnagcd. 1;i

Ironically, ample data ind:cates that the Church suffered
greater human losses from the bla:l death than almost any other
~ial in~titulion. High mortality rates among the clergy may
ha»e cul the number of priests almost in half. The plague took a
disproportio:1:i;clv high number of the most dedicated men of
God. Rushing ·to fill the gap, the Church ignored its O\\TI
standaccls and nµpoin ted m~ny unsuitable candidates to the
priesthood. Thus, Ziegler writes, in the ycnrs :ifier the worst of
the pla~uc, \\hen European society should hnvc pulled back
togcthe;, Ilic church was miserably unprcpnrcd lo deal with
protest movcmcnlS or rc,·olts. Ziegler and G.G. Coullon both
;rrgue that the plague, though it did nol lead inc.xorably to the
R:fonnatioo, contributed to the wc.Jkcnin!; of the Cm..'lolic
church."' Thus it seems =sonablc to believe that the plague,
cvm bcfo'c Luther's time. had already plnycd a significant role in
laying lhe groundwork fo~ the Rcfomrntion.
And yet, throus hout the early sixt~enth century, rcfonners
such as Lmher and Zwingli (himself almosLkilled by the µJ3guc)
had to respond to the same problems with the pcrsistelll disease.
"ibid. B6-7.
0
lieg:er. Thi ntack lkl:lh, 260-l.
~.G. CoullC>a. n1~ 8/cick D~.th {}!C\V
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Their bmtlcs ,~·ith the black dcmh shaped their rdigious outlooks
ond pcrsonol hfe-nnd-dearh c.xpcricnccs. Luther 's \\Ti iings on th~
bl~ck <kn1h suggest that he understood th~ plague 10 be both a
spL'llual and a p::rsonnl lcsl_o f character. Although the source or
purpose of 1hc disease rcmamcd a mystery, conunilled Christ ians
had sc,'C4"al clear directi\'es: preserve order, lend to the sick and
avoid spreading ll1e co~tagion. Amid the terror of a plague
outbreak, Luther urged his followers to display courage, common
sense, and compassion.

D :irwinian Racism
Doug 0 1•ermyer

[)(mg Ot-ermyer wrore rhis source analysis as a s~nior at
Eas1em Jilinois for Historical Sources and Techniques
(His 2500) "11der l'rofessor Casey Machula duri11g
Spri1'g !996. He Is ciirre111ly a graduare srudenLin the
l1·fns1er ofArrs Jn History JJrogranr.
J8SG, Churlcs D;1rwi1\ revolutionized the biological sciences
\\ith hi~ mo11w11cntal Origin ofSpecies, in which he described
ti1c c\'oluucn of species as a product of natural selection. He
argu:d c0n,·111cingiy thaL1•:1rious species engage in a v;isl struggle
for cx'. slCJ,cC in the battle!icld of Nature . As species contested
o\'cr scarce resources, D:tmi n insisted, the stronger species
511n'i1·cd and the weaker perished. In essence, Nature selects
certain \'a;ict1es as unfit to carry oo, while allo"ing others to
survh'C. These latter vnrieties would ll1en ad:tpt co their ever·
ch~nging surrou:tdings and the competition would continue. By
this process, nnimals progress, or evolve, from inferior to
superior species.
Tlt~ough his i~tcr work, specifically The Descent o/Man, he
;:pplicd his theory of Natural Selection to humans. Thenceforth,
a struggle raged in public circles after his theory became widely
knol'n. Some nccepted his new interpretation of old dntn, while
ethers rejected iL In the latter qunrtcr of the nineteenth century
and !he bzgirn1ing dcc:ides of Lhe twentieth, many politicians in
industrialized n;1tions came 10 ~cccpt Darwin's thCOI)', and besan
formulating laws lo apply this scientific lhco;y to society in
gcn~rai. ThJS c.xtrnpolation of scientific thought to social thousht
was oothing nc": the American Declaration of Independence lllld
Constitution applied Enlightenment thought or the cigliteenth
tcntu1y (so::1e of which deri\'cd from U1e Scier.tilic Revolution of
thz sc,·cme~mh) 10 the American public domain. Ho"e,·er,
~pplying Darnin's new scien!ific lhought 10 social policy had
ara.stic co11scq11cnccs. These Socia! Darwinisrs, o\'e1whdmingly
\\l111e Europeans, believed their own race wns the superior of an)'
nt~c ~1n1ong hwnanity. Oincsh D'Souz~ has rightly nrgucd ll1t1l
tins hnc of thou~hl culminated with the idea of "might makes
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Their balllcs 1~ilh thll black death shap~d their religious outlooks
and personal h fc-and-dcoth experiences. Luther's \\Titinss 011 thc
black death sugscst that he understood the pbguc to be both a
spiritual and a personal test of c!tarncier. Althoueh the source or
purpose of the disease remained a mystery, comn;illcd Christians
had several cle.ir dirccti1·cs: preserve order, tend to the sick and
a1•oid sprcmling lhc co~tagion. Amid the terror of a plogu~
outbreak. Luther urged Ins followers to display cournge, common
sense, and composs1on.

Doug 01•ermyer
J)oug Ovt?r111)-er "·rore this source anat;-sis as a senior at
Easrcm l/linois for Historical Sources and Techniques
(Hts 250(~ under Professor Casey 1'.fachula d1iring
Spring ! 996. He/.! currently a graduate s111de11Un rJ;e
l~,.fas1·er o_{Arts in History progrant
n ! ~5G, Churlcs Darwin revolutionized the biological sciences
" ill1 his monumental Origin of Species, in which he dcscrib<Xl
1hc ernlution of species ns a product of notural selection. I le
argued condncingly thm various species cngnge in a 1·ast struggle
fer c~islcnc·: in 01 ; balllclicld of l\alure. As spedes contested
over scare; resources. Darwin insisted, the stronger species
survi\'c d ~nd lh! weaker perished. In essence, Nalurc selects
certain varic1ies as unfit to carry on, while aTI011ing others LO
suJVivc. TI1c:;c falter varielics would then adapt 10 their c1·erchangi11g surroundings and the compclition would continue. By
this procc~s. animals progress, or evolve, from inferior 10

I

£upcrtcr species.

Through his later \\'Ork, specilically 11ie Descent cifMan, he
applied his theory of Nolural Selection to humans. Thenceforth,
a struggle raged in public circles after his theory became ll'idcly
kno\\~t. Some accepted his new interpretation of old data, while
others rejcclcd it. ln the lnttcr quarter of the ninctccn01 century
~nd llie beginning decades of Lhe twcnlicth, many politicians in
industrialized natious crunc to accept Darwin's theory, and began
formulating la"s to apply 01is scientific theory to society in
general. TI:is c.-..;lrapolation of scientific thought 10 social thought
was noth:ng m:w: the AmcriC<in Declaration of Independence and
Con.5tituuon applied Enlightenment thought of the eightcenlh
ci:111u1y (some of which deriYcd from the Scientific Re\'olution of
ti~~ s.:1·c:1tccn1h) to the American public domain. However,
ap.pl::ing Darnin's n~·w scientific thought to social policy had
drasuc consequences. These Social Danvinis1s, overwhelmingly
wlutc Europeans, bclic"cd 01cir own race was the superior of any
race ~mong humanity. Dincsh D'Souza bas rightly argued tltnt
lh1s hnc of thought culmin:itcd with the idea of " might mukes
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right" nnd lo "oppose it was to stigmatii.c yourself a religious
fanatic or on ignornmus."1 He nlso notes that many \\Tiler~ 1odny
.. make a strenuous cfTon lo distance Dan' in from racism,
cite[ingJ hi s record as an opponent of slal'ery, and blame the
racism that subsequently took his name on the unscientific 'social
Darwinism' ll'hich is generally branded as a dis1onio11 of the
lhcoiy of evolution."' This paper analy7.es Dnl'\\in's O\\ll \\Tilings
to show he endorsed both racism nnd socinl Dnr\\'inism.
Darwinism is inherently racist; and f1111J1crmorc, Charles
Dnrnin hi mself spawned the racist slunL in this social mo"cment
which b~rs hjs nnmc. Indeed, ihc \\'()rl;s of Dnl'\\in ~re blatantly
racis!, both on the intemntionnl ond the domestic level. Charles
Darwb, of course, did not icl\'Cnt racism. In fa~t. the idc;c of
soci;il Darwinism found its roots in ccr!ain Enlightenment ideals.
Charles Darnin, especially in nu! Desccm of Ma11, merely
ofTered racists his scientific slamp of approvnl.>
Social Darwinists can use the works of Danvin himsel f to
justify imperialism. Consider briel1y his Lheo1y of natural
selection and irs applicaLion to humankind. Througholll The
Origin n/Species, Dmwin suggests tb~t humankind is not a part
of Nature, that the rules which nominlly a?ply in pms of Nnturc
untouched by hwnanity do not apply to humam nnd human
de\•elopment.' Howc\'cr, in The Descenr ofMan, h~ applies his
theory of natural selection to human soci~ty. The di fferent races
of man, he \\TOie, nre "sub-species" in hun1anity.s One
lhcse
sut-specics, or rnccs, will e\·cntuully prove lo be supreme and
will subjugate the others. In a M;?.rxist-like C)·cle, he predicted
that different races of man would clash >?.nd struggle fer the scarce
resources found in l\ature to survi"e; after the struggle, the

c]cfe,.tcd rnce "·otdd whither into extinction, while the superior
would advance inlo the next struggle.~ He wrote " when
~Cc
: ,ilizcd nations fi.c. white Europ::•ms] come .mto cont net \\'ll'h
~·~bnric (nations) the struggle is short'"and alicr the ','struggle,"
ihc defeated "barbaric" rncc ··will surely decrease 111 number
<ooncr or later (leading) lO extinction; the end ... being promptly
d~;crniin:d by the inroads (ol) the conquering (rnce).''8
E"tinc1io11 of th·; conquered, he "rote in Origin ofSpecies, was
essential for the progress of the superior onimal in the stnigglc.
To further iJJu;;tratc, he 1•.Tote tlrnt "extinction follows chielly
from comp:;tition of' ... race Yersus race.'" If a certain rnce could
not ad;ipt to the new ccnciitions imposed on it by the conquering
rnce, it would necessarily be cxtem1inated, and Dnrnin concluded
1hnt "civilized races can certainly resist clrnnges of all kinds far
10
"-·
vu.tcr tit«n sa•·. il~"'h ' S."
Darwm funhcr believed these inferior races "ofn:eu resemble
domesticated animals'' and even compared the lowest savages to
the highc~t apc.11 He claimed that

'D:..Csh l)'SooJ.a, Tile £11d ojRadsm (l\cw YOO<, 1995), 132.
' Ibid., t2S.
llbitl., 13 1. for the purpusc:. of this study, n1;:~s1n \\ilJ t-c co:u id<:rl"d the
t>piniOJl lll!Lt CIOC: £l'(IUp of individu.'lli:t \\'hich S)Ulrc similttt physjt;at
char.!ctcris1ics1 scx:i<lJ nonns. ~'11d s<lciet)' is su;ircme t.<t an:th,::r group oj
indf.idus's \\, th different criccria.
'His ch4Jll=:ts. 5<C~rttlc n!t:ur:ll sckclion Crom tn'l!ll·i1lS?.K'd ini!ici::il
$cle.;li<111. lf n1an \ver¢ 11 purl of nature, ~::cording to D111'\vin, th;:n rio di:;11nccio11bcnvcc:n these. rartilicfol t'l 1td naLur2J, \\'Ould be ncc.::!)s:iry.

•,\s rirnphr.i.sc.i b;· Nicolas B~dyacv~ 77;t R"uia11 Rn v."u:icn (Ar:..0
i\rbor, 1931: reprinted Tcrcnto, 1966). 21. Bcrdye.cv goes i:lto m>Jrc dcl3il
linking lhc irnpor1an...:e bCf\\'(tn t...larxism 11nd 0$r.~ 1ni3m in his \\'Ork.
1
Ditr.vi11, f )rigio. 5·13.

or

~Chsik$ Oaf'\-\~11, 17io Origin o_{Sp<"c1'u r1nd D~sC'cnl uf/1!<111 (~C\V York.

19/lj, 537

the reduced size of !lie jaws from lessened use ... with

increased $ize of the brain from 1,'l'Cater intel!ectuo l
octivity ...nnd increased body stature ...have together
producctl a considerable effect on their [civilized men)
.h
1gl!!lcrol opp-zarnnce when compare·d mt savages. •
Furthermore. he cites C\•idcnce that the brnin of the " Bushman
race ...(is) c~nsidcrnbly less complicated and more symn1eu·ical
tl1ln in th; Eu:'Opean brain."11 Since DaJ'\'in bclic\'ed Ihm
"cndurnnce and success on Earth ...could be attributed to the
ability or ruccs lo adapt themselves to the threats ru1d challenges

'ro;d,, s:;o_
'Ibid., 54?.
'ibid., 549.
!llbiJ ., 4 14, 445.

" Ibid.. 555.
0
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of the natural cn" ironmcnt.~1 'and, according lO Peter Bowler,
citing more evidence that "whiles hiwc a larger crnnimn c~p~city
Ll1:m other rnces,"'s he felt confident in insisting tlmt eventually,
civilized people would exterminate the world of the inferior races
of man. Herc, Darwin clearly sounds the imperialistic trumpet
blasted by c..-cry colony-hungiy Europc:Jn and Nonh American
power.
Of course Ch:1rlcs Darwin did not pioneer th is scientifically
snnclioncd racism alone. Thomas H. Huxley, an avid s upporter
of Dam'ini~011, m·ote that "no rational mJn cogni1..'.lnt of the facts,
belie\•cs the a\·crngc )legro is the equal, still less Ll1c superior of
the average white man."16 In addition, Ernst Heinrich Pi1ilip
August Hr:cckcl, who became knO\m as "Danvin's Bulldog on
the conlin~nt'' introduced a form of social Darwinism to Germany
which c,·entunlly bocame a principle idcoloi,•y in Germany's
\'isio11 of racism, unpcrialism, and nationalism. " Finally,
Darni:iists C\'CI) wh~rc claimed according to some conm1cnlators,
that "some races had fallen so for behind ... they could nc,·cr catch
up with the triumphant ,,·hiles,"11 and "as the resources of the
world became scarce ...the stronger onimals would prcvnil and the
weaker would die out,"'~ therefore implying the justness of the
cxtennination of those Jailer we:i.'-!ings.
Daf\\in and his supporters c~sily took these general scientific
.. foc!s" and d.:rivcd social p-0licies not only 10 exterminate other
races, but 10 further enhance their own. Indeed, social Darn~nisL~
were scient ifically justified, for i f the weak in their own race were
allowed to survi\'C1 the race would deteriorate in quality and some
other ra~ would consequently pass iL For instance, J. B.
Haycraft wrote that
11

1) 'Souza,£11d o./ Nacistt:, 1~9.

t!>pc.'h:r J. HO\\'lt r, Biology aud Socfal Thought:

J8S0·191../ (Berkeley.
1993). 70.
"41'horr.a$ Iluxky. ""Ent3Jlci1Mtio:t ·Black and \\.litc/'c lllp. 1n Sci.:J!ce n11d
Ed11cc/ian (Nc'v YUtk, J90tj, 64-7.
1
-V:tniel Oas1n"n• The Sci;:ut[Jjc Ori"zin.r a,,f }hrticnut! Soc-/1t!i:..,11: Sc..ci•rl
Dn.rw:'r:i~n in Enut ll<Jvt:kei and !hrt Gcrrn<ul tllonfsl L.r:ngut. (Ni:\\' York, L92 1).
xvi. xvU, cilt:d in RUS$:1l Gri21l, «Ernsl H 11eckel: EvanQi!li:n t"or evolution aud
llros:tle of dcce~r." <:rratio11: ::X.._nihi!o 18 (lv1a.rch·1"~Y 1996)~ :lJ./,
isHO\\ 'kf, [1!0!01:r-' 011d Social Th{Jug/11,

7l>'SotO..s,, HJ rd QfP.o~fs;11, 130.
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r3 ciol ch~nr;c. improvement, or deterioration, is brought
nbou1..., by what is termed selection, l11at is, by the death
or non-productiveness of certain individuals of a race
whercb'' others alone remain. lf this remnant is
or2~nic.all~' superior, l11e next generation inhcriti:lg only
1hcm \\ill be thcmsch·es s uperior, (and] racial
i 111pro,·c111cnt is b:oughl about..,.

rr.;m

•'··r·ollv
'
' those or a race who ore weak should die off quickly,
N,,I(,,
hence k;cping lhe next generation from inheriting the fonncr·s
wcakn-:sses.
To allow the biologically weak to survi,·c in modem society
pose$ o thrc~l to thnt society. Indeed, Darwin despaired nt
nwnkind ·s O\\'n charity to the weak ar.d dom1trodden:
we civilized men do our utmost lO check the proc·~ss of
eliminltion. \\C build asvlums for the imbecile, the
rn3imcd, the sick, \\C instiiute poor (wclforcj laws; and
our medica l men exert their utmost skill to save the life
of every one to the Inst moment ...[all) highlv injurious to
the
of man. : i
•

rnce

l:nfortun~telv D3min wrote, that all of this aid "we feel impelled
.'
to give 10 th: hdpkss is mainly an incidental result of the instinct
o( si·mp3tlty.":'
I n contrast, l11e social Darwinist believes,
disci1ses such as "tuberculosis is the friend or the r;1ce. for il
~llacks no healthy man or woman, but only the 'ice blc.n"l
'
Because, Ll1e Darwinist cnnnot lcl the feeble sun·i, e if the race is
to advance, he commends also leprosy, typh<lid fever, measles,
syphilis, hemophilia, diabetes, and cancer, for these kill arr the
weak, lcnving only the strong to survive." Today, the Dam·inisl
woulJ not h~lp 1he HIV carrier, for "it is probnble ll1al, as a race,
we shall thcrcbv suffer, for ll1e banishment of the disease will
enable ll1c fcciJlc members of the commwlit)' to li\•e and
:i..Ja~,n B(tl'\ l l:ivi.:rn.il, D:1r n•1itisu1aud Rec~ ProsrtJs (J.,andon.. IS9S), l 7.
n0til'Vill, 0 1·igl;1, 501.
JZJl:id., SQ l <L

''H:~ycroil. Dlfn1--iuis.1n. $7.
?<ilhid • SS.
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...contribute to !he progcn:-· of the future."::; Funhcnuorc, the
social Darwinist praises the "popular and \\idcsprcod feeling
agamst the marriage of those with a distinct fun1ily history of
insnnity,"" which in his period included those \\ilh mcntnl
rernrdation, depression, and those with physical disabilities such
as a hearing impnirmcm. These inferior people nrc not to be
allowc<I to reproduce, lest those defective charnctcristics be
preserved in the race regardless of the "incidental result of the
instinct of sympathy," which is "highly injurious to the race of
man."' ' Howe\•cr, biological defects ;done do not constitute what
may result in the decline of a rate.
Indeed, proper morality in a society is also sel~led by nature
co survh·c with superior race as Darwin poses this example:
a sa\'agc will risk his O\\TI life 10 save thm o( a member
of the same community, but will be wholly indifferent
abour a stranger ... (while] many 3 ei,~lized man, or c\·ei1
boy, who never before risked his life for anolher, but full
of courage and sympathy, has disregarded the instinct of
scl f-prcscrvJlion, and plunged al once into 11 torrent to
s-nve a dro11ning m~n, though a slranger:'
Hence, those societies ,,;th supreme morals "ill subjugate those
societies with poor morals. Funhem10rc, immoral trails in a
superior society will be eliminated: "a timid man ...fwhoscJ
instinct of self-preservation might be so strong," mny be unable
to bring himself to "nm any such risk [which may impair his li fo],
~~-= fur~~~i~~ Th~~ = ~-~

loses his weak ch:iracteristies if the child dies. :s
Ac.;;ording to Dnrninisl ~1inking, a race should stri,·e to
multiply from those which are fitter (i.e. physically, mentally, and
morally stronger) and extenninalc the unfit, or at lease. limit their
abilities to propagate. Among "the intellcccually superior and
" ibid., 5 1.
1'ibi:L
1:Ih:s issue is stiU one or COntfO\'\:tsy today. Do tho~..: \\ith ruc11111I
rcl:ud!ltio11 forfeit lhc right to have chihlr..:n sirnply bec.iusc they h;1\'C :i
"oogcnil.:!I def::ct? The Dl'lr.vini!.1 v.:ould say. ''Yes!"
='0:an\-:n, Origin, 48 )-2.
' 1 tid.482.

th·: inrcrior, there can be liclle doubt that 1.he fom1er would
..uccecd best in all occupuc.ions, and rear n greater number of
~hildrcn.""' Furthenuorc, the intellectually superior person, who
is niorc successful, achie.\'CS wealtli, and "bequeaths it to his
children. so clrnl the children of the rich ha\·e an advantage over
the poor in the ra:e for success.~>1 I low.wcr, occasionally grcnl
wcalch " tends to con,·ert men into useless drones, but !heir
number is never b.rgc; nnd some deb'TCC of elimination here
occurs, for we daily sec rich men, who happen to be fools or
proP.igatc, squandering away chcir wealth." " Therefore., Ilic
\\Clllhy, having the useful morals and skills to succeed, are
0 ., :ra!I much more suited to contribute 10 tlie continued existence
of the rncc: si nce the poor are therefore the wcokcr and not suited
to co:11ributc to tlrnt race's proccny, they arc immornl and hence
11 nrit. This line of reasoning is tl1c basis for much of socinl
Darwinisr thought.
The poor, nonctheless, m empl to o,·crwhelm soci~ty with
offspring to that society's detriment. Darwin compl ains that the
poor and reckless ... almosl invariably marry c11rly, whilst
the careful and frugal, who arc generally otherwise
\'i11uous, m;ury late in life, so that they may be able to
suppon themselves and their children in comfort. Those
who many early ... produce many mere children.... Tims
1hc reckless, degraded, and often vicious members of
society lend lo increase al •t quicker rote tlrnn the
provident and generally virtuous members.u
O;c \I in, ever the objective English scientist, ciles e\•ide:~cc that
the

carelc~s. squalid, unaspmng Irishman multiplies like

rabbits: chc frugal, foreseeing, se.Jf-rcspccting, ambitious
Scot, seem iu his morality, spiritual in his faith, sagacious
m d disciplined in his intelligence, passes his bc:;l years
" tbid., 50).
" Ibid., 502.
" Ibid.

" Ibid.
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in struggle :u1d in celibacy, marries lale, nml ka\'eS few
behind him.''
Indeed, says Darwin passionately, "In the e:emal 'strusgle for

ex istence,' it would be th e inferior and l~.~s fovorcd race lhm had
prcYailed-and preva iled by virtue not of ils i;ood qualities but of
its faults."·" Luckily, Darwin concludes, there are "some checks
to this do\\11ward tendency" of pocr children ovcn, helming
society.15
lndccd, Nature is noi so blind as to let immorality stnin its
superior races, and circumstances ensure lhe surviv~I and
advancement of these cullures. While, Darwin not·:s, " the poorest
clilSSCS crowd into lo\\ns," the consequent "dcalh·r~te is higher
in towns thnn in rural districts."" Furth:nnorc, even if some of
the rich li1·e in towns, "no dou bt more tlrnn twice the number of
bi rths would be requisite to keep up the number of lhe 1·e1y poor
inhabitants in the l0\\11s," or in other words, more poor, rnlhcahhy
children die than rich children." Nature imposes yet another
check on the l,'Ill\\1h of the poor nnd immornl (in the eyes of all
governing Natural Selection) by Lhe high monali ty rntc of those
who arc poor and wasteful: immornl peorle will not take the
time to achieve success; only inlmoral r eoplc mar~' yoLuig, and
hence remain poor. Darwin insists that women who marry wider
twenty ha,·e twice lhe chance of dying in any given year as "the
sa me number O( the wunnrried. The mortality, also, o( husbands
under t'vcnty is (excessively high. »~3!> Ho\\'C\'Cr, if a mnn, rich or
poor, nc\·er marries, then he is certainly a waste to Nature since
his qualities do not ha\'C a chance to be passed on: Om' inist
thought claims he is immoral aiid Nature will eliminmc hiro.
Also, insisLs Damin, men weak of hcnrt and spirit ha,·e littls
chance of finding a male.'0 Nature insures they will remain
unmarried lo eliminate his destructi\'e characteristics. He is
" Jbjj_
J;lbi~ .

d

0 111cd

to die a young death.

•the 010 st un\\'holcson1e tr"dcs. '"' Cons~\lcnt Iy since,
.
'' murnagc
.
in itself is the main cause of prolonged life.... We may, therefore,
inf.:r th al sound and good men who out of pnrdcnce rcmam for a
tinic l11unnrricd, do no! S\1Cfcr a high rntc of mortality."" To
conclude, Nalllrc favors those who wail for a time lo acquire
success before ma~·i ng, and then blesses these ever so wise
p<!Cp:c with long life. '.\1e:mwhile, !\~lure eliminates the weak
and impmdcnl who marry early, wlulc poor. and breed like
rodents, lo !lie detriment of society.
Therefore, Darwin concludes that an)' action outside of nature
to proli:d the poor, such as welfare laws, is "wrongly directed.""
Most of the rich arc so by ,·irtu~ of being ll1e most n:oral in a
soci~ty. ~nd any laws restricting them also seems misdirected.
Social Da1winists, however, assume thm perhaps J\alurc rn~y
not be effective enough in its efforts in eliminating the poor and
weak from a race; and consequently, many of these scientists an
phi~osophcr~. anncd \\~th The Origin ofSpecies and De.rcem of
Afan, ll<!go11 developing dangerous social theories to help it To
further cnh~ncc the superior ruce, scGinl Darwinists decided to do
aw~v with nil inferiors: those weaklin~s of their own rnce nnd all
olh~r inferior races. According 10 Sir Francis Gallon who coined
the term. 1he scie;:cc of eugenics, which dcnls \\ith cxtem1innting
the unwonted mental or physical qualities in a r~ce to "protect"
future g~ncrntions and had its roms in racism:'" The Breeder' s
Arn)ciation, a Dan..inist !,'l'Oup founded at the tum ofll1e century,
w~ntcd to slcril i1.e Ilic lower (enth (dctcnninetl by their O\m
ddiniticn) of the American people from gencr<ltion to generation
in order to hove <loae awuv with the unfit by l 9RO. Indeed,
"Margaret Si\nger, 1he founder of Planned Parenthood, coined U1c
slog:ui, " More children fro:n the lit, less from the unCiL'"~ She
furth<.T described African-Amcrica:IS and East-European
inimigron:s to the United States as " 3 !llcoace to ei1·ilizntion» nnd

"Ibid., 50.5.
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\\'Ceds."46 She bclic,•ed the best wny to kill \\'ccds is LO
kill their roots, \\ilile adn11tting that Plann<."(I ?aren!hood docs
" not w:ml "ord to get out that we want 10 c:-:1ermin~tc the Ncsro
population. " Clci\rly, according to the soc ial Daminist, "the
stnigglc of race with race (culminutes in) t.hc sur\'ival of the
physicolly and mentally litter race.'"

Patrick Pear se and the Triumph of Failure
1Hatthew

E. Thrun

0

'

learly Darwin was a racist, as The Origin ofSpecies and 'l'lie
Descent ofMan show, and l>clic,•cd in the superiority of his
race o,·cr those he called "sa\'agcs." His works are full of
rcrcxnces bcliuline ~inferior" races :md inferior people in his
0\\1l race, and he ;ppro\·ed of their subjugation and extinction.
These references and bciicfs were more than enough for his
followers lo Iced upon, and the parasitic disease of socinl
Darwinism spread like the cancer they strove to protect. In the
name of progress, people were conquered and subjugated, and
schemes were spewed fortli to prcser\'e and advance their O\\n
•·superior" race. Clearly, the theory of evolutioa needs to be
rec~nmined.
Irrefutably, scicntilically endorsed racism is
founded upon Charles Darwin.

C
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n1'· CU(hulaiim, the Hound of l..1stcr, remained,
fat:ill\' wounded, his side and stomach gaping with
wounds. Hc bound hims·elf with his sword-~ll to _a
pilla:-stonc, Carrig-an-Con;pa.ri, so thnt . he 1111ght d1~
strinding, facing his enemies. And so he did, mlh drnwn
sword i11 hnnd, a rnvcn perched on his shoulder, the rays
of the setting sun bright on his bronze helmet, a terror
•
.
I
even in Jcalh to lus enemies.

O

0

atrick Pcarsc·s idealistic "-ays were set ,d1en he fow1dcd
St. fndn's College in 1908 ~nd cmblnoncd a quote of
Cuchulainn's upon a wall so that all his students would see
it. "!care nol t!'.ough l were to live but one day and one mght: if
only my fame :ind my deeds live after me." This w~s Patnck
Pearse speaking Lhrough Cuclmlainn; he too saw lmnsclf as
fighii:ig a 11 unbeatable foe and he also knew that one day he
would be killed in this fi2ht. It was with this mi11d sci and with
1his Irish hero in his 1ho~~hts that Pearse set out on Lhat foicful
Monda\' in 1916 to lead the Easler Rising, an Irish rc,·olLagainst
British·occupation. Pearse dreamed of b:ing a hero to his country
a,,d wanted his dczds to live 0:1 after him.
Patrick (f'adrnic) Pearse was born on No,·cmber IO, 1&79, 0:1
Grca\ Brunswick Strecl, now Pearse Street, in Dublin. His fother
W'1s Janics Pearse, n English sculptor. Politically, James was a
proponent of Home Ruic.. a proposed through which Ireland
would rcmnin a part of the British Empire but with sclfgovemment. His fathers one liternry work \\'ilS n pamphlet
entitled England's duty 10 Ireland as ii appears to an

P
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The Treaty of Versailles in the Senate
Gregory Aydt
Greg Aydr is nJur.ior in Ju:rrory and wrote nn nnalysls of
a passage ji'Ol11 (1 snmdnrd hi;·tory textbook M an
assignnwnr for Historical Sources and Techniques {l /is
2500) under Professor Christopher Waldr<:p. A ver.<1on
of 1/iis essay won the uniwrsity-wide Socinl Science
Wri1i11g Awardfar 1996-1997.
he United Slates Senntc hns debated many imporlnnt
topics, but one of the most legendary battles was the fight
O\'cr the raiification of the Treaty of Versailles.
Associated with this debate was not only the treaty, but ~Isa
Woodrow Wilson's dream of a League of Nntions. In a
discussion about the debate's lasting fame, author Herbert
Margulies \\Tote th<.t "the story of the League's rejection has
entered folklore and become almost m)1hological, "ilh President
Woodrow Wilson and Senator Hem)' Cabot Lodge the
larger-Lhan·lifc protagonists."' The ramifications of the Scnai~'s
defont of the treat;' were both immedi ate and far-reaching.
Instead of becoming hea,·ily invoh·cd in Euro;>ean affairs, the
United States shied away from o prominent position in European

T

polit ic~.

At the time of Lhc debate, prominent voices of public opin ion
held Lodze responsible for the treaty's defeat. Afler the Sciintc
rejected the treaty for the second lime in the spring of 1920, a
New York 'l'ime.f editorial staled tliat " IV!r. Lodge might al any
time ha,·e secured raiilication with resen·ntions sufficient for
C\'el)' reasonable purpose... , and upo11 him, as the leader of ihc
Republican majority, the actunl responsibility Ifor the trcal)'s
rejection] falls and will rcsl."2 Since lhat time, however,
historians ha,·e rcc1·aluated the roles played by both Lodge and
Wilson. Current history textbooks reflect this change. In the
standard textbook Nation of Nations, the nuthors charge both

Lodge :iml Wilson wil11 some responsibility for the defont of the
treaty." Lodge .loved the Rep ublica n party more than world peace
and ccrtamly did not wnnl the Democrats lo win votes by takin"
. 1or
• ti 1e treaty."1 TI1e nulhors consider this to be one of the"'
crtd1t
m:irn reasons for Lodge's opposition to tJ1e treaty. As for Wilson,
tl\cy \'.Tile that "temperamentally the president could not abide
compromise: •·• This foilure Lo reach a compromise with Lod<>c
ar>d the Republicans, despite se,·cral opportunities Lo do s~,
eventually led IO the defeat of the trnaty. UltimMcly, Nalion of
N1111ons credits the Democrats i.n Lhc Senate with killing the
trcnty, st aling Lhnt "loyal Dcmocrnts had been forced lo deliver
the ki!lir1g bloll'. "'
At first glance, it appears that the Treaty of Vers:iiltes, and
with it the l..eai,•ue of Nations, should have been easilv ratified.
While the ari,~1mcnt in the Senate might appear to t;ave been
between pro-treaty, pro-League intenmtionalists led by President
Wtfson and anti-trc~ty, anti-League isolationists under the
lcadcrshi() of Lodge, this wiis not the case at all. ~.!though Lhev
had ,·cry different ideas as lo the role which tlie United St nl.;
should assume in what Wilson called the "new world order." both
~'.lgc ~nd ~':.ilson subscribed to internationalist doctrines..Ledge
bd1c,·ea \<Ilson hnd gone too far towards complete
1111cm~licnalisrn by allo\\'ing the League of )/ations to assume
po\l'crs which should only be claimed by the Congress, but he
was not opposed to the conccpl of a league. of nations. As
'.rofcssor Da,·id Fromkin writes, it misleads to suggest t.hat the
issue was isolntionism versus in1crnaLionalism. For most
SCo•.tors, the issue w:is \\nether they shared President Wilso:i's
par11cula1· brand of intcmalionalist vision or held one of several
nval internationalist ,·isicns.6
, Of co11rsc, l\\O·lh'.rds of 1hc Senate wns required to approve
the treaty m order for it Lo ukc force. \\'hilc this number is more
than a simple majority, il was cenainly within the reach of Wilson
'JJ:1ni:3 \Vest O;t\idson and othe:s. Ji.~r.lion ofJi,'atrons: 1i lV"arran'"' j{fsl()')'
Jlaf1une 11: S;nc(r 1865. 2d e<I. (Ne'v Yo~k. 1994).
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and his supporters. Within lhc Senalc, bcl\\'een 75 and 80 percent
of the senators favored joining the Lc3g>.tc. The American public
was just as favorable in joining of the Lcngue, with perhaps as
man;• as 80 percent of the people in agrccmenL Yct Americans
chose to make the ratification ,·ote n referendum on whetlter the
United States should pursue Wilson's League, or a milder league
proposed by Lodge and the RepubliC.1ns. This mild;;r league
would delegate less authority to tl1e League of Nations and leave
more control over foreign affairs in tl1e hands of Congress.
Lodee's decision shaped the debate from the beginning.
Other factors alro affected tl1e tone of the debate. E\·cn
before the ucatv had been completely finalized, Senate
Republicans felt that Wilson had ignored tl1eir opinions and views
on how the League of Nations should be constituted. Wl1en
choosing a Republic~:\ to be a member of the peace delegation
which went to Paris to \\Tile the lrc:ny, Wilson chose not lo pick
a member of the Scnotc. Instead he chose Hcniy White, who was
not a strong Republican, and did nol even li\"C in the Uni ted
States.' This displeased the Scnnlc Republicans, and it was only
the first of several political blunders which Wilson wou ld make
to irritate them. These \'Cry same senators would cast the crucial
votes which decided the fotc o(thc treaty, a treaty which they had
verv liulc input in \'.Tiling. Since the Republicans had gnincd
co~trol of tl1c Senate in the Congressional elections of 1918, lhey
would be a very impo11ant faclor in the treaty fight. Although
holding only a s:im Corty-nine lO fony-sevcn majority,
Republican votes would be necessary to rnti fy the tre3ty.
After returning to the United States from his initial
negotiating trip to Europe, several members of the Senate
informed Wilson that some chnngcs would be nccessal)' in order
Cor the trcatv to be approved by the Senate. ScvcrJI senators
suggested, i~ fact, that the proposal for the !..<:ague of Nations
should be separated from the rest of the trcnty and dealt with as
a scparat.~ entity. 13y doing tliis, the treaty "ould be assured of
ea;;\' ratification, and nny changes to the Covcn:mt of the leai,'Ue
\\"hlch the Senate deemed neccssal)' could be made without
scuuling the entire peace treaty. The President, howe\'cr, chose
net onlv
these suggestions, but to defy them openly.
- to disre•ard
~
~tdMgut~.\fi/d R~rvtH/011/su, 8.

ln n speech in New York prior to his rctum to Europe to finnlizc
the treaty, Wilson bragged that ""11cn thnt treaty comes back,
gentlemen on tl1is side will find the cO\'cMnt nOL only in it, but so
many thrcnds of the treaty tied to the covenant tl1at you cmmot
dissect the co\'ena11t from the treaty \\itl1out destroying the whole
Yitai stn1cture."8 In the end, that is precisely what happened, and
the treaty was destroyed.
Wilson's unwillingness to allow tl1e Senate to play even a
snull part in the \\Tiling of the treaty resulted in much bittcmcss,
especially on the Republican side of the aisle; howe,·ec,
disappo!ntm:nt with Wilson's handling of the situation was not
c.."'Ofined only lo Republicans. Thomas J. Walsh was a loyal
Democratic se.>.ator from Montana; nevertheless, he felt that "the
President ha;; handled the thing most maladroitly and has
evidcn:cd a disposition to e.-:clude the Senate from any real,
a:ti\·c participation in the making of the trcnty."•
\Vilson's actions during this time created considecable
animosity b:twcen himself and the leading Republican senators.
This nni1no>ity, in addition to the partisanship naturally present
between the two politica l parties, \•irtually assured tliat
Republicans would subject the Treaty oi Versailles to more
scrutiny than might otherwise be directed toward a similar treaty
under diffcrcnl circwnstanccs. These events set the stage for tl1e
heated battle which \\'ould occur in the Scnntc.
President Wilson did not present the treaty to the Senate 1mtil
Jul:c ID, 19 19, when he asked the Senate for its approval, as
prescribed in the Constitution. The senators expected Wilson lo
present a defense of lhc treaty, with particular attention being
given to the Co,•eirnnL Wilson, however, already considered the
Republicans 10 be hopelessly ngninst the treaty. \v11ilc he did
discuss the League during the address, he ne\'Cr referred to the
spc<:iftc issues opponents of 1he league had criticized. He instead
dcli"cred a speech in which he dwellcd on "lofiy generalities,"'~
ns th·~ Chicago Tribune disgustedly reported. The President
seemed to be unwilling to respond to Republican complaints.
The New York Tunes \\Tote that "from tl1c outset he !Wilson)
'llM<l '9.
'llMJ
-Ci!icago Tt-fb1r11e~ 11July 19 19.
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scc:ncd 10 SC."1.<;e !he hostilitv on lhc Republic:in side of the
Chamber and to foci the \'irtuai fu1ili1y of ;;Jl. ~PJ)Ca! lo 1hcm.''11
Wi lson implored the senators to rcali ?.c thnl 1hc time h~d
come lo r a world organizJtion such us the League of Nations to
be Conned. He made an impnssioncd plea for adoption of the
League:
They [statesmen) saw it (the League( as lhc main object
of !he peace, as the only thing that could complete it or
mnke it worth \\nile. They saw it as lhe hope of the
wo~ld, nnd that hope they did nol dara to disappoint
Shall we or any other free people hesilatc to nccept this
greut duty? Dare "e reject it and break the hcnrt of the
world'?':
While Wilson prcserJcd to the Senate an eloquent case for a
league of one son or another, he did nol show clearly why this
particular League of Nations proposal was better lhnn other
proposals that the Senate would consider.
\\iilson's failure ;o respond directly to his senatorial critics
fueled the opposilion. According to the Chicago Tribune, a
Hronsly Republican newspnpcr lllld a grcl t anrngonist of Wilson,
"senators, generally, had supposed Mr. Wilson would cndea\·or
to demolish the opposition by explaining the mysteries of the
covenant." The article continued: "Wl1~n tvfr. Wi lson touched
upon none of these concrete objections, but continued lo dwell 011
the beauties of self-sacrifice, national unselfishness, and the new
order of intcmationai sm, interest on the noor began to wane.""
The sennlors were in no mood for idcali~tic rhc.1oric; they wanted
to hear a cold, factual ~ccount of the trcaly's P'O\isions. Herny
Fountain Ashurst. a Democratic scnalor from ,\ri7ona, sununcd
up the situation .acutely when he wrote in his diary that "his
[Wilson's] audience wanted raw meat, he fed them cold tumips." 14
Wilson's speech changed few, if any, votes in the Scnote.
11
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The trca:y wcm first to the Foreign Relations Commillec,
where senators dcbalcd it for t\\O month5. As chairman of this
commillcc, Lodge controlled the entire process. He assumed the
di rlicull t3sk of attempting lo adopt some slrate1,•y which could
g~mc1· the \'Oles of two-thirds of a seriously divided Senate.
Vvl1ile less than two-thirds of ll1e Senate would have been
suflicicnt LO kill Wilson's treaty, this did nol satisfy Lodge. He
wanted the Senate to ratify a Republican version to be sent to L'te
President, forcing Wilson either to sign a Republican treaty or to
be directly responsible for rej ecting the treaty himself. Lodge
co1:sidcrcd two possible approaches. The commiltee could either
offer a111cndments or reservations. \Vhilc the distinction between
these two policies was sometimes confused c1·cn by the
participants in the debate, the difference proved \'cry importan~
An amendment added to the Lrcaly during ratification required
renegotiation. This meant that all parties to the treaty would have
to formally agree to the ch:inge by sii,'lling the treaty again. A
reservation, on the other hand, did not change ll1c actual text of
the treaty, allowing the other signatories to agree to it "without
fom1al ocknowlcdgmem" of the alteration."
The Senate, by this time, had broken into SC\'Cral fairly
wdl-dclincd factions. A smlll, bul unwa\'ering group of senators
w1!re against the League in any fonn. M O\\n as irroconcilables,
this group could be counted on 10 ~ole against Ilic treaty with or
without amendments or reservations. Composed of fourteen
Rcpublicntls and two Democrats, this group did noL play an
inllucnlinl role in the debate. Their minds were already made up,
and nothing could change their stance. The remainder of the
Republicans fa\'ored ratification, but harbored rescr\'ntions of one
type or anolhcr. 15 Mild rescrv~tionists fa\'orcd interpreri,·c
amendments or reservations, \\i1ich would only more clearly
dclin~ what had originally been intended by ll1e \\Tilers of the
lrcaty. Stro11g reservalionists, led by Lodge, wnnlcd to define
certain parts of the treaty more clearly, but not necessarily with
lhc same meani ng which had been intended by the framers of the
trc~ty.
The strong rcscrvationists outnumbered the mild
"luolxrt H. F=U. Woodrow Oi/W11 and World liar!, 1917-1921 (Now
Yoik, l9SS), t 76.
1
'Ahhough this grou? is no-...· c.nUcd rcscrvtllior.ist~. ~Onie of these scnaton.
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reservationists, but treaty supporters needed to win both groups
to rotify the treaty.n
All of the Scnnle Democrats supported the Wilsonian position
of no reservations or amendments, with the exception of two
irreconcilables. In several cases, Democrats gave the support
only out of party loyalty. Senaror Gilben Hitchcock led Lhc
Democrats. Not actually the minority leader, he lilied in for
Senator Thom:1s Martin, suffering from a tenninal illness. TI1is
change in leadership hurt the Democrats, not by ii\jl1ring party
unity, but by 'Cw1ailing their ability to devise a policy to woo
Republican support. Hitchcock's lack of experience as minority
leader limited his inOuenee among both Democrats and
Republicans. About twenty Republican votes would be needed
in orqcr to provide a twO·thirds majority when combined with
Joyal Dcmocrnls. Compromise would probably be necessary, but
despite his att~mpts, Hitchcock failed lo convince Wilson d1a<th is

'''as so. 111
One of the major stumbling blocks for rat.ilication was Art.iele
I 0 of the Covenai;t or the League of Nat.ions, which said:
The Members or the L<iaguc undertake lo respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial
integrity and c:<isting political independence of nil
Members of the League. In case of any such aggression
or in case of any threat or danger of such ag&'!'ession the
Cow1cil shnll advise upon the means by which this
obligalion shall be fulfillcd.19
This article expressed \.Vilson's view of collective security. It
authorized league n:embers to respond to any attack ogainst
;mother member nation. Rc.scrvationists thought that this article
ga\'e too much power to the Lea!,'lte and took away the
Con!,'l'Cssional right to decbrc war. President \Vilson, however,
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considered Anicle I 0 to be "the heart of !he Covemmto'.''° because
in his opinion, it embodied the major theme of the .entire Lcag11e.
Jn a conference with members of the Foreign Rclauons
Commiucc, Wilson staled that "Article 10 seems l~. me to
constitute 1l1e vcrv backbone of the whole covenant. Without it
Ilic Jcn~ue would be hardly more than an iniluenlial debating
society:;-,,. Since Wilson saw this urticle as one of the basic tenets
upon wltich the League was founded, he did not want any
rcsen:ations attached to it.
In tJ1e ForciQn Re.Jations Committee, Republican senators
introduced d iffc:ent amendments and reservations to be
discussed.
The committee approved several amendm~nts,
sending them to the full Senate for debate. The conunittec also
adopted four rcsen-alions which came to becaine known ~s. the
Lodge reservations. These reservations became the basts for
several different sets of reservations subsequently proposed b~"
Republicans for inclusion in the resolution of rati~c.ation. Th~
first of the Lodge Reservations protected the Umted Suites
"unconditional right to withdraw from the league." The second
rcsc1\'ation stipulated that the United States would not assume
an•t obligations under Article 10, or ony other article, except witJ1
Congres~ionnl approval. Lodge's third rcscrv.ation aiiin;1;d the
United States' right to determine "what quesltons are w1tl1m 11s
domestic jurisdiction," imd therefore outside of tl1c League's
jnrisdic!ion.
The founh reservation removed th': Monro~
Doctrine from the League's domain. This left the Umtcd Stales
free to enforce the Monroe Doctrine as she saw !ii, without
obtaining ~ppro\•al from lhe Lcague.z:
.
.
In the full Senate, voting began on the Foreign Rcfattons
Committe~'s amendments. As expected, the Democra(s stuck
together ;md generally voted against the amendments. On the
Republican side though, there was no such unanimity. The strong
rcscrvationists voted in fo\'or of some amendments, b1tt agamst
others. !\inc of the mild rescrvationists \'Oted against all of the
amendments. and as a result of this, all of the amendments were
rejected. \\~1ili: tJ1is migh t have seemed to be good news for
~,_i 1lk. ed .• Papers of iFil.~on, 63:452.
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Wilson and the Democrats, a closer look ut Lhe •:otc totals
re,'ealcd that it rc<1lly was not. The combination of loyal
Democrats and mild reservationists was enough lo provide the
simple majority necesmy to defeat amendments lo the rreaty, but
it was well sho1t of the two-thirds necessary to approve the trcmy.
Q,·er one-third of the senators, more thnn enough to kill the
treatv. voted for almost every amendment. This should have
indi;~ted lo \\iilson and the Demo:ratic leadership that
acconunod~1ting the strong reservationists would be a necessity if
the treaty was to have a good chance of being approved.;;
'Wilson's next n">)ve demonstrated his idealism in action·.
Instead of looking for compromise at this point, he chose to take
his case for the League of Nations directly to the people. On
AU!,'llSl 25, Wilson decided to deliver his message to the people
th.rough the Middle West and WcsL Prior to leaving for the tour,
Wilson sent a secret mcmorwdwu to Senalor Hitchcock, dated
September 3 ;ind titled "Suggestion." In this memornndurn,
Wilson outlined in his O\m words four reservations dealing with
t11e same topics as the Lodge reservations. Wilson apparently
inlcndcd the reservations to be proposed h~· Hitchcock, bur not
until Wilson hims.e lf gave him the order. If and when Wilson
gave Hitchcock permission to propose the reservations, he was
not to admit that tl1ey had actually been composed by the
Presidcnt.2 ·1
If Hitchcock had proposed the rcsen-ations at this point, a
.compromise might have been reached. Wilson, howc.vcr, wanted
to \\in ratification on his own terms. Consequently, he departed
on his speaking tour on the. same day that he gave the
memorandum to Hitchcock. The potential rescrvmions would
have lo wait until Wilson gave Hitchcock permission to propose
them, which would likely be upon Wilson's return from his trip.
By tlrnt time, though, the situation would be drastically different.
Wilson had wanlcd to launch his campaign as early as July
20. but at tlrnt time his advisers opposed the trip. Wilson hoped
10 demonstrmc during the tour that the public at large favored the
treaty, but his advisers pointed out tlmt the Senate was fairly

insulated from any pressure which could be applied by public
opinion.z; The Seventeenth Amendment had just been ratified in
1913, ~o the populace laeke.d experience with electing senators
directly. By lute AU!,'l1sl, however, Wilson felt that an appeal to
the people wus the only oplion !ell that could 111m the tide against
reservations, so accordingly, the President left Washington by
train on September 3. By the middle of September, the public
was becoming ,·ery responsive at every stop, and the speeches
drew large crowds. After a speech at Pueblo, Colorado on
September 25, however, Wilson ·showed signs of an impending
stroke. According to Dr. Cary Grayson,. Wilson's personal
physician saw t11is and informed the President that the remainder
of the trip must be canceled. And Wilson gmdgingly consented
and returned to 'Nashington.26
On Octob:r 2, only a few days after rctW11ing from the
western trip, \Vilson suffered a major stroke that paralyzed the
left side or liis body. The long-tem1 political effects of this
medical problem were almost as damaging. At the time, those
individuals "ho were very close lo the President employed a
great deal of dcc~ption so that the American people would not
find out how greatly the stroke had impaired Wilson's ability to
hold the onice. Irwin Hood Hoover was Head Usher of the \Vliite
House during Wilson's entire term of office and was de\'oted to
\.Vilson, bul in his rncn1oirs he \•:rites lhat "never ";as a conspiracy
so poimediy and so artistically fanned."" A news report dated
10:00 p.m. October 3 stated that "the President's illness is
diagnosed as 'nervous exhaustion,' but the danger is that the
present attack ... may develop into nervous prostration.""' The fact
thm Wibon had suffe.rcd ii stroke was not announced to the
public.
According m Dr. Bert Park, a medical doctor who has studied
Wilson's c;isc considerably, "that Wilson was disabled for at least
the first month of his illness in the constitutional sense, such that
h;;. was unable to carry out t11e duties of the office, the docwnents
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...make clear."~ lrnin Hoover was a bit more dcscripti\'C when
he wrote that "this original [sic] stroke or whatever it was simply
pul the President oul of business, mentally & physically for at
leas! n month. "30 Even when recovery fin~lly did begin to l>ccome
cvidc11l, 1t was painful!)' obvious to anyone \\i10 had kn0\\11 him
prior to the stroke that Wilson wns not tl1e man he had once been.
Hoover \\Tale lhal "!here \\-:IS no comparison " ith the President
thal went lo Paris and before. He could not talk pl ain, mumbled
more than he aniculated, was helpless and looked awful. ""
Wilson would ne\•er fully rcco,·er from tl1~ trauma which he
suffered during the stroke.
The relationship between Wilson's illness and the treaty
d~bate is of great importance, because lit a critical time during
which some compromises might have been made, Wilson, the.
lender of lhe pro-trcnty delegation, could not give nny direction
lo liitchcock in Lhe Senate. Even after he regained enough
streni.>th to begin raking a limited interest in political affairs ~g.ain,
the long-tenn cC!Ccts of his stroke still took tlteir toll. Although
it W:IS not kno"11 in Wilson's day, strokes also hJvc an effect on
an individual's psychologic~l well -being. These effects include
disorders of emolion, impaired impulse control, and defective
judgment. Fur'J1ennore, a stroke victim's underlying pcrsomtlily
trnits are greatly magnified and become plainly ob,ious. For
Wilson, these 1raits included intransigence. Usually hiddm by
Wilson's sense of pr•)pet and prudent behavior, it cnrrn: lo the
forefront after his Slroke and became evident in his actions
pertaining 10 the trear1. 12
\Vnile Wilson's recovery continued slowly, action continued
in the Senalc. On No,·ember 6, Lodge introduced fourteen
reservations whicl1 he hoped to aU:ICh to the trcmy prior lo
ratification. Some ofthcsc were similar to the original four Lodg~
reservations which the Foreign Relations Commiltcc had
proposed, but there were several additional rescrv111ions as well.
The list of resen>ations stmc<l: that the United States would nol
enforce sanctions \\~thout tl1e consent of Congress; that only the
1'lbid., 63:644.
10
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US woul<l decide if it had fulfille.d its obligmions m the La1!,'UC
if it withdrew; thnt mnadatcs would only be ncccp1cd \\ith
Congressional approval; that only the US would detennine wlrnt
qualified as a "domestic" issue; that no issues pertaining to the
Monroe Doctrine would be submiucd to the Lcnguc; that
arms-limitnlicn agr=cnts would be binding only if 1.hey were
gi,·cn Congressional approval; wd !hat the covenant of the
League must be amended to equalize the voting power of the US
and Great Britain in combination with its dominions . There were
ether reservations included, but these were the most important
ones.
Senator Hicchcock realiz.cd lhc situation lookc.d bleak. On
~o,·cmb:r 13, Hitchcock \>Tate to Wilson so that he might be
kept abreast of the la lest developments. He in[ormed Wilson thnt
the Republicans were solid in their support of !he Lodge
reservations, und 1h11t the Democrats offered substitute
rcscn-;llions, similar lo those suggested by Wilson prior to his
speaking trip. These substitute rcscn>ations drew !he support of
all but three or four Democrats. Hitchcock also spelled out the
Democrat's plan for voting on resolutions of ratification. They
intended lo oITcr a rcsolulion of unqualified ratificntion to rival
Lodge's resolution of ratification \\itl1 reservations, knowing full
well that their resolution would be defeated. Thcv would then
offer intcrprcti,·c reservations in place of the Lodge .Rcsen·ations,
ngnm e.xpectmg defC:lt. The purpose of this wiis to "make the
dcmocrntic record clcnr." 1)
1litchcock proposed to Wilson thnt the Dcmocrnts vote
against the resolution of ratification containing !he Lodge
rescrv:i1ions \\·hen it came lo a vole. This would assure its failure.
There was, however, another possibility. Hitchcock \\TOtc:
"This plan is subject to modification, however, in cnsc when lhe
time arrives we shall determine, or the Presidenl shall advise us
to vote for the Lodge resolution.""
With this slnlcmcnl,
Hitchcock intended to give \Nilson an opportunity lo clrnnge his
st?nce on reservations, since the trC:lty would apparently not pass
"1lhou1 the Lodge re$Crvations :1rtached. Hitchcock followed up
this correspondence to Wilson \\llh a pcrson:il visit on ~o,ember
1
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J 7. Hitchcock hoped that the spirit of comp;omisc which Wilson
had displayed brieny, prior to his ill-fated westem trip, \\'OUld
again be manifested in Wilson's behavior.;'
Upon asking the President if he had any1hing to suggest nbout
the Lodge resolution. Hitchcock soon disco,·cred that any
disposition which Wilson might have had toward compromise
bad been deslro~'Cd. The President responded "l consider it n
nullification of the Treaty and utter])' impossible." ScMIOr
Hitchcock tl1e11 noted that lhc Senate had made some changes to
Article 10 of the Lca~~·c covenant, and proceeded to describe the
changes. Wilson \\'US not impressed, and staled: "Th:tl cuts the
very heart out of the Treaty; I could not stand for those changes
for a moment because it would humoiate the United Stntcs before
all of 01e allied countries." Wilson's bitterness toward the
Republicans was clear when he told Hitchcock lhat "I " i ll get
their [Republicans] poliLical scalps when the truth is kno\\'n to the
people.... Mind you, ScnaLOr, I have no hostility towards these
gentlemen bul an utter contempt. • )6
Hitchcock wanted to mnke certain compromises with the
Republic.'UIS, but Wilson was set against it. The Presitk:nt
considered e\·erything except interpretive reservations, which did
not change the substnnce of the treaty, as being loo
compromising. Aficr his conference wilh Prcsidenl Wilson,
Hitchcock spoke to the press about his discussion with the chief
executive. He inforrr.ed them that "President Wilson will pocket
the treaty if 1he Lodge pro1,'Tam of reservations is carried 0111 in
1he ratifying resolution." 17 ltl olher words, even if the Lodge
resolution passed wiih a veto-proof two-thirds majority in lhc
Senate, Wilson would refuse to comple1c the rotification process.
This action would send the Lrealy back to the Senate at the
begiJUiing or the next session to start the entire process o,·cr
again.
By No,·ember 19, the Scn3te was fmally ready to vole on lhe
difterent resolutions of ratificalion. Before any votes were cast,
howe,·cr, there was one finnl bit of political wrangling. Before the
vote took pince, Senator Hitchcock circulated among the
"Ibid., G•:43.
"Ibid.
"Ibid., 64:•18.

D:mocrats in 1hc Se nate a letter from President Wilson
discussing 1hc Lodge rcsolulion in which he \\TOLe: "In my
opinion, 1hc resolution in that form do:s not provide for
ra1ificatioa bul, rather, fo~ the nulli fication of the 1rcaty. I
sino:rely hope that ll1e friends and supporters of the treaty will
, · 0 tc against 1hc Lodge resolution of ratification." Senator Lodge,
sensing a chance to mJke Wilson look foolish for urging the
Sennlc to \'Ole ngainst a resolution califying his O\m treaty, read
the kllcr to the entire Senate. Finally, debate was closed, and the
YOting began-"
The scnalors firs1 voted on the resolution of ratificmion with
the Lodge rcscrvmions nlloched. This resolution received
thirtv-ninc \'Otes in favor of ratification and fifty-five votes
o~ai;1st ntti fication. A motion was nrndc to reconsider, so the
s;me resolution co nle up for a second vote. This time the measure
was defeated forty-one to fifty. Consequently, the Lodge
resolution went down to d·~ fca t. Then, as plaJUied by Hitchcock
and the Democrats, the Senate voted on a resolution of
ratification "ill1 no reservations at all The resolution rccei\·cd
thirty-eight votes in fa\•or of ratification, versus fi11y-three \'Otes
a2ainsl ratifiC3tion. Similar margins decided all three votes.
None of 1l1em came close lo lhe necessary two-thirds majority.
The Trcatv or Versailles was dead, at least in this session or
Congress.'•
When the nexl session of Congress began in Januruy of 1920,
Viilson ugJin sent the treaty to the Senate for rali!icaiion.
Unfortunnicly for the supporters of the treaty, he hnd not altered
his stance in the least since the previous Senate's actions. In the
Presidcnl's traditional Jackson Day message to Democral.S, he
stood bv his earlier posilion; namely, thal interprelh·c
rcscrYnti~ns were acceptable, but no1hing else. Me wrote, "We
c:i:mot rc\\Titz this treaty. We must take it wilhout changes which
al:cr its mcanmg, or lca\-e it.'""' Only compromise could have
saved the treat\' in the Senate, bul Wilson le[! no room fOf
maneuvcrins. TI1e treaty came up for another vote on ~farch. 19.
The resolution of ratification including the Lodge reser\'ahons
~P.Cong.-cssionRI Rccord,, 661h Cong.. l s1 se."s. (1919), 8"i6l\.
391'.'ew f c;rk Tr'H11t..f, 20 Novcmb:.-r 1919.
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was defeated, with r~rty-nine senators voting in favor of Lhc
rcsclutioa and thirty-five voting against it. Despite the foci thnt
twenty-one Democrn1s broke ranks lo join with Republican
supponcrs of the Lodge resolution, it fell seven votes short of
being approved by two-thirds of the Scnate.'1
This S<:COnd defeat ended Woodrow Wilson's dream of
American participation in the League of Nations, but ullimatelv,
Wilson himself was r!sponsible for !cadin!! lhe Democrats to ~n
ignominious defeat. By refusing e\'cry attempt at compromise,
Wilson ignored U1c political realities of the situation. Even
several members of his own party believed llu\L some reservations
were necessnry, but Wilson stubbornly clung to the idea U1nt the
treaty could somehow be approved without reservations. I le
repenL~dly refused 10 accept opportunities to reach some sort of
agreement with his adversaries, and even with SenaLor Hitchcock,
his own pany's lcndtr in the Senate. By asking Dcmocrnl.S to
rcjccl his o"n treaty, Wilson left them with no good altcrn3tives.
They could either ,·ot~ for the treaty and humiliate the President,
or vote against the treaty and kill it In the final analysis, nearly
half of the Senate Democmts did vote again5t Wilson's \\ishes,
but this was not enough lo save the treaty. for these reasons, the
D~mocrats were responsible for defo<1tin!! the Tre:itv of
Versailles. This ended nn unfortunate clrn1;ter in the storied
history of Consressio~al debates.

The Life of l\1ary J. Booth
lJrnntlie E. Banks
llranclic B<ml::s, an Eru1em Illinois undergraduate, wrote
this biography for Historical Sources and Techniques
fl fis 2500) 1111der l'rofessor Christopher Waldrep as a
regulnr weekly nssfgnmcr.t req1li1·i11g use of t!te
Uni>·ers·ity Archives a1 Boofii Library i11 Fall 1996.
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ary Josephine Booth, librarian at Eastern Illinois Stace

College from 1904-1 945, was instrumenul in the
acqu isition of the current library facility in use todny.
Had it not been for Booth's persistence and dedication to her
profession, the building of Booth librarv \\'ould hnve been
delayed ccnsidcrnbly. Mary Booth \\'a; a truly rem11rkablc
woman whom e\·eryone respected and ndmired for her
~ommiuncnt to the University. She fought for funding of a new
hb~ary ~nusc she bclie'-cd it would be an integral part of the
UruYcrsny. Only by Booth's insislcntc was the need for a new
libr3_'): ns~csscd by the Illinois State Legislature. By trneing Mary
Boo,h s lustOI)'. one can see more clearlv her moti\'ation.
Booth lived from J 87G to 1965. Booth was bom in Beloit
~'iisconsin: to ~ohn Jnd Mi_nerva (Leonard) Booth. She graduated
lrom Beloit High School m 1893, alt~ndcd Beloit College, and
then the Uni\'crsity of Illinois Librarv School where she
grJduatcd in 1904. She immediately ,;as hired bv President
Li'·ingston C. Lord nnd started work ihat fall at Easiern Illinois
S tatc Coll~gc. Booth wns the third 1ibrarian at Eastem where she
stayed w1til she rctircd in 1945, except for a brief but important
•~tcrludc when she served as a Red Cross relief worker during the
First World War.1 Booth was state treasurer and later Prcsid:nt
of the Illinois Library Association, as well as a member of the
Daughters of U1e American Revolution Women's Overseas
Service Lcaf,'UC, and the American As~iation of l:ni,·crsity
Women.
.

.'rvt.uy I. Booth, 1~04-19-15, r...1ary J. Booth Collc"Ction. Universilv
Arduvcs. Booth L1bn'll)'• EJ\s:1cm U!innis tJniv~rsily, CharleHoo, Ulinois.
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was defeated, wilh forty-nine senators voling in favor or the
resolution and thirty-five \'oting against it Despite the face that
twenty-one Democrats broke ranks ro join wilh Republican
supporters of the Lodge resolution, it fell seven ,·otcs short of
being appro,·cd by two-thirds of the Senate. • i
This second defeat ended Woodrow Wilson's dream of
American participation in the League of Nations. but uhimatel\',
Wilson himself wns responsible for leading the Democrats co ~n
ignominious defeat By refusing every auempt at compromise.
Wilson ignored the political realities of tl1e situation. C:vcn
se\•ernl members of his O\\il party beLleved that some rcser•ations
were necessary, but Wilson stubbornly clung to the idea thnc the
treaty could somehow be approved without reservations. J!c
repeatedly refused to i1cccpl opportunities lo reach some so1t of
ai,>rcement with his adversa ries, and even \\ilh Senator Hitchcock,
his own party's leader in the Senate. By <isking Dcmocrnls 10
reject his 0\\11 lm\ly, Wilson left them \\ilh no good alicmatives.
They could either \'Ote for Ille trcatv
. ;md humiliate the l'rcsidcnl,
or vote against the treaty and kill it. In the final analvsis ne11tl\'

half of the Senate Democrats did vote against Wilson's

~vishc5,

but this was nol enough to save the u-....ary. For iliese reasons, the
Democrats were responsible for defeating the Treaty of
Versailles. This ended an unfortunaic chapter in tl1e storied
history of Congressional debates.

T he Life of.1.\-tary J. Booth
Brandie E. Banks
/lrandie Hanks. QJ1 l!iutem 11/inois undergraduate, wrote
this brogr"phy for Historical Sources and Technlque.f
(His 2500) under I'rofeuor O;ristopher Jfo/clrep as a
regulnr "·eel:ly assignment requiring use of the
University Arc·hives at Booth L i/Jrary in Fall 1996.
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ary Josephine Booth, librarian at Eastern Illinois Stale

College from 1904-1945, was inslr\.unencal in the
.
ncquisit ion of the current library facility in use today.
Had 1t not been for Booth's persistence and dcdicJtion to her
profession, 1hc building of Booth libraf\' would ha\'C been
delayed considerably. Mary Boo!h was· n truly remarkable
woman whom everyone respected and admired for her
commilnlcnt to the University. She foul!ht for fw1di112 of a new
li~~ary ~=use she believed it would ~ an integral part of the
Llnffers1ty. Only by Booth's insistence w<1s the need for a new
libra~: assessed by the Illinois St~tc Legislature. By tracing Mary
Booths l11story, one can see more clearly her moli\'ation.
13oolh lived from 1876 lo 1965. Booth was born in Beloit
\~iscon.~in: to ~ohn and Minerva (Leonard) Bootl1. She grnduatcd
trom Bclo11 High School in 1893, attended Beloit College and
then the \;ni,·crsity of Illinois Library School where' she
graduated iii 1904. She immcdiatelv was hired bv President
Li\'rngston C. Lord and started work ihat fall ut Eastern Illinois
Stale College. Booth wns the tl1ird librarian at Easlem where she
stayed w1lil she retired in 1945, except for a brief but important
inlerluJ c when she served as a Red Cross relief worker durin• the
.
I
o
F•rsl World War. Booth wns state treasurer and later President
of the Ulinois Library Associ~tion, as well as a member of the
Dau~htcrs of the American Revolution, Women's Overseas
Service l..cJ!,'llC, and the American Associatioa of University
Women.

~Mary J. Bcx;lil, t80•-t945, Mary J. ilooD1 Collection, Univcrsily
J\r<1h1\•.;s, Booth Library. EaS1ern Illinois Uni·:ersity, Ch~rle.ston, i11inoh;,
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During her tenure at Eastem, Booth nindc rnJn,·
contributions. Her ll"ork meant so much to her t11n1 often sh~
would sacrifice her O\\n health for the job. In n correspondence
from the secretary of the Illinois State Historical Library, Jessie
Weber stntcs: "I heard from some of the librnI\' ladies tlm ,·our
hc.~lth hod not been good and I was \'Cf)' so~; to hear it, but I
musi confess that I was noLmuch surprised, for you know that I
had told you when we were in Mackinaw together that you were
working too hard and using up too much nervous encrgy."l This
kucr prOl'CS that Gooth was extreme!\' dcl'otcd to the Univcrsitv
and to her profess ion.
·
Booth wns nlso very acti\•e \\'ith the Red Cross. She bccmnc
in\'ol\'cd by scrYing as lhc head of the Red Cross relief \\'Ork
when a cyclone hit Mattoon and Charleston in I 916. After this
incident, when the call for ll"Orkers for tl1e First World War
sprallg up, Booth jumped nl the chance. She was the only faculty
member nt Eastern lo sen·cd overseas. Bootl1 \'Olwitccrcd in the
fall of 1917 and arrived in France on No\·cmbcr 27. She served.
as a Red Cross Canteen worker in the aviation trnining center m
lsoudum until Mny 191&. Her library experience caused her to~
transferred to the American LibraJY Association for the rcmnindcr
of hcr stay. She wns posted to do militnry camp library work in
P:iris, Chaumont, and Gievres, France, and also in Cob lcnz,
Germany. Booth classified the library al General Pcrshi11g's
hcndqunrcers and was in charge of the library in the Fcstha lle.
Coblen7.. Booth returned lo the United Stntcs on Julv
. 17 19 I 9'
and lo Enstcm lhnl Fall.' Booth later conuncmcd on 1J1c n~1iona l
effort lo send books O\'Crseas in a speech to the Daughters of the
.American Revolution:

.

From one of my letters: One hundred and cichtv-nine
cases of book-s came into the library tl1is last \~k. and
we ha\'C all buc about fony unpacked and soncd. Man"
ca~es have been packed and sent out. I know they uill be
?Jessie Palmer \\'cbcr, Springficl<f, llli:1cis., to ~.iary J. Booth. Ch:trl:$tOn.
Jllino:s, 1 7 ()(;1ober 191 1, ?vlary J. Uooth Colfce(k1n. Lro;'.~niity J\r::hi'.'c!I, 8CJO\h
Library. Et1.stcm lllinoi.s Univetsity?Cha.rlcsto1l Illin{li.li
'Clvirl-cs H. Colcn1:i.n. £1.r.rf~rn /Hinois Stale College: Fifty ru<trs 0/1'1.blr~

Sen•;ce (Sprincflcld, 11., 19;0). l 7l.

opprcciotod, for the boys like good American books and
these nre lhnl kind.'
Baoth worked very hard to provide books for the troops She
sll!l:med up her \'Olwiteer c:qiericncc: "[cJarly in July we n:;ich.xl
l\<.·w York and the experiences overseas became a memo!)',
happy in part, sad in part, mingled with a feeling or 1h3nkfulncss
1hnl I had been permitted to be over there."' Perhaps Booth's
librarian experience in the war prompted her lacer in her career to
r~alizc tl1e need for a new library at Eastern. TI1e library
S)ntboli?.cd n necessary part of the school jusl as it hod been n
necessary part of the soldier's lives which gave them hope.
Booth's contributions to the University are another example
of how dedicmcd she wns in promoting learning amongst the
sludcnls. Booth published many of her own. works including
records of books in her library, geoyaphy matcrfol indexes
()ow'ill1i of Geography), and her Index to Material 011 Plc111re
Swdy (an index to children's books). She scn1 library information
booklets out to other uni•'Cl'Sities and correspondence from
Phineas L Windsor of llte Unh'enity of Illinois Library School
shows 1hat Mory Booth often sent her publications to other
schools without charge.• Booth's work was truly her passion.
Mary Gooth elso contracted to work outside tl1e Uni\'~rsity
compiling indexes for other organizations and for the Index
oillcc, a nationnl library categorizing orgnnization. Booth spent
a month organizing the librnry at the Southwescem Louisiana
Institute in Lnfoycllc, Louisiana, which increased from 4,000 to
I 0,000 books to gain membership to the Southern Association of
Colleges.' During Se\'eral summers, Booth worked as n volunceer
wilhoul pay al the New York Public Library. Booth gained
\'alu:1blc cxpcrionce and knowledge of the variety or books
nvnilable. There is much com:spondcncc of Booth rcqucsliug
libnL'' materials, sending books back lo tl!eir original schools,
:Ind discussing the Dewer Decimal system. Her correspondence
4
Mitry J. Booth, •Doot.:s O\'tr Tbcrc,w s:pc:eh lo lht: Oij\JShlm o!' lt(
Arr.crlca;11Rt\'Olution, S February l936? t.iary J. Boo!h Collection.

j!bid.
\;ok1n11:i~ F!PY >'.:ors o/Sc.,TV;c~. 359~ Phin::a-; L. \\'indsar, Urb:tntt, lHinois
IC r"ttl~ J. Booth. Chw-lestoa. Illinois, 14 /\pril 1925, f\.1:iry J. Oooth Coll c~ti o11.
'.·I111,<:1::~da111 I:\'t11lug Rt•r:otdCJr (Nc:'v York). 19 April 1923.
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shows Booth was in high demand. She was asked to compi le n
bibliography of poems written about Abe Lincoln for the
centennial of Lincoln's birth in 1908.1 Booth was, in foci, so well
kno\\n in the library community that she felt conr.dcnt enough 10
apply for !he editorship at the 11.W. \Vindsor co~1pany, 3
prestigious publishing house in New York.
Among oil 1l1csc examples of Booth's persistence, the biggest
accomplishment in her life was 01c building of the Mary J. Booth
Library on Eas1ern's campus. From 1900 lo 1948, the library nt
Eastern Illinois Stale College increased from 2,500 books to O\'Cr
67,000 books. The libr~· was localed in Old Main and sprawled
over six classrooms before the new library was built Books were
stored in the "tower" which made them highly inaccessible.
Reading space was also inadequale as the student population rose
year nflcr year. Jn 1933, limited spnce and a growing student
body caused 1hc srncks to be closed to sludcncs.~ In the 1930
Warbler yearbook, Miss Booth ouclincd the type of building that
was nccdcd. 1 Finally, after much insistence on the mnLtcr of 1he
new librnry, the Illino is Gcncml Assembly appropriated
$2,0 L0,092 for th~ building and another $80,000 to [urnish it in
October 1947.11 The hbrary building, named after Booth, \\as 1hc
first major building erected at Eastern since 1940. An article in
the Illinois Stale Register said about Booth: "She has 1hc
distinction of being one of the first li\•in2 wcman academic
lenders in Illinois for whom n college building was named. "12
This was quite rm accomplisluuent for a \\'Oman at that rime.
Mary Booth recei\'cd an honorary Doctor of Literature degree
from Beloit College on June 5 of the same year as the grand
opening of the new librnry. When Booth died on January 2, I%5
at !he age of Sll, the local newspaper produced a lcn£thy tributc.u
Mory Boo!h's cr:rly contributions 10 the Uni\'crsitv and her
persistence and dedication were the inspimtion for and prompted
construction of 01e muc.'1 n::cdcd library facility in use today.

°
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lllinoi~

S1:11c J--listt"rical Libra1y1 Springf'itld) Jllinoi~

tt1 ~.1r1ry

CharlCS:t()l'1, :lliuois, 5 D::cembi:r 1908. f\.Ury J. 13oolh Collection.
'Co!i:tnttn, Fij:y J"e,rrsq/Serw·c,·, 279.
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The U-2 Incident
Am1111d11 Sramlerfr.r
Am11nda Sranderfer is a grad11ale s111de111 in hi.wary ar
Et1stcr11 Illinois University cmd ht1s held the lllinois
Regional Archives Depository lnremship m Booth
Lil>rary. 771is essay was wrille11 for a seminar in
f)fplommic History with Professor Mark White. ft was
co-wlMner of 1:.e Hamand Grad11me Writing Award for
i997.
n No\·cmbcr 1954, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, nod
se"crnl 01hcr ad\•isors approached President Dwight D.
Eisenhower aboul proceedini; with a progrnm for a special
high-performance aircraft possibly t~ be used for reconnaissance.
They wanted to produce about thirty pl~nes for around .$35
million. Lockheed had developed, under tight security, a lightweight plane called the U-2, which could maintain altitude_s over
60,000 feel for a long period of time. Eisenhower later said i.11ot
"any le~k of information either al home of abroad could compel
1
ab;ndonmcn1 of the c:itirc idea of such a reconnaissance planc."
Th; nnme L:-2 or a utility plnnc, ctooked its reconnaissance
capabilities. Since the govcmmenl could not deny Ll~e exis_tencc
of the plnnc, it was said to be used for gathe.n ng clunntc
infonnntion armmd the world. The President approved lhe plan
bccnuse of 1hc need for intelligence information about the Sovie!
Union, nnd, consequently Jlights began in 19.56. Pilots from the
Air Force, including Francis Gary Powers, were chosen based on
their experience and rigorously trained.
On I :0-.fay 1960, Powers's plane crashed near Sverdlovsk,
ncar!y 1,500 mile.s imo the heart or Russ~a, spa.rking a ~sible
intcmaJionot crisis. TI1e President was mformcd when 1l Wl'.S
cc11ai11 thnt 1h~ plane was missing. The President was also 1old
that lhe possibility th~t the pilot li\'Cd was slim to n~nc. I le had
bcm "nssmcd thal if a plane were to go down 11 \\'ould be

I

"!biol., 28 I
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shows Booth was in hi~h demand. She was :;sked to compile a
bibliogrnphy of poem; mitten about Abe Lincoln for the
centennial of Lincoln's birth in 1908.1 Booth w:is, in foci, so well
kilo"n in the libra;y cotnmunity thnt she felr confident enough to
apply for the editorship at the H.W. Windsor company, a
prestigious publishing h:msc in New York.
Among all these examples of Booth's persistence, !he biggest
accomplishment in her life was the building of the Mory J. Booth
Library on E:islcm's campus. From 1900 to 1948, the librnry nt
Eas tern Illinois Stme Col!C!,'C incrca.sed from 2,500 books ro O\'cr
67 ,000 books. The library was located in Old Main and sprawled
O\•cr six classrooms before the new library was built. Books were
ste<cd in the "tower• which made tl1cm highly inaccessible.
Reading space was also inadequate as tl1e student population rose
year nflcr year. In 19;.3, limited sp~ce and a growing student
body caused the swcks 10 be closed to s tudcnts.9 In the 1930
W"rblcr yearbook, Miss Booth outlined !he type of building th3l
was necdcd.'° Finally, .:fier much ins istence on the matter of the
new librn.ry, the Illinois General Assembly appropriated
52,0 I0,092 for the building and another $S0,000 ro furnish it in
October 1947.11 The library building, named after Booth, was the
first major building erected at Eastern since 1940. An article in
the Illinois St:1tc Register said abouL Booth: "She has the
dislinction of being one of !he first li\'ing woman academic
leaders in Illinois for ,·chom a college building was named.""
This was quite an nccomplishmcnl for a wonrnn at that time.
Mnry Booth rccci,·cd on honorary Docror or litcrnturc degree
from Beloit College on June 5 of the same year as the grand
opening or the new librn:y. '\'hen Booth dic<l on January 2, I 9G5
nt the age of 88, the local newspaper produced a k n1'lhy tribute."
Mary Booth's car:y contributions to the Uni,·crsi!y and her
persistence and dedication wcre the inspirnticn for and prompted
construction of the much needed library faci lity in use today.
4Jlliuois S1;a1e H.islorical l ibrary, Sp.ringfii:!d, Illinois 10 f\.1.:;S')· J. Booth,
Char?cston, Jlliuois, 5 J)~c::nt~r 1908, Mnry J. Ikl<Jlh Collection.
~Cok1nun, f<l[ty
1
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The U-2 Incident
Amanda Standerfer
Amanda Swnderfer is a graduate student in hf.uory at
Eastern l/!inois University and lws held the Illinois
Regional Archives Deposirory Internship cu Booth
Library. This essay was wrltren for o .~eminar in
l)fplomallc Hiswry with Professor Mark White. ft w<1S
co-winner of th~ Hamand Graduate Writing Award for
1997.
n J\O\'Cmbcr 1954, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and
sc\'cral other advisors appro3chcd President D\\ight D.
EiscnhO\\'Cr aboul proceeding \\i th a program for a special
high-performance aircraft possibly to be used for reconnaissance.
Thcv wonted to produce about tl1irty planes for aroU11d $3 5
million. L-Ockheed had developed, under tight security, a light·
wcighl plane cnllcd the U:2, wh i~h could maintain a!ritudes over
60,000 feet for a long period of umc. Eisenhower later said that
"any ]cal: of information either at home of abroad could compel
abwdoMlcnl of the entire idea o f such a reconnaissance plane."'
The mime U-2 or a u\i\ity plane, cloaked its reconnaissance
capabilities. Since the government could not deny the exis.tence
of the plane, ir was said lo be used for gathenng clunale
infom1mio11 armuid the world. The President approved the plan
because of the need for intelligence infonnalion about the Sov iet
Union, r.nd, consequently flights began in 1956. Pilots from the
Air Force, including Francis Gary Powers, were cl1oscn based on
their experience and rigorously trained.
On 1 May 1960, Powcrs's pl:uic crashed near Sverdlovsk,
ncarlv I 500 miles into the hem of Russiti, sparking a possible
- '
.
intcmntional crisis. TI1e President was infonncd when 1t was
•cnain that the plane was missing . The President was also told
that the possibility that the pilot lived was slim to none. He had
been "nssurcd that if a phmc were to go down •t would be
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destroyed either in the air or on impact, that proof of e.~pionagc
would be lacking.'0
On May 3 NASA issued a s!a!emzn! saying thnt a U-2
rcs;:~rch plane flying o\·cr Turk-~· on a Air Weather Scr\"icc
mission had gone do'rn in the Lake Van, Turkey area on Sunday,
May I. NASA was told to issue this statement, Md really did not
know about the U-2 p~ogram or what had happened on May I.
The Soviets did not issue a statement 1m1il May 5, bonsling lhat
they has shot down a United States reconnaissance plane. At this
point, !he Presidcnc, upon IJ1e recommendation of his advisors,
decided to continue lo maintain the co,·cr story sngscsting that
the pilot had difficulty with his oxygen equipment and moy have
suayed into So,·iec air space, and that this was the r lnne chat
Klirushchev an!law1eed hod been shot do\\n. They felt it was
irnponant to issue a stn'.cmcnt in response to Khrushche\• in order
to in::iiut:iin the '1 cl'edibil i~·" oft11e "explrination."!
Then, on May 6, Khrushehe\' allllounccd thal the pilot,
Fr:incis G~ry Powers, was "afi,·e and kicking.•
A Stale
Dcpnrtment stalement acknowledged lhe need for "intclligencccollccting acti•itics," b~t more or less still clung to the false cover
story. Th e next morning, the President, again upo!I the ad\'ice of
his aides, issued a Slntcmcnt "ncbnitting the essentia l tnith or lhc
So,·iet allcgalio11s," :ind accepling full rcsponsibilily~
At the Pnris Summit on May 16, Khmshch~v dem:u1ded an
apology, nn end to all U-2 flights, nnd punishmcnl of the
respm1siblc pa1tics. Eisenhower hod n!readv said that the Oi i:thts
would be ended, bm he \\'Otild not apologi~. He did not fc~I it
wos. ncccssory to "permanently tic 1hc hands of the United Slates
g0\'en11nen1 for tlie s ngle purpose of sal'ing a conference.•
Khrushchev refused lo believe that th~ Prcsidcnl w~s behind the
nights, nnd w~ntcd someone, Dulles or Nixon prcfcrnbly,
punished for sending 1he U-2 O\-er So\'ict airspace. Khrushchev
was also dissatisfied \\ith Eisen_~ower's word that the flights
would not be resumed. De Gnullc, Macmillian, and Eisenhower
made several nttcmptS to get Khrushche1· lo con:e lo lhc meelings,
~Ibid,. ~47.
3 Jbid.,

S49.

~ I bid. ,
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'Ibid .. 554.

but he continued to insist lhal Eisenhower npologiz.c. The
Summil concluded before it ever re~lly started.
The U-2 episode poses se\•eral important qucslions: first,
1111S the decision to slnrt the U-2 program the besl wu~· 10
O\'Ctcome the problems created by the secrcty of the Sol'ict
Union? Second, was a night over the Soviet Union so close to
1hc Paris Summit necessary? Third, was the inilinl co1·cr-up the
best way to deal with the incident? And founh, could something
ha1·e been done lo save the Paris Summit? To es1oblish a case,
this paper \\'ill make use of Eisenhower's memoirs and papers, but
will also consider Khrushchev's, Powers's, and the mcdi•1's role in
1hc U-2 incident.

-{\'ins tl1c decision to start the U-2 program the best ahcrnnti\'C
to cracking 1hc secrecy of the Sol'iet Union?
President
Eisenl1owcr hesitated to have American pilots fly over Soviet
territory. He knew he had to re5pond to So•ict secrecy. Border
pilots and spy balloons had been used in the past "iU1 little
success. Of course, the Americo:is also had spies in the Sovkt
Cnion. Ycl, informntion from these spies took a long tim e to
reach the United States, and invol ved great risks. Eisenliower and
his advisors snw tl1e need to develop some olhcr way 10 extract
infonnation from the Sovicl Union. The President was e~tremely
"intelligence-minded," so the idea of the U-2 appealed to him
C\'cn though he had serious doubts.6 Eisenhower's advisors noted
tha1 the Soviets spied from !heir s~tellite, and tl1at technically
lh·~rc were no intemational laws against sending planes over other
countries. Besides, the advisors said, the Soviets would tnkc
~d,•amagc of this technology if 1hcy had it. T11c President
approved lite program, but there was always the matter of
continuing the flights, and tl1e President's ad•isors were quick
\\ilh reasons why the U-2 htld the best rctom1aissa ncc
capabilities.
Eisenhower felt that a viable altemalivc to the overflights was
a satell ite. The Soviets had their own satellite which could take
pie1urcs of the United States. In 1959, aboul lhr~'C years <1ft.c r lhc
"h.1n.:hncl R. l3cscl1los:1, lvltr,.wlo~v, (N,.":-.•: 't'c-rk. 1986), 3G3.
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beginning of lhc o,·crllights, Eisenhower sugge.~tcd in a mc~l ing
that 1he U-2 overfligh11 should be curbed and more nd,·an-:cd
technology developed to replncc them. One of his nd\'isors
"poinlcd out that the new equipment will not be a\'ailablc for
eighteen months to two years."' Thus, the President bclic\'c<l that
U-2 ovcrflighls were his only option for probably the nc't two
years. Eisenhower lllso srud that he was hcsilant lo OUlhoriz.e
more !lights because nothing would make him "declare war mere
quickly than ''iolation of our air space by Soviet nircraft."8 It was
for those reasons lhat lie President was againsl nn extcnsi"e U-2
progrnm. Reconnaissance satellites would not 'iolatc anrnne's
airspace, so Eisenhower felt that "lhe SJtellite rcprcsc1;ts 1hc
grca1est future in this reconnaissance area.''9 E\·en thoueh
Eisenhower c~pressed this opinion, his ad\'isors kept insisting ~n
the importnnce of ca;r:ing out U-2 missions immcdiatclv.
Eisenhower's ad,·isors took the role of salesmen. To kc,:;p
business going, 1l1ey htd lo conduce their boss that ii " ·as the
best course of action. The President could dc,·elop all the
s~tellites that he wantc:I, as long as he kept approdng the U-2
flights.
The President was also hesitant to use the U-2 during Ilic
continuing Berlin crisis Eisenhower said that "it would be most
unwise to have world tensions e:rnccrbutcd by our pursuit of a
prof,'11lm of cxtcnsi\'e reco1maissnnce (lights o\'cr ll1e territory of
lhe So,ic~ Un ion.'" 0 The President had clear concerns about h:)\\
1he U-2 would effect international relations in the e\'cnt of a
mishap. \Vhy "~ th.s not a m~jor concern 10 his nd\'isors?
Again, they seem only lo be interested in keeping the progrnm
and lhc information pro\'ided alive. In another meeting 1he
President worried '"o,-.:r the terrible propaganda imp:1: t that
would be occasioned if n reconnaissance pfone were to foil.""
'Mc1ucrandcm For the Kc:ord>12 FcbrUi!tV 1959. in Gk'lln '·'·' LoFarat::stc,

ct al., eds .. Forr.·1·~1u Rclati1J11s 0;,,r 1/1~ (in;t.:d Stnt~s. (FRl.IS). Vol X! Pan t,
f:a:.·t;:n, Eurc>pt! Ri:~fou; So1·i1tl liuion: CJipr11s (\\'us\1in_g:o11, D .C.: U1li1ed S1:1h:S

Gv•on111><ol P:intins Ollie< 199'.'). 261.
•1bid., 26 1.
'lbid., 262.
''lb<d.
ttf\1ernot:\ndum ofCon(cn::n::c ''i~ President EiscnhO\\cr, 7 A;r.d 195'>.
in FRUS, X, I, 2GS.

His advisors responded by tell ing the President of 1hc im(lortant
thnt might ha\-C long-range missile capabilities. Once again,
1l1e advisors pushed the President's concerns aside.
The President also considered the Soviet perception of Ilic V2 progr:im. The So\icls had detected the O\•ert1ights Vet)' early on
in the program, and knew about each one even though they could
do nothing about 1l1em. Each time the Americans sent a U-2 o\-cr
Sodct territory it led the Soviet leaders to be "more inclined to
distnist the Americans."" The Soviets felt that the Americans
surely knew !lie kinds of problems they were causing by sending
the U-2's over the Soviet Union, but "So\'i ct secrecy was so grc~l
Lhat lhe President, State Department and CfA could not precisely
gauge the imp~ct of the lli£hts on internal Kremlin politics." "
\Vhen laboring over the decision of whether to ~ulhorizc
more nighls, he said thnt the United Slates was "gelling lo the
point where we must decide if we arc trying to prepare to fight a
war, or to pre.vcm one."'• In this case, the President decided to go
ahead with this llight since his advisors provided him with an
"unanimous recommendation." The advisors once again had
powerful influence over the President's better judgement.
Al1J1ough several of tl1csc examples did not dcul specifically
with the vc1y beginnings of the U-2 progra.m, they were iniportant
facto~s when considering the continuance of the program. In each
case the President's advisors played nn important role in the
decision making process.
~ites

-!IWns a flight over the Soviet Union so close to the Paris
Summit ncccss!lry? The United Staces and the Soviet lJnioa had
b~n cnjO)ing what had been dubbed the '"Spirit of Camp Oa\'id."
In 1959, Khrushchev hod visited the United States and had made
some serious progress in negotinling with President Eisenhower.
It "as during this visit that Khrushchev agrc..>d to a Summit to be
held lhc following sprini:; in Paris to be attended by the SO\~et
1
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Unicn, lhc United Stai.cs, Frallce, and Great Britain. Both
Eisenho\\·er and Khrushd1c\• hod been looking forward to funhcr
negotiations in Paris. The "Spiril of Camp Dal'id" ended wi(h the
dom1ing of the U-2 en I May I 960, just before the Summil
opened.
U-2 missions had been canceled when Eisenhower felt the
international situation too lcnsc. He had previously considered
"whether t}1c intelligence which we re.ceive from this source is
worth tl1e e.xt1ccrbation of international tension that results."" For
example, the President had cnncc!cd flights >Vhcn 1hcre was
problems with the Suez Canul ond Berlin bcGausc he was afra id
thut the flights would ch'. ll the Cold War.
Another example of this policy of canceling nights when the
international situation was tcnsc was a meeting b.:twccn the
President and his advisors on 7 April 1959. He had scheduled the
meeting to 1cll them ihat he was not going to appro\'c ccrtnin
01·erfiigh1s. Eisc11ho\\'er ga\'c several rcosons for this decision:
first, we now ha\'e the power lo dcslrov the Soi ic1s
1"ithout need for dctailc<l targedng; second, as the world
is going now, there seems no hope for the future unless
we can make some proi,'Tcss in negotiation; 1.hird, we
cannot in the present circumstances afford the re\'Ulsion
of world opinion zgainsl the United Stales thJI might
occur- the U.S. being the only nation that could conduce
this acti\'ity; and fourth , we are pulling sc1·ernl hundred
million dollors imo proi,'mnlS for more advnnccd
copabilities.16
Overall, the President folt that the U-2 program could potcntin lly
be a poli1ical problem worldwide.
Aud yet he rcYcrscd his decision and outhori7.ed the Mav
flights. Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of Defense Gntc;,
CIA Director Dulles, and Chainnon of the Joint Chiefs T11inin2
" all argued th:11 the flights were important; information on a first
Soviet IC13M and other targets might be impossible to get until

n1011ths after May 1960."" The advisors pointed to "technical
fnctors" for the timing of the flight such as the nnglc of the sun's
rays and the \\'Cather." They pointed 0111 that the intelligence
infonnation the flights provided was invaluable, and without this
infornmtion the military would ha'-c lO be put on alert since the
United Stoles ll'OUld have to be ready for a surprise attack m all
1in1cs, something which the U-2 flights could warn against.
Besides, one advisor asserted. "the intelligence objective i11 bis
,-icw ou1weighs the danger of getting trapped."" The President
c1·en fell confident ..wit.Ji a record of many successful flights
behind us," and perhaps because of th~ success of other missions
1hcv hml become careless in proposing future Oights.20 Besides,
Eiscnho,\··c.r felt no reason to go against his advisors who were so
confident in Lhe program. Bui. his advisors foiled to mention the
U-2 Oight over J:ipan tlialhad crash landed in Scptcmlxr of 1959.
There were al>o problems with other planes in Japan, one of
which, mUllbcr 360, was transferred Lo Turkey just in time for
Powers's May l flight."
This pIO\'CS historian Michael Beschloss 's argument that
Ll1erc was a "fatnl weakness in the system Eisenhower had created
to monag,~. the U-2 program." Eisenhower had taken the main
role in assessing the importance of each flight and the possible
consequences in the event of a mishap. Almost all of
Eisenhower· s advisors ~had a stake in prcssins for flights." In
olmosl all c:iscs, Eisenhower was the only one to discuss the
down side lo c:rch flight, willi his advisors assuring him that he
had nothing to \\'Oil)' about. The advisors feared that if the
Prcsidcm 3nd Khrushchev come to some sort of agreement at
Paris thar Eisenhower "might not approve a flight into tlw So\·ict
Union again, causing an intelligence blackout until spy satellite s
were in full opera1ion." Thus, the President's advisors had other
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priorities, namely saving lhcir belo,·cd U-2 progrnm, and because
of this their recommcnc!a!ions were not alwa\'s sound'-'
As for lhc liming ofthe U-2 flights in the-spring of l 960, "the
Prcsiden l said that !here was no good lime for foilurc:•:l This
was a differenl nltiludc than Lhe vcnr bei'ore when the Presiden1
questioned !he liming of Oighls in-relation to inlcmnlional e\'cnts.
Also, !here had been a flight in April 1960, so another flight that
spring seemed out of place."' The Prcsidcnl's advisors were so
enthusiastic aboul the flight lhat !he President fell he hnd no
choice but lo agree. But Eisenhower had !he final say, and he had
refused lo nuthori7.e Oights in the past.
\i,11at if Eisenhower bad consulted olhcr ad\'isors? Would Lhe
fligl11s have been rcswned? The President could ha,·e consuhcd
seYcrnl specialists in So,ict affairs, and they might ha ....e ~d,•iscd
him that "resuming lhc U-2 fl ighls in the spring of 1960 mighl
send \1oscow;; hostile signal he did not mean." Bui lhc Prcsidcn1
could only consul! lhc sdect fc" who h~d knO\m of the program
frcm the vc1y beginning. TI1e secrecy of the progrruu might h:l\·c
been lhc problem whe11 mnkinr; the decision nbout the spring
1960 nights.~ The So\'icls had kuo\\n about the fliehts for some
tii:ie, and they had, as Nikita Khrushd1c\' once pul it, •protested
its violations of our airspace, bul each time th~ U.S. brushed our
protesl nside, snying 110ne of their plJncs were overflying our
tcrrito1y."" The President look pride in lhe way he handled his
foreign policy, his ''institulionnl dccision-m:1ki11g, understanding
his rivals' poinl of \'icw and relating wctics to strntci,,')'o" bul lhcsc
policies "foiled him in his decision to resume the U-2 flights.""
- 111-

Was the initial cover-up the best w:iy to deal witl1 Ilic
incident? The President said that !he 'big error we made was, of
:13esc.:11!0:1s, .'t..fayday, 370.

?l:..fcmor,..ildum of Cc11f::;:.!ncx \\ilh President l:tSCtlJlO\\'Cf, 8 It1I~ 1959,
I, S2J.
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course, in the issuance of n premature and erroneous CO\'er story."
Allowing himself to be persuaded on 1his issue was his "principal
pcrsond rcgrel~xccpl for the U-2 failure ilSClf-rcgarding the
whole affair. ""' The Presidcnl had voiced his opinion that he did
nol wan! to issue 1he immediate cover story.
Eisenhower's advisors had told him, however, over and over
1hal if a plane went dO\\U the United States had nothing to worry
about because the Soviets would not admil chat it had happened.
KJ1rushchc\' might be "unwilling lo admil that United Stales
planes had been for years penetrating deep into his territory," and
"suppress the focls. "" The !'resident's ad\'iSors assured him thnt
it would embarrass !11e Soviets for loo much to reveal lhat a plane
had gone down.
Eis~nhower had also been told lhal the plane would be
destroyed if it we~.t do\\n, and the dcstruclivc ch:irgc would
eliminate proof of espionage. Based on tl1esc two assumptions
from his advisors, Eisenhower agreed to issue the NASA
statement without knowing of any reaction from " itl1in the Soviet
Uruon. Mis advisors had been \\TOng on bolh accounts, though,
because on May 5 Khrushchev announced that they hoid downed
a plane over Soviet tcrrito1y. The Prcsidem's advisors wanted to
issue an immediate stalemenl, but the President himself "voiced
serious doubts." His suggestion was to "remain silem unlil we
knew what Khrushchev's follow-up was to be. "30 His aides
a:gued that !hey must make an immediaic Statement so !hat the
initinl cover story did nol lose credibility. IL was upon this
uuanirnous reconuncndntion of his advisors lhat Eisenhower
agreed lo issue !he nc.xt cover story. This once again proves the
innucnec that the Presidenl's advisors had on dictating policy.
Eisenhower was astonished when Khmshchev nnnounced on
Moy G that the pilol was alive. Eisenhower had "no system lo
show him Lie full range of options and contingencies," and
because of this he had "hastily approved the false CO\'er slory"
lhat caused so nHUJ)' problems.l1 The President and his advisors
now had no choice but to admil to engaging in espionage

i-IBe~<.:hk-..~s, A11ryday, 370.
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actil'l[ies and reveal the essenti al truth. Had the o~iginal co,·cr
story nol bc<:n issued, the President nnd his advisors could ha\'c
dealt with the situntion in a much more infom1cd manner.
The.fatal wenki1ess in the process for which the U-2 proi,'Tnm
\l'llS managed comes out again \li1en dealing with the co•·cr ston·.
The President suffered "from the c:->clusi»e, ad hoc procedure l~e
had fashioned to run fac U-2 progrnm."" If the Prcsidcm had
been able to consult with ad\·isors other than those "ho were so
close to the U-2 progrnm, such as an e:->pert on the Soviet Union,
he might ha\·e acted di ffcrcmly in the davs immcdint~lv followin2
the do"ning of the plane. The secrecy o"r the program· would
allow Eisenhower to ccnsult outside sources, tl1ough, so he was
forced to act upon the unanimous rccommcndutio~s of his
advisors even if that meant ignoring his own instincts. Powers
wns astonished when sho\\·n the cover ston• in n United Stntes
newspaper. He was held in a Soviet prison ~nd being questioned
rigorously. He said that he bad bocn given no formal training 0:1
what to do if captured, or any infom1ation on whm kind of a oo•·cr
story would be issued. Eisenhower's advisors said that Powers
hnd been "told to re veal whatever he himself knew, includine the
foct that he worked for the CJA."'l
The President could have "cut his losses a~d told 1hc world
the truth" afler tl1e initial NASA slaten:cnt and before
Khrushchev a1U1ounccd that the pilot wns alive. This would ha,·e
restored his cred ibility, und he hnd reason to belic1·e that this \Yas
the right thing to do. On Mny 5, after the NASA s tmcmcm nnd
nOcr Khrushchev had announced thot o plane hod been downed
over Soviet territory, the President rcceh•ed a telcgr~m from the
United States Ambass3:1or in Moscow, LlcwcUyn E Thompson.
Thompson hnd m·erhea-d Deputy Foreign Minister Jncob Ma lik
te ll someone nl a function thnt night that ''tltcv were still
questioning the pilot who had parnchutcd to snfclv.:,,., Herc the
I'r.csidcnt bad evidence that there "as a possibility ll•c pilot was
nl11·e, and yet he still agrrod to continue with the CO\'cr storv.
Eisenhower had the ch;i.nce to tnkc ad•i~-c from n so11rc: oth~r

not

than his close ad,isors and he chose to ignore it. Thompson's
telegram should have been the red Oas when considering what
n1o•'C 10 make, but il was not. This mistnke was by f.1r Ilic most
critical in the whole affair.
Even afrer Khrushch~-v had revealed that the pilot was olive,
the ad•·isors d<:eidcd tl1ot it would not be best to involve tl:e
President in the program directly. The statement gave a more
truthful version than the previous two statements, but only said
that the "pilot hnd 'probably' invaded Sovicl airspace but thm the
I1.ighl had not been oulhori7.ed by Washington.'"; This Stotement
shocked Powc,-s since he waited in his plane for nearly thirty
minu1es for "approval from the White House."" By not admitting
that Eisenhower hnd control over the flight "ignited dte
international scare that some Americnn ofticer could start a war
without the President's knowledge."" Now Eisenhower had put
himself in the position where he had to accept responsibility for
the night.
This finsco with the cover stories led the Americnn people
mid press to be incrcasinglr distrustful of their goYemment
Some Americans were proud that their country could handle such
n secret operntion for so long without being discovered, but others
feared that this might start a war.'• Eisenhower made a primetime s~h on television several d~ys after the tmth came out in
order lO infomt the Amcric;in people about the U-2 proi,'Tam and
talk about the events of the previous days. \!.'hat if the American
people had been told about the program back when it started?
Ce1tainly the Soviets hnd known about it for almost tl1nt long, and
if they already knew about it then there was no renson why the
American people could not have known about it as well. If this
had been the case, if the Eisenhower administration hnd been
truthCul from the very beginning, tl1en the false cover story would
not have been needed. The people knew that the U-2 w:is used
for gathering weather infommtion, and being good Cold Warriors,
they might have ovcn,hclmingly approved of the flights over
Russia. The American people would ha\'e been disappointed that
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the plane had been

sh ~t

down, but al least thcv would have

kno1111 that ihcir govemmcnt had been hone~t with ihcm.
- I V-

Could something have been done lo save the Pnris Su11UTiil?
Khrushchev had gone to Paris corly hopi ng that Eisenhower
would do the snmc so they could talk privately. Eisenhower did
not come until the day before the meetings were supposed to start,
and by thnl time Kluushchcv had decided lo make three demands:
the U.S. must public!~, apo!ogizc, promise r~,·er to send nights
0\'Cr the So\·icl l!nio~ again, and pLU1ish those rt:Sponsib!c.
Eisenhower had already stopped the tlights, but refused lo
apolosi1.e.
Eisenhower wondered why KJ1rushchev had no'. said an~thing
about the fiigh~s at Camp David the year before \\i1cn relations
were good. What Khrushchev did sav•. was that he was cuttino
. :;:i
back his o"n espionage against the United States, and he
presumed that whcn lhe flighlS Slopped for a time after the CUmp
Dnvid meetings that 1he Americans had curtailed their espionage
as well. So when the flightnvcrc resumed in the spring of 1960,
Klut1shchcv thought this was a sign that relations " ere turning for
1hc worse. Khru~hcl1c,· now felt that Americans were "followin~
o two-faced policy" sin:e they were so friendly al C11mp D1wid
but were now sending more U-2's over Russia."
Khrushcl1C\' might ha\•e been C.'<ploiting the U-2 nffoir for his
om1 reasons. In a telcb'Tam, Ambassador Thompson said that
"Khrushchev is ha,i ng some intcmcl difficulties and this incident
affords him a com·enient di\·ersion.'"'0 Eisenhower's add sors
mention several rcnsons why Khrushchev would wanl to cxploil
the incident:
Hrst, deep com·1cuon, which appears common among
So'iet leaders, 1J1atsecrecy is a major asset of the USSR:
second, anxiety with respecl to any violation of Soviet
''Khru.shcht''.', Klu·u:rl1ckcl' i lNuenrbcrs, S I J.
" Telegram fm1n the 1!1111'.lssy in the SO\'icl Un)on ~o thi: Ocpartm: nl of
~"41C, 7 ~i.ty 1960, in FRIJS,X. 1: 515.

tcrrilO<Y; third, the pos sibility Lhat the Soviet military
hierarchy was unh3ppy over the demobilization measures
recently announced by Khrushchev nnd hns conscq11ently
insisted that Kl1rushchev taken strong stand in the pl:ine
case: and fourth, a possible desire to embarrass the
Prcsiccnt :?t tlte outset of the Summit Conference. 41
Economic diflicultics, opposition to Khrushchev's policy of
rcloxn1ion, and 1\ poli tical power struggle were also influences on
1he Soviets at this time.
Klirushchev himself did not feel these factors inOucne<:d his
dc<isions in Paris. He hoped that there would be an agreement
reached al Paris up to the time the U-2 was dO\med. Khrushchev
said that he decided on the plane Paris there could be no
agreement at the Summit because the "Americans had
deliberately tried to place a lime bomb under the meeting," and
hence the ronference "was doomed before it began."''
Khmshchc\' points to U1e role of Eisenhower's advisors.
Khrushchev notes that the President wanted to apologize, but thar
one of his advisors said no "in such a way, with such a grimace
on his foce, that he lcfl no room for argument on the issue.""'
Khrushchc,· even said that the President "let himself be pushed
arocnd by his Secretaries of State, first Dulles and now Herter.•••'
The British n:id the French supported the Cniled Stales at
Paris rin<l were e\·en somcwh3l disgusted al the way Khrushchev
lrnndlcd C\'Cills. Both dclegadons, I.hough, admiuing the U-2
flight was ill-timed, noted that President Eisenhower ndmiucd
that he had made a mistake. Charles de Gaulle informed the
Soviets on May 16, that, considering that the U-2 was shot dO\m
on May I, they had time lo make amends wi~1 the United States
or they should have "let il be known that he [Khrushchev) would
45
110 1 be coming to the conference."
Both the British and the
Frcnch nsreed thnt the Soviets needed to come to terms with what
11Mcnau:,;r.cfu1n o( the .Discussion a1 the 44-41h ).fec1in~ of Ilic N:1ionotl
Scouri1y Cooncil. 9 May t960, in FRUS, X, 1. S18.
•
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had happened. •LI.Cler all, espionage was not unique to the U11it~<l
Stales, so in th:ol se.nse the Soviets had nothing to compl;1in about.
The American public reacted badly to the events in f'nris.
After the President retuned from Paris, he went on a lour of the
Pacific, nnd found the 01·ersc<1S reaction to his recent foreign
policy was also negative. Thus, Eisenhower left office on a sour
note. Had he not been so distrustful of pub!lc opinion, he could
hnYc p:c1•ented the cycnts in May 1960 from heightening the
Cold War. Eisenhower did not want the American public's hope
for peace nt Paris to inOucnce his decisions there so [,'!"Cally that
he would ha1·e appeared "to ha1•e been taken in by the Russians. "
This wa~ J flaw of his "hidden-hand leadership.• Without
inl'oh·ing the public, his foreign policy seemed weak.
Eisenhower could hnvc prevented this perception by ha\·ing the
backing of Arucric~n public opinion integrated in his policy:•

E

isenhower's decision-making process before nnd after the U-2
incident wns not entirely cffccti\'e. Tbcre are n number of
e.xamplcs that show his advisors' opinions !~king precedence. Nol
only is this not th<: best way to make deci.sions about any policy,
it certainly is not the best way to mnkc decisions nbout a \'ital
security and diplomatic issue. The President himself seemed to
ha1·e the right idea about what should ha,·c been done: dc\'clop
other methods of infonnation gathering, curb !lights during
critical imcn1ational periods, wait for a respon.sc from the Sovicls
before issuing n false cover story, and apologize to the Soviets 10
Sa\'c the Paris Sununit. His advisors frowned upon these idcns,
and tossed them aside. The role of tloc An~:rican public was also
marginalized, but this 11as the President's fault for no: trnsting in
the people he was leading. This U-2 incident wns a tuming point
in the way the Amcricou people and media Yicwcd the President
of U1e United States. Am::ricans were incr~singly distrustful of
presidents, staning \\i t!: lhc false t.:-2 story and continuing with
events like \Vntcrgnte and Vietnam.
Eisenhower on!y regret that the false corer stoiy had been
issued, but ns far as Inc U-2 progrnm was concerned he did not
think that he would make any <kcisions diifercnUy, "gi1·cn the

5 a111~ set of facts as the}' confronted us at th: time ."" The
information gathered from the !lights had pr·ovcd invaluable.
Eisenhower, looking back, thought tlrnt U1e Pnris Summit
probobly would have been a failure e\·cn if it had nol been for the
U-2 because nothing would haYc been acccmplished except
bringing the world "further disill usionrnent."' 8
Besides,
Khn1shcbcv had known about the nights for some time and only
now had made a fuss about them. This led Ei senhower to belic1·c
that KJ1rushchc\ was only using this as an excuse to \'.Teck the
Summit bcc11usc he had other issues prcssiI1g nt homc.'9
0Ycrilll, it was the President who had U1e fimol say in Ilic
course or e\·e~ts. He may ha,·c been inOuenced by his ad1isors,
bui he still could have halted events. The problem was that he did
not. He !cl his advisors intluencc his final decision, and his
excuse was that since they ai,>rccd unanimously thnL he would go
~loni,: "ith it.
T11is decision showed bad judgement on
Eisenhower's p~rt. lf Eisenhower had the backbone to st~nd up
for whm he thought was right, then the U-2 incident might noL
lm\'C been "n supreme hwuilinlion for Eisenhowcr.'' 10
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- 1ilh the capture of control of the United Stnlcs
Congress. Republicans made history in 1994. f'or the
first time in more than forty years the Rcpublicnn~ had
control of bo1h houses of Congress. The new Republicnn
ConL'TCSS had a decis ivclv comcrvalivc fl avor. \\ilh auacks on 1hc
lib:;.;l social progrnms ~nd calls for limiting. federal power over
the stales. But 1he conservatism that climbed into Cong.rcssional
leadership did not always possess such influence. In fnct, there
wa.5 a time when conscr,·atism was thought lo be inlcllccrually
dead, or at least catalonic. Between 1946 and 1996 Am~-rican
co1t5cn•atism rose from a beleaguered remnant 10 1hc holls of
Congress and widcsrread popularity.
The rise of this
conscr\'atism can be laid al the feet of Ilic changes in American
society thm hn\'c lnkcn place in 1he last fifiy yo:irs 011d on the
heads of n liberalism that failed to respond adequately to the
conOicts and complexities created by these socin l and ceonomic
changes.
Arri,·ing al a definition of conservatism is not an cnsy iosk,
for 1he word mcnns mnny different lhings to different peop le. In
man\• books and nrtielcs. conscr•:ath·es and others ha,·c tried to
dcfi~c the 1cm1 and themse lves. Ddinilions varied
rc1e<
Wilonski, Ill his "lnlrod'uclion to the Wisdom of Conscr,·oti\'cs,"
~greed lhal conscn mism did not ha,·e a fixed mc:ining, but added
to the confusion by insisting that conse.n atism was not an
ideology but inslcad a "style of 1hinkiug." 1 G1.-orgc Nnsh

W

1Pctcr \Vitonski, ~ntroJuc.tinn lo the \Visdo1n of Cor.~1vu1is.-n:· in
l··iewpoi11ti: 111tt CC,t$ef'v<Hiv..~ A !1e.n111.'i\'e, c:d. Ou\'iJ U.n.1dnoy (Y1inoc~JpOlis.
1973), 15.

presented the simrlcst definition. Ile identified post-World War
Two conservatism "ns rcs isrnnce to certain forces per.;;c1vc:l to be
!cf1ist, rcvolutionnry, and profotmdly subversive of what
cons;:rvati,·cs nl 1he time deemed \\-Orth cherishing, defending,
and perhaps dying for.'"
. . ..
Although American conservatism shared many sm11l:1r11u:s
and idc~s \\ith European conservatism, the two were not the
same. In Co11scrva1/.w1 in Amerk'a. historian Clinton Rossiter
slated 1hat there were three general difierences between American
and European conservatism.
TI1e former was clearly more
optimistic about the nature of man, the uses of reason, lhc
possibilities of pro(,'!CSS, and the prospects of dcmo~racy. Also,
American conservatism was clearly more matenahslic because
much more of it is based on economics instead of ethics or
politics. Finally, the kind of conservmism extant in the United
States was clearly more i11dividualistic because it relied less on
1hc primacy of society nnd the state.'
Nash described lhc slate of conservatism in 19<15 as such: "In
1945 uo articulate, coordi.nated, self-consciously conservative
intellectual force ~cd in the United States... In 1945
'c;:msCT\·atism' was nol a popular word in America, and its
spokesmen were without much influence in their native land."'
There were scverJI reasons for the weakness of conservatism
during this time period. The chief rcaso•l was thnl there \\11s no
ck;;r bod\' of co!lsen•alive doctrine.
Its detraclors saw
conscrva1i;m as almost cxclusi\'cly a reaction against Roosel'clt
and the New Dcnl. s These were the very programs nnd lenders
which were seen as victorious over the Depression und the
Second World War. During the Depression and the war, the
l<!deral gO\'cmment increased its role in the economy and society
so that by 1945 the reactions and cries of conscrrntism sccmod
out of place and out of step with the times to the m~jori ty of
.
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lf conserv~usm was in such low reg.ird :md seemingly \ 'Cl)'
unpopular. what happ-:ncd in the course of fifty years to resurrect
lhc movement? ~spite the bleak outlook in l 945 , there were
people who committed themselves to rallying the conservati,·e
cause, but they \\'Crc isolated nnd Jacked an inte.llectual voice in
societv. h is ironic that one of the first ,-oiccs to sneak oul for the
conse;....ati\·e cause in America was Friedrich ;.on Jfo1·ck an
. '
Austrian professor who had immigrated 1.0 Britain in the 1930's
nnd was an early antifascist. In his 1944 book The Road 10
Se~fi:lom, Hayek argued that "the rise of f.1scis111 and Nazism was
not a reaction against the socialist trends or the preceding period
but a n·:ccssa1y outcome or those tendencics."6 1l1is connection
bctwocn Nazism nnd socialism was importnnl because it sa\'e
American conscrYati\·es a clcnr response to the charge that
fascism ~nd N:izism bnd been brou,ght imo power by the
frishtcned business class. The book allo\\cd the conservative
mo\'ement to escape from the charge that it had much in common
with fascism and Nnzism, and the book ~a\'c 11 strono
"'
philoscphicnl basis for their support. of the \\'nr.'
The Road IO Sc1fdom became \'cry popular in the United
States. Hayck's thesis for the book was simple: "[p]lannins leads
to diclntorship," and "the direction of economic acti,·itY" would
incvilnbly neccssitntc the "suppression of freedom. "" The book
bccJrne a conlrO\'c.rsial bestseller in Amcricu. It offered the
cousen ·ati\'cs a vibrant new weapon to auack the New D.:ul r.nd
the planning structures of the war effort. Liberals stronolv
"'·
opposed the book since it nttacked the 1·cn· successes and
triumphs which they had achieved in the prcl'iou; twel\'Cyears.
Hayck's book fit into the first of three categories of
conservatism established by Nash: "libcrtnriun" or "frcc·m~rket"
conscn·atism. TI1is branch was mainly concerned 11i1h limiting
the role of the stale in the cconomv and sociclv. These
conservati,·cs were especially concem~d with the .growth of

-
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po"·cr in the exccuti"e branch an<l thc gr:o111h of slntism, which
1hcv, connected lO socialism and communism. Though Ha1·ck
.
him~clr did not agree with the total free-market or the pure
faissc?.·foirc idea, his book gave much intellectual force to the
tNlicf.~ of the libertarian braoch of conscr\'atism. Other examples
or early libertarian writers were Hayek's mentors, Ludwig von
\1iscs and Albert Jay Nock, whose best known book was Our
Enemy, the S;me. Libertarian and individualistic thought wns
also sprc.ad through joum:ils such as The Freeman and A11alysis
and by organizations such as the Foundation for Economic
EducJtion and the Intercollq,>iatc Society of Individualists.
The rcvi•:al of conservatism i;lid not limit itself to the
indil'idualists and libertarians. The postwar period also witnessed
the b'l'O\\th of two other branches: traditionalism and anti·
Communism. The "new eonscrvati•·e" or traditional br~nch of
conservntism looked bock at the destruction and d~solation
caused by the war and questioned the modem society. Richard
Wca1·er and Russel Kirk were two early proponents of this fom1
of c-0nscn-atism. Both looked into history to explain the
problems of mnn. Kirk argued that America did indeed ha1·e a
consCITa!ivc tradition und that it defined the American
experience. Kirk enhanced the philosophy of non-American
Ed.rmu1d Burke, but also traced conservatism through fi&'l1rcs such
as John Randolph, John Adams, John C. Calhoun, and Henry
Adams. Both Weaver and Kirk argued that there were
fundnmcntnl, unch~ngeable truths or principles in the world.
They saw modernism and ethical relativism as dangers 10
r i1·ilization a:id were even wicomfortable 11ith democracy and
to:ally free markets. The traditionalists emphasized l'altRs,
communit;, and self-discipline over profits, pure individualism,
and constunerism. Mnny viewed capitalism as n possible threat
lo the community.
The third ~chool of eonscn·ati\•e thought-anti-Communismwas main\y made up of people who had in early years been
rn t1uenccd by or involved in lefiist organizations and had come
to repudiate those earlv beliefs ru1d associations. TI1e anti·
Comniunisls fa\'orcd an ir1ten ,entio11ist type of foreign policy nnd
>poke about rolling back Ilic gains made by Communism. 111csc
co~scrvati•:es allackcd Harty Tnmrnn's containment policy as
coslly and cowardly. Their crusading spirit c;i111c from c.x·
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communists, who supplied much energy and %Cal and hcl pc<l the
Right to acquire a forvcnl mass following for !he first lime in
years.?
The diffcrwc::s among !he lhrcc schools were obvious lo both
liberals and conse£Valivcs, and in the l 950:; a mo,·cmcnt started
to bring the three togclber. This mo,·emcnt searched for a
~ing journal that would be able to spread the conservalive
m:ssage lo new converts and establish a sense of unitv or
community among the three schools or conservatism. F~r n
while, many hoped that J7ie Freemmr could be lite unifying voice
of ccnscrvntism lml "hen it was sold and the cdilorship iumcd
over to Frnnk Chodoro,·, a near an archisl, the call for a new
jounrnl increased.
Into this qcuum moved William F. Buckley, Jr., who
four.dcd the Na:iona! Uevlew in 1955. The !1'01!0110! Review was
w.::ekly nml aimed at a wide audience. Buckley saw the purpose
of this nc\\' journal ns not only to renew the allnck ngainst the Left
but to consolidote the R.ight. Although the ediLol'ial board was
made up n wide range of conser,·ative thinkers. the new joumal
was stridently nnli-Commw1ist 111e new journal nllowcd for !he
discussion of ideas while cmphnsiiing the unity of the movement
Sine~ the joumal was the only weekly a\'0\1'cd conservati ve
magazine for a long time lo come, it became indispcnsablc co the
Rii;!:l. Without such a similar journal, there would 1101 hn\'c b::cn
a coh·:sive inlcllecllrnl force on the Righi in the J%Os and
1970s.' 0
Nol ouly did the National Review promote conservali,·c unity,
ii also acted as a lester of onl1odoi.y. Through ics ericieism of
arch indi,·idualist Peter Viereck, J\,11 Rand. and the radical
libmarians, the journal tried co cst;blish a ~ohcrcnl vision of
conscr•atism. The fusionist consensus built bv the Nc.1/01wl
l<eview !)rO\'Cd durable and lasted through 10 the 1990s.' '
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- JllIf the 1950s, howcvcr, began the molding of new
conS(.·rvati,·c thought, it did no! appear to be the beginning of new
conservatism practice. In 1947, historian Arthur Schlesinger
called for i1 new policies of freedom in his book The Vital Center.
Schlesinger su·css;d his belief in liberalism and Ke:-11esian
&oncmics. A liberal consensus seemed secure. Even "hen
Republicans were elected to high public offices, the New Deal
and wclforc slate pol icies did nol under go significanL re\·ision.
TI1c Eisenhower presidency, 100, did not prove n chance to
implement the Right' s ideas nnd beliefs. Ahl1ough Eisenhower
wa; economically conservative, he did not agree "ilh socinl
conservatism. The Right stnrtcd to realize that it needed to gain
more influence in the Republican party before its \'iews could
gam more widespread political support. Yel, America was
undergoing a dramnlic 1.ransformalion. The very success of the
" clfare slate and liberalism planced the seeds of a counter-~unck.
Mainstream Liberalism would be gravely \\"cakcncd under
concerted nuncks from both lbe Left and the RighL
The I%Os saw the gro" th of the conscn·ati\'e movement in
both the intdlccLual world and the political. Re1rospcc1ively, the
1940s and 1950s could be seen as a lime of rebuilding and
prcpJratioa for the changes that would shake Am~rica's belief in
lit-crnlism. Tiie ad:ninistrations of President Kennedy and
President Johnson rnised hopes in the general population Lhat
poverty, racism, and chronic w1employment would disappcnr
through libcrnl legislation and Supreme Court decisions. Some
groups "ere not satisfied with the progress of govcmmcnt action
and resoned to street protests and even viokm confrontations.
The 1960s " ere a lime of great political and social change but
that chang: caused a backlash by lhose who did not agree with
the way tlley snw American society to be prog~essing. This
backlash also caught up ll!fge nmnbcrs of less a mucm, or
" orking class l\'hilcs, who fell that tl1eir interests had been
forgollen by the eli1ism of liberalism. This, combined with the
increased power of middle-class intcllcccuals and reformers in the
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Democratic Pany, caused Lhc New Deal libcrnl conlit;on to stnrl
Lo fr;icturc.12
The fracturing of the libcrnl coalition hccmuc noticeable in
tJi.~ I 964 Prcsidcnlinl elcciions. Although Bany Goldwater lost
in a landslide, L11e election scr\'ed notice that there was n growing
number of conscn-ati\'e voters in both the Republican and
Democratic Parties. Fuwre Republican presidential candic alcs
swncd to sec this realignment and lo use conscrvaci\'e messages
and themes lo draw the support of tbcse voters. The conservati ve
Republicans realized the potential power of illCSC ,·01~ and the
cmnpaigns or Nixon, Reagan, and Bush were successful in
couiting social conscrvatl\'e working-class and loll'cr-middlc
class rnte." Through this process the oon~rvati,·e ,·oicC$ gained
a wiJcr audience and increas·: d their crcdibiliry.
The great changes that took pl;1ce in the I % Os also caused
some li~rals of the day to reacl. It \\'OS a mo,·emenl made up of
liberals "who had been mugged by rcalily." 14 These people were
concerned with what they saw as idcologicnl rigidity in liberal
p:ograms. The belief !hat libcralis.-.i no longer knew what ii was
lalking nbout became a ecnlr:tl theme for the neoconscrvalivc
mo\'cment. Nccconscrvalivcs :dso perceived liberals ns soft on
CommWlism.
Several erstwhile liberals became very critical of libcrnl
programs. The writers and journalists or the lllO\'C!llCnl became
increasingly skeptical of th~ liberal 'icw of r:llionally analy7.ed
social problems "ith quasi-scientific solutions.
The
ncoconservmi,·cs doubted thal im;:ierfcct and unpredictable man
could be organized socially on lhe basis on 'sciemilic' kr.owlcdgc
alcne.l> Their criticisms of the liberal programs were more
ac;:~led by the mainStream press, which saw them as credible
since they were seen as urbane intellectua ls ai~d nOI pcnnypinching busincssrncn or rac.isLs.16
As the neoconSCl'\'.1ti,·c mo\•e.mcnt progressed, i1 became
increasingly conscrvatl\'c. The atrncks on libcrnl progrnms were
notonne,. Hott.! PolilicJ', 5 J. 80-3.
" lbi<l., 180-9 l.
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~'tci:dcd until just about cvccy gaYemmcnt program was called
in:o question. The ncoconservati\'CS did noL just criticize. One
of the main strengths of the mO\'cmem ond one o( its great
co1wibutions lo American consc1'Vatism, was its 1'bility to set uo
foundations, journals, :md think tanks. These instituti~s helped
to formulate positiYc counter proposals to liberal pro&•n1rns.
Instead of just criticism, tl1e neoconservativcs were able to offer
alwr.:ativcs to the liberal programs. The ncoconscrvatives wanted
la reverse the agenda of govcrnmc11t, turn the government nw(ly
from grand schemes, and reform America by relying upon the
prh'ate s:ctor, market mechanisms, and traditional instirutions
such i1s the family and !ocnl conummity.
Aoolh>:r group of Americans who became active in the
process of political encl social thought due lo the changes taking
place in the 1960s, was the religious conservatives. Prior to the
1962 Supreme Court d:cision agninsl school prayer and the
Court's subsequent mlings on abonion and pornography, most on
the rdigious right did not ncti,·cly participate in the political,
intellectual, and social discussions of America.
In fact,
fundamentalists prided thcmseh·cs on being apoliti cnl if not antipo!itical. The !,'!'Owing permissiveness of sociely and the mass
mdia concerned tlte religious conscn•ativcs. These concerns
causcJ lhc religious right la reexamine their separatism; in tl1e
la!e InOs righl·wing C\'angclieols organized themselves to
dcicnd the Judco-Christian tradition and the cultural values tl1m
they bclicl'cd in and ll'hich they felt to be under ~ttack."
Organizations such as the Moral M~jority and tJ1e Christiun
Coalition sprang up lo ad\'ocale and \'oice the concerns of the
religious conservatives. TI1ese organizations were successful in
motivating and mobili1ing large blocks of religious conservatiYcs
in support of the conservali\'c cause.
Despite the ''nrianccs and diITcrcnces within the conservali\'e
ntO\'cment, many were able to find common ground and bring tl1e
ntO\'CtnClll together. The anti-Communists found conuuon cnusc
with the rcliaious eonscr\'ati,·es who were concerned about the
atheism of ;ommunism. The t.raditionalists and the religious
co~scl'\·ativ~'S had common groWlds in their beliefs and in eternal
ll'lilh$ and principles. Withoul lhe groundwork of the 1940s nnd

Hoi~nt!c, //nte Pohtir.t, 60.
111

1bid.• 6 1.

1

~Uunn, C:aus~rwr!itic Tn.ullrlou, 8-10.

83
1950s, there may not ha,·c been a coiiscrntism lo tum to whm
the 1960s caused a great reaction in many p·:oµlc .
But the conservative revival must not bo! seen as just a
reaction to the 1960s.
Because of Commenwry, Nalional
Review. 3nd Russell Kirk's Modem Age, along \•,ith oth.:r
conservative journals, the conservative movcmcm was able to
offer altcrnati\'CS co the policies and beliefs of liberalism. As
conscrvnti' cs became more adept at formulJting ;ind presenting
these nltcrnati\·cs to I.he American people, they became more
readily accepted. This process was £really h:lpcd by the
emergence or the ncoconsen•ntives, whose criticisms or the
libernl programs and policies were accepted os much more
crc.:liblc by the main;tre~m media. The neoco~scrYnlh cs also
signilicantly helped the conscrvuti,•e cm1sc by establishing
fowidations and other groups thnt were nble to posili,•ely present
conscrvatiYe policies for goYemmcmal and soci~I reform. Thus,
modern conscn'atism was able to offer full altemalivc.s to the
people nnd \'Otcrs who tw·ned away from modem liberalism in the
second half of this century.
People mrned nwny from modem liberalism for mnny
different reasons. Blue collar :u1d less affiuent \\fates twi1cd
away from libcrnlism because or whnt th<.'y perceived as an
abandonment c ( their interests by modem liberalism and the
Dcmocralic Party. The radical Left also turned awa,· from
libernlism becnus-~ of their concern over the f;1ck of social
progress. Some of these radicals, interestingly enough would
later st;irt to identify \\ith the libertarian school of conscrva1isn1.
Maybc some or the success of conservatism wns due to the ,·ery
fact that it contained so many divergent and different aims and
beliefs. If Witonski was right nnd conscn-atism was not :u1
ideology that would also help c)<plain its rise. The conservative
movement \ms open to rnrious beliefs nnd people. The same
people \\110 ,·otcd for F.D.R in the 1930s could feel at heme \\ith
conservativism in !he 1980s and 1990s because it allowed 1hem
lo keep and express their traditional social and cultural beliefs.
Modem CC·mcrvatism was open to 1he 1dc.~s of the
ncoconservalivcs and the religious conscrvnth cs. Though
conscrvalism wns not open to everyone, it did allow in groups
that had become alienated and discnch;:ntcd with modem
liberalism.

lS9

Die conservative movement was ulLimatelv successful
becau;c it was able to o(fer alternatives to the libC'ral !JrD6'fams
3nd policies which had increasingly been critici7.ed ~ml called
into question. This ability lo offer an allcnrntive Lo liberalism
cn~blcd cons::n·a:ism to attract new and diYerse groups to i1s
ranks.
l\.1iethcr the conservative revival will sec continued growth
is a question th~t has yet to be adequately answered. The 1996
elections snw a conservntivc Republican majority rctum to the
hllls of Congress; but their nwnbcrs are fewer and President
Clinton was reelected. But perhaps the reelection or President
Clinton bodes well for American conservatism. The President did
pledge support for a balanced budget and sigucd into law tl1e
welfare refonn bill, both of which were widely s11pp-0rted.
Perhnps America is not as conscrvath•e as the conservu1ives wish
to think it is, and tl1e reaction to some of the 1994 ConL'fCSS's
;ictions on the enYironmcnt and Mcdic:ire arc examples of this;
support for welfare repeal, however, and other rcfom1s of the
welfare stale suggest that America has mo\·ed percepiiblv to the
~~L
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ocal history has been tm anoninly-n stepchild- in (he
acaccmic discipline of history. In the Europcln and
Am:riean hisloric:il traditions of the nineteenth century,
history was wrillcn to highlight important people and en:nls in
Ilic dominant nation-slates of the western hc111ispherc within a
national framework. A paradigm shill occurred in historical
profession in the 1950s and 1960s that emphasized study of the
general population or specific groups nt various periods cf
history, i.e., sQcinl history. The sh.ifl underscored the potentially
\'aluablc use of local history as case studies of national trends.
Local history began to tnkc on a broader meaning.
Th~ public J-Jstory mo,·cmcnt of the Inst 1wc111y years has
gi\'cn funhcr impetus to th e study o[ local history. While in
Europe public history, or applied history as Europeans arc apl to
call ii, is exclusi\'cly equated with the fonnmion of public policy,
the Unoted States \'icws public history as that which is applied for
the use of the public.' American historians sec 1hc ad\'cnl of
public history ns the link between local and academic history,
gi\'ing both l,'l'Catcr use and validation by the general population
nt IJrge. Public history is also the arcno in which museum and
historical agency professionals ply their craft and serve ns n link
between local history, historical mi:thodolog\', and public
audiences.: In Great Uri1ai11, the link between local history,

omscurn~ nnd academic history is comparatively weaker, arid the
Amc1ica11 ideas of public history have not forged as slroni:; a
bond '
Local history has a long respectable p:i.~t. In the United
Stnt~, ns in Oilier nnlional traditions, 1he past has been fascinating
and oflen sacred to its citizens. This led lo the cstablishmcnl of
ninny local historical societies charged with saving b0Ll1 the
mnlcrial culture and documentary heritage of the commwtity's
histo1y. Historical societies are as old as the United States. Some
of tJ1c firs\ historical societies, such as the Massachusetts and
!\cw York Historical Societies, were founded soon after thi s
count.rv \\'as established. They initially sought lo save maleriiils
from liie people in\'olvcd will1 the Revolution.• These slates were
fom1ed on the basis or colonial boundaries and fornting societies
on the basis of slates seemed reasonable. The inclinaticn for
Americans lo dil'idc themselves into regiorL~ is deeply cmbcc!dcd
in 1he colonial past nnd the tendency for historians to create
societies base.d on the different regions is a natural one.' It was
only logical for early historical studies in the l.:nitcd Stales to
center on localities. In iB early incarnations, local histories and
historical societies were handled by "patrician historians,"
intcl'estcd in preserving ll1e past of the elite, to honor the
\'cncrublc pioneers, and to tench the yow1gcr generation the great
!eats tlt:it their nnccstors had performed before tl1ey wcxe lost 10
the past• After the Ci,·il War, as W.B. Hesschine notes, the
United Stat-zs nntional govcmment was sl10ngcr, which
i110m:nced studies in politics, culture, economics and h!stoiy to
be nntion~l in their focus.' Odes 10 local foundel's and hcnrty
pioneer$ continued, but a national conception of histoiy bcgari lo
emerge in the Inst quarter of the nineteenth century.
1
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His1orians in Great Britain also followed the his1orioi,>rophical
tr<1dition of focusing on prominent people and events in their
early n;itional histories. \V.G. Hosk ins, tt promin·~nl pioneer in
bringing local histo1y to academia in England, noted that parish
noblemen were some of 1he fim historians to mile local histories
in Enghmd, appcnring ns early as the ]ale fiftccnlh ccnlury. These
types of \\Titers concentrated on 1hc pooplc :ind the ocii,·itics !hat
occurred in the nrnnor ins1ead of the \'ill ngc. AlthousJi there were
m~ny such histories \\Titten, by the ninctcc1ith centu~" historians
in academic d~pnrtme:1ts were oorn:cnlrating on national social
and c'onomic issues, \\'hich rose out of the culmrnl nationalism
thut prevailed in Llic Western world during 1J1e ninclccmh
ccntul}'.1 Carol Knmmen, an Amcrici!ll l~I historian and author,
has nolcd thal the hislory or the cnrly \\Ti iings on local history in
England and tlle Unilcd Stntcs are similar. She beliC\·cd it is
b..><:ausc the upper clJsses had Che lime to \\lite Justori~ " ith thal
related stories of U1e successful and wealthy people like
lhemscl,·cs.9
The nature of local hiscory scans to be J difficuh subject for
many auU1ors lo define. The most comprehensive dcfini1ions
have been put forth by Cnrol K:i.nun~n for the United States nnd
W. G. Hoskins for England. In The P11rsui1 of low! History:
Readings on 11:cory and Prnclfce, Knmmcn charges nuthors of
AmcricJn locnl history to focus on the ordinary people of a
specific cornn1unity. She also slrcsses lhJl local hiscorians should
not work in a \'acuum nnd need to be nworc or broad liistorical
Jlersjl<:Cti\'es.' 0 She is adamant Iha! ma1crial culture is an
imponanc pan of writing good local history, and Uiat n local
uudiencc is often the primmy target for locnl histories." Prc.-ious
local histories in the United Stales were molivatcd by an
nltachnicnt 10 lhe local community ~ml a curiosity to trncc the
history of tire nrcn in \\'hich the historian lived. The subjects of
10"1] history ha• e included educ:icion, poor relief, rcligio11, and
!\\'.G. 1loskin,;, /~ucal lliJt01}'
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Ionics that often were left untouched bv ocadcmie
h~torians before the 1%Os.11
•
Dcspilc i1s apparent popularily \\'ith the public al lnrgc in the
United Stales, locnl hislory has had a difficult scrngglc 10 become
a pnri of profcrsionnl hislory. This w~s becaus~ the people who
" ere heading local socielics and wri1i112 countv histories were
oficn not tr:1incd academic historians. ii mnde t heir work seem
suspect. Indeed oficn ther~ were good reasons for these low
opinions. 1lowcvcr, there were many avocational historians who
ccntribu(cd distinguished works. Th~')' analyzed their locales ns
case studies for trends in national events. They wccc already
performing the ll'ork that Kanu11cn was promoting.
W.G. Hoskins took an integrated :1pproach to the subjecl in
focnl flistory,• m Englan,/. Like Kammen, Hoskins noles thm
people intcrcs1cd in doing local hi sto~· cherished and were
interested in Uieir O\\n local commw1ity. Hoskins instructs his
renders that a local historian needs to have a good general
knowledge of English hislory to be able to put Lhe. local history in
perspc~i\'e, a scn1irncnt shared by Kammen.
He is also
concerned that loe~I historians seem to concentrate ouly on
documents nnd suggests the use of fieldwork to add depth."
Cullural geography, or cult=! hislory broadly defined, is a
hallmark of Hoskins school of English local hiscory.
Since lhc second edition of Hoskins' book, several nrLiclcs in
British historical ioumals ha\·c rc,·isited local historv. As in lhe
Unilcd States, local history enjoyed a rebirth beginning \\ith
Hoskins first cdi1ion of his book in 1959. which continued into
the 1960s and 1970s as acndcmic historia~ becan to delve into
1hc "new" sociu.l history. Local history provided more details
abo111 Lhc deep structure of communities and "common"
occuraures, as oµposcd to tlie national over\'iew of policies end
economics. There was a parnllcl resurgence in lhe ch~ use of local
history in locnl schools. Sc\'eral authors believed Uiat Joc~I
his1ory, including \•isils 10 museums, can be used as ;1 way 10
1110\ e away from the 1raditional 1cx1book histories and towards o
multi-culturnl ;1ppr0Jch. As in 1he U.S.A .• Great Britain has been
s1:11ggling \\i th its O\\lt debate about the use or history in schools
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an<l lhe question of ins1illing nn1 ional patrioli~m through history.
Some 1hat an introduction to to\\1\ elders and their knowledge of
its hi~lory \\'ould give children a sense of pride and place. 1' 1
Part of lhc problem in lhc dclinino local his101v. and ils \'aluc
lo the general public and the hisiorical profession comes from 1hc
difficulty of pinpointing who exactly can be or is a local historian.
TI1c s1ruggle is similar in 1he United Stales and Engk nd.. Both
Hoskins and Kammcn, and other \\Titcrs on local historv.
conceded 1hat some. local history was wrillcn bv anmtcL;J:~
unt.raincd in his1oricnl metl~ods and \\Tiiing for ·their o\\n
J,'Tali licalion, which produced histories 1hat were innccuratc, nonunalytical, :1nd often lnckcd documentary and l.> ibliogrnphical
refcrcnccs.'- At the same time, I.hey rccogni1.ed that there were
local his1orians \\Tili ng al a scholnrly b\'el. The books thev hm·c
wril!C!l nrc models for local historians lo emulate.
•
Tensions ha\·c sometimes de,·dopcd bot\\-ecn local historians
who arc sent imentally lied to the communitv nnd omsidc
academics using histories of localilies rcmo,·cd j·,·om their 0\\11
e11p~ricncc as case Sl\!dies. In the Cnitcd States, historians such
ns Herbert. G. Gutman in Wo,.k. C11/(11re, mul Society, h;J\·c
work;:d wilhin the realm of local history 10 flesh out their theses.
England has created a Chair of Local liistorv at lhc Uni,·ersilv of
Lciceslcr. But local his1oiy is still sepnr~lcd from the gc~cral
s1udy of histo11·. In the United Stales and England, local historv
is also considered ll1e realm of most muscom profcssionais,
although Hoski11S docs noL include museum sta ff in local
histo1y.16 local museums could benefit from Ilic advice on local
history given in Kammen's works. Museum professionals nnd
local historians in lhc United Stales come together in the
Am~riean Associa1ion for State nnd Local Historv
but often
.>

professional academic historians do not fully recognize this
or2anitmion·s contributions lo historical know!cd2c.
- In England locnl historians and museun~ professionals
cm1linuc work s·~p~rate from those doing history in universities.
llic rifi in England sccws lo be greater, because 1here is wry little
dialogue between 1hc two in professional journals, whereas the
t.:nited Stoics has nctivc discussion on lhe role of museum
profcssionJls and other public historians in both nca<!cmin and the
general public." llislorians in boll1 countries sec a rift beiwecn
the many fncets of history and there is a great clamor for
coo~ration between all branches of history, whether
professional, amateur, student, professor, historians and laymen."
In 1hc United States, museum professionals arc still oflcn
lilbclcd am:lleurs as m;ll, even though academia has crca1cd
trnining programs promoting better historical methods and
c.~pct1isc in run.;ing historical agencies, and techniques for
presenting histoiy to the public.'9 In Great Britain, the gap still
remains wide. The few museum studies proi,>Tams offered in
England arc oflcn separated from history depnrlments and placed
in the realm of art hisloiy, as museums professionals are oflcn
thought of as people who work in nrl galleries. Again, the
Uni\•crsity of Leicester is a leader in museum studies programs
that emphasize history in museums , and that relates museum
"ork to Ilic broader di~ciplinc of history .
Local his1ory and academic rustory arc Slruggling lo find
common ground in th.c Unired Stnles and Great Bri 1~in. Doth
Kammcn and Hoskins charge local his1orians in their respective
e01uuries lo follow acad<:mic standards, e\·en if tl1ey ha,·e nc,·cr
had fom1al training. Local hi.story continues to .hDve a poor
rcput~tion in some quarters, because the earlier histories were
oficn based upon legends and were biased as to "~'ar they
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included and excluded. The reputation also follows museum
professionnls, C'l'Cn after many of them arc being trained in
uni'l'crsit ies. :-01:u1,- histori:ms, <!Cadcmic and otherwise, find \•nluc
in 1hc use of local history in academic studies and in publishi ng
it for the public. Increasingly historiMS, ncadcmic and oth~.,..., ise,
hn..-c cnllcd for all to work together rather than to critici7.c each
other from separate cnmps. 13ccause this is echoed so many tim~s
on both sides of the Atlantic, it is S\1rprising that so lilllc has been
done lo bridge that gap. England r.ml the United States could
learn much from each other by dc,·cloping an exchange between
local historical org;,niz:nions, since the problems associated with
local history :ire oficn quite similar."' A fuller recognition of the
museum profession in iocal historical studies in Engla~d, could,
for example, create new Jllianccs and collaboration sen·ing all
who work in the field.

~'1e11dish. "British .'tssoci~1ion," 62·3~ Lacy E. Tise, .._S1stc and Loc~I
liistory: A ;:Jl i.;.rc frorn the Past."' 111c Public l!iJtOl'i<Jn 1(Sonm1er 197Y): 1.:.
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Reviews
lconocla!Sm: A Historiographical Essay
Lois A. Dickenson
Lnis Di,·k~nson is a gradualc s111de111 nr Easter/! filfnois.
71;iy rtv'/eu1r.:SStJ)' 1'11t.'1S ,,..n·uan for a .'lraduate se1ninnr on
the Ren(1issance and Reformation for Professor Joy
Kommcrling during Fall 1996.
It examines 1/ie
his1orloi;rapliy of iconoclasm aero.rs !lefom;a1im1

Eurape.
istorinns hn,·e long acknowledged thaL Lhc rejection of !he
,·nlidity of image worship, of\cn followed by outbursts of
ico11oclasm, was the hallmark of the Protestiml
Rcform;11ion i11 many communities. Interpretations of the
changes in lh~ popular perception of religious images differ
widely. Some historians have noled on nbnipt, rapid, ~nd
"id..--sprc~d change in imasc perception, while others argue c.'lat
it occurred slo\\'ly and reluctantly on the part of the common
population. The bnsis for iconoclastic acts has also been debated.
Was iconoclasm n natural product of ProlcSlanl theology, or was
iL an expression of local/regional socio-economic or political
factors'/
Alternatively, was iconoclasm an expression of
ritualistic S)111bolism traditional among Lhe general population?
This cssny reviews the scholarly debate on these questions.
Because of tlie multi-faceted dimensions of the problem of
i111ages and iconoclasm during the Reformation, the theses and
arguments examined h<::rcin are dra\\n from several schools of
histori~~I thought-art hisloty, social history. intellooual
history-with the belief that these di ffering approaches contribute
unique i1isigl11s. Like"isc, the broad geographic r:u1ge of
iconoclnstic e,•cnts has prompted the inclusion of ar!,•umcnls
based on incid~nls scattered from France lo Russin. The variance
in loco! bockgrmmd provides not only o basis for exami ning
similnrities and di fferences in Lhe arguments conoeming the basis
for iconocl:l~m. but also provides an opportunity lo examine the
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Gendering Franklin And Eleanor: a Review
lforbara Bur/;e
M.A. in History smdent Barbaro B11rke wrote this rel"/cw
/or l'rofess()r L)nne C11rry's Historiography of Women
n11d Gend~r History Seminar in Spring 1997.
o Ordinary Time, by Doris Keams Good\\'in, is n
biography of Franklin and Eleanor Rooscvch> which
looks :111his incredible husband nnd wife tcnm from !heir
early li•:es, through a disease and an affair \\'hich almost ruined
their lives, to c\·cnlunlly how they managed to rebuild their
relationship on the most 11nus11:1l terms. How 1l1c Rooscrelt's
redefined their rclatio11ship was paralleled by the cfCccls of the
war on the Amcncan heme front and how the country lried to
i-Wcfmc itself in the war's aficrmath. This rc,·icw shows the role
gender played in Good\\in's analysis of the liycs of Franklin and
Elea:ior and compaml her findings \\ith thoS<: of Qlhcc hislorians
looking at eender roles.
A; Do;is Kcnms Goodwin frequently points oul in her book,
Eleanor Roosc,•clL was not lhc 1raditional wife Clf her tim:s. In
foci, she let her husband's secretary, Margu·~ritc " Missy"
LeHand, hnndlc thnl position freeing her to pursue h~r ow11 goals.
Vvbilc Missy pla)•cd the pnrt of FDR' s hostess at parties nnd kcpL
the president company, Eleanor traYeled and visited the American
people. Elcnnor fell ralhcr out of place as hostess lo her
husband's cockta il hour, or filling the social duties of n wom:1n or
her class. She preferred to keep busy doing "ork that was
meaningfu l to her rnthcr lhnn play a merely social role. However,
Eleanor did believe in her right to be the mistress of the \vbite
House and did not liken if others im!X>Sed upon her position.'
Since F111nklin's fight with polio lcfl him paraly7.ed, Eleanor
became instnuncnta! in her husband's political life. Due to his
paralysis, Frnnklin could not mo,·e freely around lhc coun11y as
he would like, so he scnl the !irsl lady in his place to act ns his
eyes and c:1rs. Even before his election to the or!icc oi the
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prcs1denl, Eleanor wns important. A year after FDR contrnctcd
polio, his wdb mnintnincd n busy schedule of appointments and
poliLical meetings in her husband's name so that he would noi be
forgotten He taught her to inspect Slate institutions while he "as
go,·cmor, looking for human clements, so lhal be could bcucr
understand the pccpb. Someone else probably could h:l\-C filled
this position, but Franklin chose Eleanor.
Dw-ing FDR's presidency, she continued in her_role .as
in specter and advisor. Her opinior1s earned a lol of wc1sh1 \\1th
her husband nnd she used this position to urge Franklin to fight
for ci\'il righls, foir labor practices, and the mobilization of
women in the 111ili1nrv. Frequently, she pushed her husband LOthe
breaking point and fii:hts ensued. Through it all, Fran~lin l~l
Eleanor speak her mind and tried not to control her. Frnnkhn
e\'cn allowed Eleonor to influence policy. Trude Pratt Lnsh sovc
the flfsl lady credit [or the ideas behind hN husband ·s four
freedoms, which included the civil rights for which Eleanor hnd
long fought. Perhaps, her f,'TCatesl contribution to ~1er husband:s
presidcm..-y was her appearance at the pany convenbon for F~R s
third nomination. Eleanor did not want to make a sp~h, SlllC¢
a first lady hnd never spoken at a convention before. Ycl he
speech helped to ensure the nomination.
Allhough she broke some traditional roles, Eleanor for the
most part stayed in her sphere. America bCGame Eleanor' Shouse
nnd il's people her children, both of which she had lo watch o:cr
like a eood wiCe and mother. Her inspections primarily dealL w1lh
the si;k, the poor, the working class, and children. She was
dedicntcd to abolishing child labor, improving h1bor laws for
women and esinblishing minimum wages.
Wl;cn the w:ir crunc, Eleanor's main concern was still
domestic affairs. A !rip to the Pacific illuscrated her role nnd
ima«e in the mind of the American people. One soldier who met
El::.;nor saw her nO! as a diplomat for the \\'hilc !louse but os "an
American mother" (464). Elc~nor's O\\TI words reveal how she
tried to confonn 10 traditional ideas of )>'Ol1l:111hood: "ll1e nmction
of a woman is Lo use tl1ings along: smooth them over."
Anolhcr i11tcrcsting aspecl of Eleanor's life was her
rclalionship with her female friends. As a worker for the Lcnguc
of Women Volcrs, Eleanor came into contact with other
politically oriented women, with some of whom she dc\'cloped
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close relationships. Se,·eral of 1he women lvfrs. Roose"clt
befriended, according lo Goc'<h,in. were lesbians. Good\\in
suggests that she was jealous of 1hcsc \\.Qltten's close, caring
relationships. One woman in particular, Lorena Hickok (Hick),
dc,dopcd n special relations hip with the First Ladv und even fell
in lo1·c with her. The two women wro1c mnov letters about their
love nnd their longing lo sec one another· 11·hcn apru1. The
relationshi1' Inter faded as the first lady became increasingly
active in politics.
Good11 in addresses Eleanor's romance in tcnns of her
Victorian backgrowid and refers to Carroll Smith Rosenberg's
study Ros1:nb~rg in "The Female World of Lo"c ~nd Ritual:
Rela1ions Between Women in Nineteenth Century Arncrica,"
srudied correspondence of women of that era in an altempt 10
exami11c female relations in the proper culmrnl and social con1cxt.
M~ny of the le11crs Rosenberg presented show similar
dcc!arntious of lo\'e and the need 10 be together. According 10
Rosenberg, lhis type of desire was nol indicalivc of
homosexuality as much as emo1ional 1ies l;ctwccn women.
Rosenberg \\Tiles, "these female friendships ser\'cd a number of
emotional functions. Within this secure nnd empathetic world
women could share sorrows, anxieties, and joys, confident that
oth:r women had experienced sin1il:ir emotions."1 [).~spite the
fact that !lick fell in 101·c with Elcnnor, Good\\'i n appears to agree
with Rosenberg that, for Eleanor, this relationship filled an
emotional need that coming from n Victorian l1pbringing, only
ano1hcr woman could have fulfilled.
E\·cn though .Elearnr's success was contin!!cnt on her
husbnnd, she w;is nccomplishcd in her 01111 right.
Gallup poll
rnkcn in 1940 re"calcd a 67% apprO\'al rating (higher than her
husband's), \\ilh r.1ost of Uie American people accepting her work
as a part of the national life. This raling e\·cntually dropp.:d as
the First Lady continued 10 fight for the rights of blacks and
labor. The N<11ion honored her at a banquet fer her work in c ivil
rights and for th·: poor, one speaker referred LO her as an
insrilution. She was among the highest paid lecturers in the
counlry and in 1940, before her husband was nomino1.cd for a
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third term, sh: rccci\'cd a five ycrrr c.xLCr!Sion on ber newspaper
column Gooch\in suggests that such success coming from a
woman of Mrs. Roosc\'clt' s position nnd era was rare. \l.l'hile she
docs show that other women, such ns Eleanor's friend Hick. hoo
a career and were respected, no other women held quite a position
of authority and popularity as Eleanor Roosevelt.
Eleanor Roosevelt became the archetype for American
women during the war era. Like many '"°men circumstances
pushed her out of the house and into Uic public sphc.re. Mimy
wome11 took jobs in factories. AL the beginning of the war, the
govemm::ot and other institutions discouraged women wlto
entered the work foroc, such as the Catholic Church, for they
were viewed n threat to the American home and traditional family
values. When the war look it's toU on the male labor force,
however, women were called in ns substitutes. Al the end of the
war women would be expected lo return home.
Howe1·cr, as the author poinlS out, lhcf'e was resistance for a
change of status al the end of tl1e war. Goodwin found that many
women \\'elcomcd Uicir new jobs and responsibilities, with 79%
of women snying tliat they enjoyed working more than sta)~ng at
home. ~l~nor was the model of the change in women's roles at
1his Lime. Ltke many women she was happy out in the work force
and did not care lo lea"e. As Goo<h1in points out '~1e agitation
tl1e sixty-year-old Eleanor felt in not knowing what to do was
echoed in the hearts of millions of American women for whom
the war hnd been a major turning point, creating new
cxpcctntions, new adjuslJllents, new problems" {555).
Eleanor even worked al I.be cosl of her maniage. In 1942
FDR implored his wife to stay at home more, acl as his hostess,
and accompany him on trips. "But over the past decade, " as
Good\\'in obscn·cs, "the e:qiericncc of becoming a political force
in her 0\\11 right had brought with it n profowidly different sense
of self-of independence, competence, and confidence. II joining
her husband now meant gi"ing up the life she had built for
hcrscl!: it sccmcxl a great deal 10 ask" (3 72).
There were women who fell differently. For example
Eleanor's daughlcr Arme lo"ed her new job and rcspo11sibili1ics
for awhile, but after a time she encouraged her husband lo come
home for she could 110 longer handle the problems without him.
This seems more in line with Drew Gilpin Faust's findings in
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Mothers of ln•'f:nlinn. In this book F;111s1 looks nt wcalthv
south-::m women in the Ciril War and how thcv dealt 111th th~
changes that the war hnd on gender roles. These.women grew U(l
in a world of protection and privilege unable to d~al \\ith the new
rol es nml responsibilities the war brought. Al times, the "o:ncn
broke gender roles by verbally assaulting enemy soldiers, by
playing the spy, or by wearing mzn's clothes, ya they always
retreated behind their gender.' Faust claims that the women
question " the desirnbility of female independence or
emancipation.•·• But she points out, much like Good11i11, tlrnt
circumstances had changed and not everything could go back 10
the way it wns.
As stated abo\·e, Good\\in also addressed tl1e hcsitancv of
allowing women into traditional male roles such a.~ !.he \~-Ork
force. A woman's mnin function was to sc.e to their homes and
th; r.1ising of their children. Good\,;n \\Tote of pcopk's concerns
nbout the b1·cakdown of family values if women entered the work
force. These same issues arc addressed in Christine Stansell's
article "Women., Child:cn, and lhc Uses of lhc St=ts: Class and
Gender Contlict in New York City. 1850-1 860." Due to the
number of women working, children ran loose on the slrecls.
Some yout hs tum~d towards picking up bc1tlcs and garbage for
money, others lo se!li11g themselves on the streets. Stansell finds
lhal New York's middle class was 1•cry upscl al 1hc prescucc of
such children on the streets and tried to rc;iffinn tl1eir domestic
idenls upon the wqrking class. They encouraged women to erealc
a good home cm·ironmc.11., which included keeping a clean home
and wntching o\·cr their children.' Goodwin found that c,·cn in
the 1940's the same ideals hold true. As the war came ended
women's joumals and 010\·ies encouraged females to leave their
jobs nnd return to their place as caretakers or Ilic hearth.
\\>llile Eleanor' s break from traditional female roles is
implied throughout the book, Franklin's masculinity is hardly
mentioned. This appears to be a silent sta1c111enl that while
11)t'C\\. Gil?.Jl fau>t •.'. /"'1oers Qfbnwuioti (Ch::.pct Hill, 1996).
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Eleanor did somclhing tumsual by going outside her lraditioual
sphete and entering into politics, Franklin's life in politics was
perfectly natural. Fr~nklin Rooscrclt was presented by Goo<h1in
as a slrong leader, \\·ho was forced to deal with U1e problems of
tl1e United Swtcs :ind the world He had to constantly balance
public opinion witl1 his policy. Goodwin often r~ferred to the
pr~sidcnl's inabi lity to have deep personal relationships.
FDR, along with his friend Winston Churchill, took a certain
omounl. of pleasure in mobilizing nnd waging war. Upon seeing
Churchill's m~p room, Roose\'ell ordered one made for himself.
He took pride in seeing the gro"lh of the military and re\·ie1,ing
the troops. Upon visiting the men in Africa, Goodwin reports
" the sight of so many young Americans in good health and high
spirirs wns n tonic for the soul" (405). £1.::anor described lhe
President and the Prime Minister making war plans like two boys
playing soldier. Such idc:1lized male views of wnr arc also found
in The Grcm Adventure by Michael C.C. Adams. In his piece
Adams writes how men traditionally found joy and cleansing in
war, not to mention the fact that war was viewed as an honorable
way 10 die. Furthennore, m<:n in the trenches, much like
Rooscvcll and Churchill in the mnp room, found male
companionship during war.• According to Goodwin, Roosevelt
nlso held this romantici7.cd view of war.
Because the President faced the troubles of the nm ion nnd the
war all day long, it was important for him to come home and
rcl5x. Eleanor could nol be the type of companion Franklin
i'olmd in Missy. Missy looked up al Franklin witl1 adoring eyes,
sh~ repeatedly listened lOhis stories, hosted his parties, and made
his life more comfortab le: a trnd ilional wifely role. In facl,
Missy "ns referred tons FDR' s other wiCc. Home was to be the
plaoc where Franklin could escape !lie outside world, and
lhrouglloul his li fe he fow1d women to make this place for him.
Although Frnnklin Roosevelt contracted polio DI a young age,
he remained aClive in sports. He tried hard al nn e.-.rly age to
excel in school nnd ad,•ance his positio11 in socictv. While his
father Iaught him " how to row and sail, and skate ·nnd sled" his
moth~r focused more on his moral leaching, taking him \\ilh her
while she visited the sick and the poor (75-80). 111 "The habit of
6.'vli..:h::-.;l C.C. Ad.a1ns. Tit' G n:c:l 1JJvcuu1u•-t (Bloorning1on: 1990).
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''iclorf: the American military and the cult o[manlin~ss," Donald
J. Mro7.ck examines three different masculine models. Mrozek
points out how fathers lend IO emphasize tl1e Masculine Achiever,
an idc:i based on a strong, active, aggcssive mdc stereotype,
"hile mothers tend to emphasize the Christian Gcntkman a~ idea
based on right actions, compossion and restraint. RooseYclt 's
parents appeared lo fit this pallcrn.
Fr.inklin himself seems to fit into the third cntcgory, the
Masculine Primiti,·c model, in which n man slrivcs 10 ncl1ie,·e the
strength of body and personality of th e Masculine Achiever but
relics on his primiliN instincts for sur\'ival. Although Donnld
Mrozek studies middle-class boys, Franklin seems to fit in since
he was comp~t iti,·e in college and ~t sports. Mrozek states that
"competition and physical challenge were important tests of
manhood."' Good\\in orten shows Franklin 's fight "ilh polio as
an importnnl chnlknge which changed his life, for he wos able 10
conquer it and continue.
hen though FDR contracted polio long before he ran for
president, most people did nol know that Ilic leader of the world's
most powerful country was crippled. He was proof thnt being
crippled did nol make. one less o[ a rnnn, This compJrc to the
findings in Sonya Michel's "Danger On The Home Front:
Motherhood, S;xuality, :lrld Disabled Vclcrans in American
Postwar Films.~ In three of !he mo,·ies c.~amined hy Miche l,
disubili1ics suffered from the war, esp!cially amputmions were
viewed as cm11sculating, for a mr:n wns expected to be the
)lrO\·ider nnd protector. If he were crippled he would be tumble
to fulfill this role. Furthcnnorc, !he man then became d~pcndcnt
on his \\i'.e or i;irlfricnd.
FDR was nn example of how a mnn with a major disability
could overcome and go on l.O succeed in the world of politics, ~
traditional nrnlc sphere. Michel also finds in her sludy !hat in t\\'o
o f tl1e post-World War II films lhc womcn of the injured \'Clerans
"were not onl~· lo surrender their jobs, but also to subordinme
!heir o\•ns dreams, ambilions, and desires to those o f the

\'Clcrnns."' This did not npply lo the relationship between
Franklin and Eleanor. Eleanor's power was increased nr1cr her
husband's pamlysis, and furthermore Franklin encourngcd iL by
teaching her how to become an inspeclor and sending her out in
his nrunc. Eleanor doesn't subordinate herself to her husband just
beer.use he was in a wheelchair.
Good11-in understands gender better frpm a woman's point of
view. She covers Eleanor's personal gT0\\1h and break from
iradilional gender roles in f,'fCaL detail. She compares Eleanor's
e."pcricncc to thal of American women as a whole during the war.
She clearly showed that women enjoyed !heir new found
freedoms nnd mnny refused to give them up nl the cod o f the w(tr,
much like the first l;:dy herself. On the other lrnnd, Goodwin is
ratl:cr "ague when it comes to men and their ge.'lde.r roles. Her
silence on such issues is a s1rong statement. Men were made for
wnr, it w<is their job to play politics and fight on the front lin~s.
Howc\'cr, she misses two important aspects. How did men feel
about the roles they were assi(;ncd? Moreover, how docs the
ordinary m~n feel about the world of gend::r turned up;;ide dom1?
NQ Ordinary Tima is an appropriate title for this book, and
Goodwin \\rites more than just an ordinary biography. She docs
an excellent job o f paralleling !he lives of Franklin and Eleanor
Roosc,·clt to this remarkable time in American history. Just as
the rclaliooship between this husband and wife would undergo
major changes during a time of crisis, so would the American
home front Nei 01cr would ever be the same.
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